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Vietnam: A Twenty Year Retrospective
Matthew Lippman*
January 23, 1993 marks the twentieth anniversary of the sign-
ing of the Paris Peace Accords between the United States and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.' This Treaty ended American in-
volvement in the Vietnam War. The twentieth anniversary of the
termination of the conflict provides an opportunity to review the in-
ternational legal controversy surrounding the war and to begin to
assess the war's significance.2
Initially, the historical roots of the Vietnam conflict are
sketched. Then, the debate over the international legality of United
States involvement in Vietnam and the refusal of American courts to
address the justifiability of American intervention are outlined. The
next section presents an overview of United States military tactics
and strategies. The judiciary's refusal to definitively determine the
legality of American involvement in Vietnam sent a signal that the
American leadership was free to disregard the rule of law in the
prosecution of the war. A sophisticated technological assault was
launched against a third world guerilla army which resulted in an
infamous record of war crimes for which neither ordinary combat-
ants nor military and civilian leaders were held accountable. While
the rule of law was abandoned abroad, it was strictly enforced at
home. Those who refused to serve in Vietnam or who engaged in
civil disobedience against the war were portrayed as threatening so-
cial stability and were subjected to criminal prosecution and punish-
ment. Americans have yet to confront their moral responsibility for
the damage inflicted upon innocent Vietnamese. The "kicking of the
* Ph.D, J.D., LL.M.; Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice,
University of Illinois at Chicago.
1. Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (Jan. 27,
1973), T.I.A.S. No. 7542, 12 I.L.M. 58.
2. There have been few efforts to review the legality of the Vietnam War under interna-
tional law. For a reassessment of the constitutionality of American involvement in Vietnam,
see John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part : The (Troubled) Constitutionality
of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990); John Hart Ely, The American
War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of the War They didn't Tell Us About, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990). Readers will appreciate that it is necessary to selectively utilize
sources in writing an article about such a complex subject. Arguments inevitably must be
simplified or summarized. A best survey of the issues surrounding the Vietnam War is con-
tained in four edited volumes sponsored by the American Society of International Law. See I-
IV THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.A. Falk ed., 1968).
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Vietnam Syndrome" requires that the United States begin to make
amends and to persuade the rest of the world that it is willing to
adhere. to the rule of law rather than to rely upon military muscle.
I. The Roots of the Conflict
The history of Vietnam is characterized by a struggle to break
the manacles of foreign domination and occupation.3 Modern
Vietnamese history is dated from roughly 208 B.C. when a renegade
Chinese warlord invaded the Red River Delta. A Sino-Vietnamese
autonomous kingdom was established which persisted until 111 B.C.
when the territory was annexed and reconstituted as a Chinese prov-
ince.4 The Vietnamese admired and absorbed many aspects of Chi-
nese civilization. However, in 939 A.D. they revolted and declared
their independence.5 In the early fifteenth century the Chinese reas-
serted their control over Vietnam, only to be expelled in 1427 A.D.
by the great warrior* Le Loi.8 Despite their independence, the
Vietnamese remained in constant fear of domination by their north-
ern neighbor and continued to pay tribute to the Chinese Emperor.
7
The Vietnamese now were free to direct their energies towards
securing the underbelly of their country and, thus, began to expand
southward. In 1471 the Vietnamese overran the Indonesian kingdom
of Champa. The boundaries of modern Vietnam were completed in
the seventeenth century when the Vietnamese asserted control over
the Khmer controlled Mekong River Delta.8 During the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, political power was divided between the
Trinh in the north and the Nguyen in the south.9 The country finally
was unified by Emperor Gia Long who ruled between 1802 and
1820. Gia Long was succeeded by three other Nguyen emperors
whose reign lasted until 1883.10
The Nguyen emperors attempted to insulate Vietnam from
western influence. They were particularly suspicious of French Cath-
olic missionaries whom they viewed as the first wave of an impend-
3. Vietnam has been described as an "S" running from the southern border of China to
the tip of the Indochinese peninsula. It stretches for more than 1,200 miles, nearly equaling
the length of the entire Pacific Coast of the continental United States. Vietnam is comprised of
127,000 square miles. The country's width varies from as little as thirty-three to as much as
three hundred miles. GEORGE M. KAHIN & JOHN W. LEWIS, THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM
3 (Rev. ed. 1967).
4. JOHN T. MCALISTER, JR., VIET NAM. THE ORIGINS OF REVOLUTION 17-8 (1969).
The kingdom of Viet Nam was comprised of present-day Vietnam and southern China. Id. at
17.
5. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Roy Jumper & Marjorie W. Normand, Vietnam: The Historical Background, in
VIET NAM HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 10, 12 (1965).
7. MCALISTER, supra note 4, at 21.
8. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 5.
9. Jumper & Normand, supra note 6, at 15.
10. Id. at 16-18.
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ing western storm which threatened to engulf Vietnam." The emper-
ors' repressed the French missionaries-imprisoning, expelling, and
executing the Christian crusaders. 12 This repression provided the
pretext for a joint Franco-Spanish task force to invade Danang. In
February 1859, the joint force turned south and captured Saigon.
Spanish ambitions were focused on Latin America, and they had lit-
tle interest in remaining in Asia. French colonial ambition, however,
remained unrequited, and by 1883, they had extended their control
over the entire territory of Vietnam.13
The French attempted to discourage the assertion of
Vietnamese nationalism by dividing the country into three adminis-
trative units which both reflected and promoted regional and cultural
differences. 4 Governmental power was concentrated in a colonial
elite which displaced the indigenous Confucian trained administra-
tors. 1 5 The French asserted exclusive control over mineral extraction,
the rubber industry, manufacturing and monopolizing the sale of al-
cohol, opium and salt. This deprived many Vietnamese of their liveli-
hood and inflated prices. Peasants were further impoverished by high
taxes and interest rates and found themselves dispossessed from their
land. The land was consolidated into large plantations and the peas-
ants were reduced to a condition of serfdom in which they lived and
worked under conditions approximating peonage."6 At the same
time, there were few opportunities for the privileged few Vietnamese
who managed to obtain a French education." Nationalists who ad-
vocated reform or revolution were jailed and most fled abroad.' 8
In the nineteenth century, there were some localized and loosely
organized rebellions which were motivated by a fear that traditional
Vietnamese society was being uprooted and supplanted by continen-
tal culture. Vietnamese opposition movements in the first quarter of
the twentieth century became increasingly nationalistic and couched
their appeals in terms of revolutionary doctrine and communism.' 9
The destruction of the nationalist Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) in the
1930s led to the emergence of the Indochinese Communist Party
headed by Ho Chi Minh as the major opposition force.2 0 HO pos-
sessed strong nationalist credentials. As early as 1919, he had ad-
11. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 5, 8.
12. Jumper & Normand, supra note 6, at 18-19.
13. Id. at 19.
14. MCALISTER, supra note 4, at 43-45. Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin are Chinese
and Western terms applied to the territorial divisions in Vietnam. Id. at 43.
15. Jumper & Normand, supra note 6, at 22.
16. Id. at 23.
17. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 10.
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. MCALISTER, supra note 4, at 56.
20. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 11.
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dressed a memorandum to the Great Powers at the Versailles Con-
ference demanding self-determination for the Indochinese.21 On the
eve of World War II, the Communist Party remained the strongest
and best organized revolutionary force in Vietnam. The party at-
tracted support and allegiance from a wide'array of Vietnamese and
was in the vanguard of opposition to French colonialism.22
The Japanese seized the opportunity created by the Nazi inva-
sion of France in 1940 to demand that the French recognize Japa-
nese sovereignty over Indochina. The Japanese were content to leave
the French administration and security forces in place while reserv-
ing the right of transit through Indochina as well as asserting control
over military facilities and economic resources.23 The Indochihese
Communist Party assumed the leadership of the Vietnam Doc Lap
Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnamese Independence League), or Vietminh,
which was the national front resistance organization.2 4 Recognizing
that the Vietminh was the most formidable opposition force in Indo-
china, the United States funneled'assistance to Vietminh guerrillas.
In return, the Vietminh helped to rescue American pilots and pro-
vided intelligence to the Allied Forces.
25
As the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, the Vietminh entered
and seized Hanoi and Saigon. They formed the Provisional Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and on September 2,
1945, they declared Vietnam a sovereign state.26 In a statement rem-
iniscent of the American Declaration of Independence, Ho Chi Minh
publicly proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic
Vietnam (DRV) on September 2, 1945:
We hold truths that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness . ..
We are convinced that the Allies who have recognized the
principles of equality of peoples at the Conferences of Teheran
and San Francisco cannot but recognize the Independence of
Viet Nam.
A people which has so stubbornly opposed the French domi-
nation for more than 80 years, a people who, during these last
years, so doggedly ranged itself and fought on the Allied side
against Fascism, such a people has the right to be free; such a
people must be independent.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 16-17.
25. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
26. Id. at 18-19. Bao Dai, the "puppet king" of Annam for twenty years under both the
French and the Japanese, abdicated in favor of the new regime. Id. at 18.
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For these reasons, we, the members of the Provisional Gov-
ernment of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, solemnly de-
clare to the world:
'Viet Nam has the right to be free and independent and, in
fact, has become free and independent. The people of Viet Nam
decide to mobilize all their spiritual and material forces and to
sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their right
of Liberty and Independence.'"
The unified Democratic Republic of Vietnam was short-lived.
The victorious Allied Powers divided Vietnam at the sixteenth paral-
lel. The British were given a mandate in the south and the Chinese
in the north. Both were to detain, disarm, and repatriate the remain-
ing Japanese troops.2 8 The British immediately declared martial law,
suppressed the media, disarmed the Vietminh police and militia and
then turned control back to the French." In contrast, the Chinese
fulfilled the terms of their mandate and recognized the de facto au-
thority of the Vietminh.30 The French, however, were determined to
regain control of the entire country of Vietnam. On February 28,
1946, the Chinese agreed to withdraw from the north. In return,
France renounced all their extraterritorial rights in China and trans-
ferred their concessions in Canton, Hankow and Shanghai to the
Chinese. The Allied Powers clearly had no interest in establishing an
independent and unified Vietnam. The Vietnamese found themselves
bereft of allies, debilitated by the war and weakened by the looting
of their economy by the Chinese. They realized that they were una-
ble to effectively challenge the French and felt compelled to enter
into an agreement.3 1
The French adamantly refused to assent to Vietnamese indepen-
dence. Instead, they rather ambiguously agreed to recognize the Re-
public of Vietnam as a "free state which has its government, its par-
liament, its army, and its finances, as is a part of the Indochinese
Federation and of the French Union."32 The French also pledged to
conduct a referendum concerning the unification of Vietnam. The
Vietnamese, in turn, promised to "receive the French Army in a
peaceful manner.
33
27. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(1945) in VIETNAM A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS 28, 29-30 (Gareth Porter ed., 1979).
28. Harold Isaacs, Independence for Vietnam? in VIETNAM HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND
OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 37, 42-43 (1965).
29. Id. at 44-47.
30. Id. at 51.
31. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 25.
32. Preliminary Franco- Vietnamese Convention, Mar. 6, 1946, in VIETNAM A HISTORY
IN DOCUMENTS 42, art. I (Gareth Porter ed., 1979).
33. Id. at art. 2. See also Franco- Vietnamese Modus Vivendi, Sept. 14, 1946 in Id. at
VIETNAM
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This bilateral agreement reduced tensions. However, it quickly
became apparent that the French had no intention of relinquishing
their claim to Vietnam. Negotiations between the two parties con-
cerning Vietnamese autonomy were unproductive and stalled. The
French then announced they planned to establish a Vietnamese gov-
ernment which was sympathetic to French interests."4 Tensions be-
tween the parties escalated. On November 23, 1946, the French ini-
tiated a naval bombardment of Haiphong, killing six thousand
Vietnamese civilians.35 The French demanded that the DRV recog-
nize French military control over the Haiphong and the surrounding
area. On December 8, the French continued their offensive and occu-
pied Hanoi. The Vietminh withdrew their forces into the rural areas
and retaliated by initiating a coordinated attack against the
French."8
On June 5, 1948, the French installed Bo Dai as Emperor of the
State of Vietnam. 7 In 1949, the United States began to assist the
French in their struggle against the Vietnamese, and in February
1950, America extended diplomatic recognition to the Bo Dai gov-
ernment. 8 United States involvement was based on Vietnam's stra-
tegic significance as a bulwark against the ambitions of the newly-
installed Communist Chinese regime. American officials no longer
viewed the struggle between the French and Vietnamese as a local-
ized colonial conflict. Ho Chi Minh and his supporters increasingly
were perceived as a central component in the international commu-
nist conspiracy. The clash in Vietnam now was elevated into a litmus
test of the determination of western democracies to resist the spread
of Communism in Southeast Asia. It was believed that defeat in Vi-
etnam would lead to the growth of the "red menace" throughout
Southeast Asia and eventually to Japan.39 The Soviet Union and
34. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 26.
35. Id. at 27.
36. GEORGE M. KAHIN, INTERVENTION How AMERICA BECAME INVOLVED IN VIETNAM
24 (1986).
37. See The Ha Long Bay Agreement June 5, 1948, in VIET-NAM CRISIS A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY VOLUME I: 1940-1956 117 (Allan W. Cameron ed. 1971) [hereinafter Cam-
eron]. The French commitment to Vietnam appears to have been based on a fear that the loss
of the country would lead to a crumbling of their entire colonial empire. As early as 1950,
France's military expenditure in Vietnam surpassed the total of all French investments in In-
dochina. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 27.
38. United States Recognition of Increased Sovereignty in the State of Viet-Nam: Note
from United States Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup to H.M. BAo Dai, Jan. 27, 1950 in
id. at 143. See also United States Recognition of Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia: Statement
by the Department of State, Feb. 7, 1950 in id. at 146. Thirty other States accorded recogni-
tion to the Bao Dai government. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 31. American support for
the French campaign in Vietnam grew from roughly 150 million dollars per year in 1950 to
over one billion dollars in fiscal year 1954, when the United States was paying roughly eighty
per cent of the cost of the war. Announced expenditures in 1955 equalled one-third of the
entire American foreign aid program. Id. at 32.
39. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 31.
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People's Republic of China responded by according diplomatic rec-
ognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.4 ° The French re-
sponded by characterizing the Sino-Soviet action as violative of in-
ternational law, since the "sole legitimate government of Viet-Nam
is the government formed by H.M. Bao Dai, to which the French
Government has transferred the rights of sovereignty which it previ-
ously held."' 1 Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed that the
Kremlin's recognition of "Ho Chi Minh's Communist movement in
Indochina . . . should remove any illusions as to the 'nationalist' na-
ture of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in his true colors as the
mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina."' 42
By mid-1953, the Vietminh controlled all but a small portion of
the country. 43 France's dead, wounded, missing, and captured to-
talled more than ninety thousand over the course of the six year con-
flict. French military spending was double the total it had received in
United States assistance under the Marshall Plan. 4 4 In desperation,
the French launched a major military offensive termed the "Navarre
Plan." This effort culminated in a disastrous defeat at Dienbienphu
in 1954. Dienbienphu was a fortress situated in a valley on the for-
mer Vietminh invasion route into Laos at the western extremity of
northern Vietnam. The French strategy was to induce the Vietminh
to attack the heavily armed fortress. The French calculated that
their heavy artillery and aircraft would then crush the Vietnminh.
The French, however, underestimated the ardor and size of the
forces arrayed against them.4'5 They quickly realized that their forces
were on the verge of a devastating defeat.
France urgently requested American intervention. The specter
of a Vietminh victory sparked a major debate within the Eisenhower
administration. Some advocated the deployment of nuclear weapons.
Others were reluctant to risk a possible conflict with China. In the
end, the lack of Congressional and British support for such an en-
deavor tilted the scales against American involvement. On May 7,
1954, after two months of fighting, the French capitulated and the
Vietminh flag was raised over Dienbienphu. 41 American intelligence
40. Recognition of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam by the People's Republic of
China, Jan. 15, 18, 1950 in Cameron, supra note 37, at 142; Recognition of the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam by the Soviet Union January 20, 1950 in Cameron, supra note 37, at
143. See generally 1952 Policy Statement by U.S. on Goals in Southeast Asia, Neil Sheehan
et al., THE PENTAGON PAPERS 27 (1971) [hereinafter Sheehan].
41. French Government Protest against Soviet Recognition of the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam, January 31, 1950, Cameron, supra note 37, at 144.
42. Secretary of State Dean Acheson: Statement on Soviet Recognition of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam, February 1,1950, Cameron, supra note 37, at 145. at 145.
43. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 35-36.
44. STANLEY KARNOW. VIETNAM A HISTORY 203 (rev. ed. 1991).
45. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 36-37.
46. KARNOW, supra note 44, at 214.
VIETNAM
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
indicated that the Vietminh now controlled the country and, had
elections been held, Ho Chi Minh would have won eighty percent of
the vote. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed with the American as-
sessment and concluded that virtually all'of Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia were under or subject to, imminent Vietminh control.
4 7
The French position in Indochina now had become untenable-the
next morning in Geneva, nine national delegations convened to dis-
cuss a peace settlement."
The Geneva Conference drafted two separate but interrelated
instruments. The first was a set of bilateral armistice agreements be-
tween the DRV and France and between the DRV and the Franco-
Laotian and Royal Khmer army commands. The second was a mul-
tinational, thirteen-point, Final Declaration orally endorsed by the
DRV, France, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. The
United States and the State of Vietnam refused to endorse the
Declaration .49
The DRV and France entered into the Agreement on the Cessa-
tion of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. 50 Article 1 established a provisional
military demarcation line. The People's Army of Vietnam were to
withdraw and regroup to the north of the line and the forces of the
French Union to the south.51 This process was to be completed
within three hundred days. 52 "Pending the general elections which
will bring about the unification of Viet Nam, ' 53 administration of
the southern zone was to be in the hands of the French while admin-
istration of the northern zone was to be the responsibility of the
Vietminh. 54 The introduction of reinforcements in the form of arms,
munitions, and other war materials was prohibited. 55 No military
base under the control of a foreign State was to be established in
either zone. The two Signatory Parties also were required to ensure
that the zones did not enter into any military alliances and were not
used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive pol-
icy. 56 Each Party also pledged to refrain from any reprisals or dis-
47. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 53.
48. KARNOW, supra note 44, at 214. The Vietnminh experienced greater success in the
North than in the South. They were able to garrison and easily supply northern troops from
China. In the south they also competed for loyalty with various charismatic religious cults. F.
FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE THE VIETNAMESE AND THE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM 88-89
(1972).
49. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 61.
50. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (July 20, 1954) in Cameron,
supra note 37, at 288.
51. Id. at art. 1.
52. Id. at art. 2.
53. Id. at art. 14(a).
54. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, art. 14(a), in Cameron, supra
note 37; see also art. 8.
55. Id. at art. 17(a).
56. Id. at art. 19.
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crimination against persons or organizations on account of their ac-
tivities during the Indochinese conflict and guaranteed to protect
democratic liberties.5 7 During the period in which troops were with-
drawn and transferred, civilians were to be "permitted and helped"
to move between zones."8 An International Commission was estab-
lished, charged with responsibility for the control and supervision of
the agreement.59 The Commission was to decide most issues by ma-
jority vote.8" However, questions concerning violations or threats of
violations which might lead to a resumption of hostilities were to be
decided by a unanimous vote."'
The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was based on an
exchange of territory for elections. The Vietminh temporarily ceded
land in exchange for a commitment by the French to conduct a na-
tional election.8" Absent this assurance, the Vietnamese undoubtedly
would never have entered into an armistice agreement. a It also was
significant that both Moscow and Peking desired to end the conflict
and pressured the Vietnamese to accept the terms of the accord. "
The Chinese feared that a perpetuation of the conflict would lead to
American intervention in Vietnam. This would pose a threat to
China's southern flank.65 The Soviet Union hoped that the termina-
tion of hostilities in Vietnam would lead France to redeploy its In-
dochinese troops in Europe. This would bolster NATO forces and
undercut the argument that there was a need to rearm Germany as a
bulwark against Soviet expansionism. 6 The United States did not
support the French decision to enter into negotiations with the
Vietnamese. However, the Americans were hoping for French coop-
eration in a proposed new European defense alliance and feared that
pressuring the French to stand firm would strain their bilateral
relationship.
7
The day after the signing of the armistice agreement, the Final
Declaration of the Geneva Conference was endorsed by the United
57. Id. at art. 14(c).
58. Id. at art. 14(d).
59. Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, art. 14(a), in Cameron, supra
note 37.
60. Id. at art. 41.
61. Id. at art. 42.
62. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying texts.
63. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 61. The Treaty of Independence of the State of Viet-Nam
(June 4, 1954) in Cameron, supra note 37, at 268, in article 2 provides that "(South) Vietnam
shall take over from France all the rights and obligations resulting from international treaties
or conventions contracted by France ...." This provision meant that Vietnam would succeed
to France's obligations to conduct an election. The Treaty of Independence of the State of
Viet-Nam (June 4, 1954) in Cameron, supra note 37, at 268, art. 2.
64. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 57.
65. Id. at 56.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Id. at 54-55.
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Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and Laos as well as
by France and the Vietminh.68 The United States69 and the State of
Vietnam only "noted" the Declaration.7 0 The Declaration expressed
"satisfaction" at the ending of the hostilities71 and took notice of
provisions in the armistice agreement which prohibited the introduc-
tion of foreign troops and military personnel as well as arms and
munitions 2 and banned foreign military basess.7  The Conference
proclaimed that the "essential purpose" of the agreement relating to
Vietnam was to "settle military questions with a view to ending hos-
tilities" and recognized that "the military demarcation line is provi-
sional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a
political or territorial boundary."'7 The Conference also declared
that general elections should be conducted in July, 1956, under the
supervision of an international commission .7 The Declaration clearly
anticipated a unified and democratic Vietnam. It proclaimed that
political problems were to be settled on the basis of respect for the
principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The
Vietnamese people also were to "enjoy the fundamental freedoms,
guaranteed by democratic institutions which were established as a
result of free general elections by secret ballot.
'76
The Declaration reaffirmed that individuals and their property
must be protected and that the Parties must "allow everyone in Viet
Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live."77 The Confer-
ence emphasized that the French and Vietminh should not permit
"individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collabo-
rated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against
members of such persons' families. '78 Each member of the Geneva
Conference also undertook "to respect the sovereignty, the indepen-
dence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam and "to refrain from any interference in their internal af-
fairs."79 In conclusion, the Conference pledged to consult one an-
other on any question which may be referred to them by the Interna-
tional Supervisory Commission and agreed "to study such measures
68. The Verbatim Record of the Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina [Extracts], July
21, 1954, in Cameron, supra note 37, at 308-14.
69. Id. at 314-15.
70. Id. at 315.
71. Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference (July 21, 1956), 2, in Cameron, supra
note 37, at 305.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. at 1 5.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference (July 21, 1956), 7, in Cameron, supra
note 37, at 305.
77. Id. at s 8.
78. Id. at t 9.
79. Id. at 12.
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as may provide necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam are respected.1
80
The United States was not completely averse to the settlement.
A temporary Western presence in South Vietnam was preserved as a
bulwark against Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. 81 However,
the ghost of the recent loss of China to the Communists still haunted
American domestic politics. The Eisenhower Administration did not
want to appear to be acquiescing in the creation of yet another Com-
munist beachhead in Asia. As a result, the United States refused to
formally endorse the Geneva Agreement. John Foster Dulles dis-
tanced himself from the settlement by sending his deputy Walter
Bedell Smith to the final sessions of the Conference. 82 As previously
noted, the most Smith was willing to do was to "take note" of the
Geneva Accords. 8n The United States also announced that it would
"refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb" the Accords and
stated that it would view "any renewal of the aggression in violation
of the aforesaid Agreements with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security." 8
The United States also entered a significant reservation. It did
not endorse paragraph 13 in which the Conference agreed to "con-
sult" concerning those measures which may prove necessary to en-
force the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. 85 This reflected
the United States' view that the United Nations was the proper body
to supervise the armistice and to conduct elections.8 The United
States also suggested that it was not ready to endorse any arrange-
ment which might interfere with the right to self-determination of
the French-sponsored State of Vietnam. 87 Emboldened by the refusal
of the United States to explicitly endorse the Accords, the State of
Vietnam also took "note" of the armistice between the French and
80. Id. at 13.
81. The United States view of a minimally acceptable settlement is set forth in, KAHIN,
supra note 36, at 54.
82. Id. at 64-65.
83. See Verbatim Record of the Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina [Extracts], in
Cameron, supra note 37, at 314 (United States Declaration).
84. Id.
85. Id. The United States only took "note" of "paragraphs I to 12." Id.
86. Id. at 315. Kahin suggests that this provided a basis for the United States to object
to any national elections which were not conducted under ihe aegis of the United Nations.
KAHIN, supra note 36, at 65.
87. The Verbatim Record of the Eighth Plenary Session on Indochina [Extracts], in
Cameron supra note 37, at 315 (United States Declaration).
With respect to the statement made by the Representative of the State of
Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are
entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement
which would hinder this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or
does indicate any departure from this traditional position.
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the Vietminh.88
America refused to accept the inevitability of a unified Vietnam
led by Ho Chi Minh. The United States quickly constructed a multi-
lateral military mantle over the southern State of Vietnam. In Sep-
tember 1954, America and its allies met in Manilla in the Philip-
pines and organized the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO). Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained that the
United States and the free nations of Southeast Asia now confronted
66a common danger, the danger that stems from international com-
munism and its insatiable ambition." '89 The inroads achieved in Indo-
china, in Dulles' view, were "bridgeheads" to be used to achieve fur-
ther territorial gains. 90  As President Eisenhower had earlier
explained, the Communists were engaged in a "domino" strategy:
"You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one,
and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go
over very quickly." 91 Dulles argued that the only way to deter and to
defeat such aggression was to agree to collectively combat Commu-
nist belligerency.9" This was not only a matter of self-interest, but it
was also a moral obligation: "Those of us who are free and strong
and not yet instantly imperiled are bound in honor to prove that
freedom can protect those who, at immense sacrifice, are faithful to
freedom."
9 3
In Article IV of the SEATO Treaty, the Signatory Parties-
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, the United
Kingdom and the United States-pledged to act against "aggression
by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Par-
ties or against any State or territory which the Parties [may] desig-
nate . . . in accordance with its constitutional processes. 1 4 In cases
88. Id.
89. John F. Dulles, SEA TO: Dulles Explains the Purposes, in AMERICA IN VIETNAM A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 172 (William A. Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyed Gardner &
Walter LaFeber eds. 1985).
90. Id.
91. Dwight D. Eisenhower, COUNTING THE DOMINOES, in AMERICA IN VIETNAM A DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY 156 (William A. Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner & Wal-
ter LeFeber eds. 1985).
92. Dulles, supra note 89, at 172.
93. Id. at 174.
94. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty with Protocol and Understanding by
the United States Sept. 8, 1954, art. IV(l) 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 81, in Cameron, supra note 37,
at 342 [hereinafter SEATO Treaty].
As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast
Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general
area of the Southwest Pacific no including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees
30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend
this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding
to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty
area.
Id. at art. VIII.
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in which the territorial integrity, political independence, or, sover-
eignty of any Party or designated State or territory in thetreaty area
is "threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected
or threatened by any . . . situation which might endanger the peace
of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree
on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.","
Article IV further stipulated that no action on the territory of any
State or territory shall be undertaken except at the "invitation or
with the consent of the government concerned." 96 The Signatory
Parties to the SEATO Treaty unanimously designated "Cambodia
and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of
Vietnam" as protected States under the SEATO Treaty.
97
The Republic of (North) Vietnam charged that the SEATO
Treaty violated the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference
which stipulated that the two zones shall not be incorporated into
any military alliance. 98 The Republic charged that SEATO was a
"flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements, an infringement upon
the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam . . . and . . . a threat
to the security and peace of the peoples of South East Asia." '99
The United States now replaced the French as the central ally
and financial supporter of the State of (South) Vietnam.10 President
Eisenhower wrote to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in
October, 1954, offering to provide American financial assistance in
transporting Vietnamese from the northern to the southern zone.,01
President Eisenhower explained that the "purpose of this offer is to
assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a
strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or ag-
95. Id. at IV(2). The United States lodged a reservation to this article.
The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with
the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed at-
tack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply
only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or
armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.
Id. at Understanding of the United States of America.
96. Id. at art. IV(3).
97. Id. at Protocol to the Treaty, September 8, 1954, Designation of States and Terri-
tory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable. The SEATO
Treaty was an odd amalgam of Western and Asian States. It did not receive support from
major neutral South and Southeast Asian States such as Burma, Sri Lanka, India and Indone-
sia. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 62. Prince Sihanouk promptly repudiated Cambodia's
inclusion; and the neutralization of Laos in 1962 resulted in Laos' removal from the jurisdic-
tion of the protocol. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 71.
98. Statement by a Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Extract], Oct. 22, 1954, in Cam-
eron, supra note 37, at 348.
99. Id. at 349.
100. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 81, 84-85, 87.
101. Message from President Eisenhower to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, Oct. 23, 1954, in
Cameron, supra note 37, at 349.
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"1102gression through military means. As many as eight hundred
thousand Vietnamese civilians, a substantial majority of whom, like
Premier Diem, were Roman Catholics, were moved south by French
and American transport.10 3 The United States also subsidized the
Vietnamese military, paid for roughly eighty percent of the southern
regime's expenditures, and heavily subsidized the economy.104 Jour-
nalist Francis FitzGerald observed: "Created, financed and defended
by Americans, the Saigon regime was less a government than an act
of the American will-an artificial military bureaucracy that since
the beginning of the Diem regime . . governed no one and repre-
sented no one except upon occasion the northern Catholics."'0 6
The North Vietnamese persistently requested Premier Diem to
enter into negotiations concerning the elections provided for in the
Geneva settlement.' The South Vietnamese regime, however, was
not prepared to risk being incorporated into a unified Vietnam under
the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Premier Diem argued that the South
had not endorsed the Geneva Accords and that it was not bound to
cooperate or participate in the conduct of the elections.1 0 7 Diem also
emphasized that the North had practiced "terror" and "totalitarian
methods" and that they could not be trusted to permit free elections
or to guarantee democratic rights and liberties. 08
Diem deftly ousted Emperor Bai Dai as Chief of State, reorga-
nized the government, and assumed the newly-created presidency of
South Vietnam. 0 9 The Pentagon Papers, an internal United States
study of decision-making during the Vietnam War, describes Diem
as "authoritarian, moralistic, inflexible, bureaucratic and suspi-
cious."110 He gradually assumed near dictatorial powers and adopted
102. Id. at 349-50.
103. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 76. This massive movement, in part, was fueled by a
propaganda campaign orchestrated by the United States. Id.. at 76-77. The Catholic popula-
tion in South Vietnam tripled as a result of the migration. This brought the Catholic popula-
tion to over one million, or seven percent of the entire population. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note
3, at 75.
104. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 136-37.
105. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 422-23.
106. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 87.
107. Premier Ngo Dinh Diem: Broadcast Declaration on the Geneva Agreements and
Free Elections, July 16, 1955 in Cameron, supra note 37, at 383.
108. Id. at 384.
109. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 95. Diem called a referendum and offered the populace a
choice between retaining Bao Dai and creating a democratic regime. The election appears to
have been tainted by fraud and Diem received 98.2 percent of the total votes. Id.
Ngo Dinh Diem was from a Roman Catholic Mandarin family that had worked for the
French controlled imperial regime. Diem resigned in 1933 as a result of a dispute with Em-
peror Bao Dai. In 1946, Diem was offered the premiership by Ho Chi Minh. He refused, in
part because he held the Vietminh responsible for the murder of his brother. He left Vietnam
in August 1950 and spent the next four years in the United States. Cardinal Spellman and the
other members of the American Friends of Vietnam rallied behind Diem and largely were
responsible for his appointment as Premier. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 66.
110. Sheehan, supra note 40, at 70.
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various repressive laws which were administered by military courts
with no right of appeal.11 These laws were "broad enough to be
used against anyone who annoyed the regime or whom it suspected
of disloyalty, and just the threat of its application was sufficient to
terrorize most critics into silence." ' 2 Perhaps as many as fifty thou-
sand persons had been jailed by the end of 1956.113 Diem further
solidified his control by abolishing elections for village councils and
appointing local officials loyal to his regime. He further distanced
himself from the local populace and alienated the large Buddhist
population by appointing newly-arrived Catholics to civil service po-
sitions. 1' Diem demonstrated little interest in land reform and as-,
sisted landlords in repossessing the lands that the Vietminh had
turned over to peasants. 1 5 Rents were permitted to rise11 6 and land-
less peasants were relocated to fortified villages.117 Diem also re-
versed the French policy of granting cultural autonomy to mountain
tribes.1
The nationalist impulse which previously had fueled opposition
to the French now generated antagonism towards the Diem regime.
Diem increasingly became perceived as an oppressive and corrupt
agent of the United States. Between 1956 and 1960, indigenous re-
bellion to Diem escalated among various peasant and Buddhist
groups and former Viet Minh supporters. 9 The North Vietnamese
leadership attempted to restrain this opposition. They were preoccu-
pied with building a socialist economy and feared American inter-
vention. The North also believed that the Diem government inevita-
bly would be forced out of office as a result of its own ineptitude.
12 0
Nevertheless, in March of 1960, a group of former Vietminh
resistance fighters declared their opposition to the Diem. 2 They ur-
gently appealed to the South Vietnamese to resist Diem122 and put
an to end to "the colonial regime and fascist dictatorship of the Ngo
111. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 97-98.
112. Id. at 98.
113. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 100.
114. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 98.
115. Id. at 98-99.
116. Id. at 98.
117. Id. at too.
118. Id. at 99.
119. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 109-13.
120. Id. at 108-10. The strength of the Vietnamese resistance movement always had
been in the north. Following the cease-fire with France, some ninety thousand Vietminh with-
drew from the south and regrouped in the north. Still, below the seventeenth parallel there
were hundreds of thousands of Vietminh cadres and guerrillas. As United States intervention
escalated, the southern forces became increasingly dependent on Hanoi for material assistance,
military support and military direction. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 195-96.
121. Declaration of Former Resistance Fighters on the Present Situation in South Viet-
nam Mar. 1960, (Excerpts) in KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 458.
122. Id.
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family."123 At the Third National Congress in September, 1960, the
Hanoi regime recognized the inevitability of civil war and endorsed
the armed struggle against the "U.S. imperialists and their hench-
men." 2" In December, 1960, a coalition of southern religious, na-
tional, and Communist groups met and formed the National Libera-
tion Front (NLF). 2 5 The first point of their ten point program called
for the overthrow of the Diem government and the formation of a
diverse and democratic government:
The present regime in South Vietnam is a disguised colonial
regime of the United States imperialists. The South Vietnam
administration is a lackey which has been carrying out the
United States imperialists' political line. This regime and ad-
ministration must be overthrown, and a broad national demo-
cratic coalition administration formed including representatives
of all strata of people, nationalities, political parties, religious
communities and patriotic personalities. We must wrest back the
people's economic, political, social and cultural interests, realize
independence and democracy, improve the people's living condi-
tions, carry out a policy of peace and neutrality and advance
toward peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.12
Vice President Lyndon Johnson flew to Saigon in May 1961,
and reaffirmed the United States' support for President Diem. The
two leaders issued a joint declaration. recognizing that Diem is "in
the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periph-
ery of the Communist empire in Asia."1 7 The United States recog-
nized the need to provide emergency assistance and expressed its
willingness to provide "such assistance to those willing to fight for
their liberties." 28 On his return to Washington, Vice-President
Johnson starkly posed the challenge facing the United States in Viet-
nam and Thailand:
The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must de-
cide whether to help these countries to the best of our ability or
throw in the towel in the area and pull back our defenses to San
Francisco and a "Fortress America" concept. More importantly,
we would say to the world in this case that we don't live up to
treaties and don't stand by our friends. This is not my concept. I
123. Id. at 460.
124. Resolution Of The Third National Congress Of The Vietnam Workers' Party On
The Tasks And Line Of The Party In The New Stage, September 1960 (Excerpts), in KAHIN
& LEWIS, supra note 3, at 462.
125. The Ten-Point Program Of The NLF December 20, 1960 (Excerpts), in id. at 464.
126. Id.
127. Joint Declaration by U.S. Vice-President Johnson and Ngo Dinh Diem (May 13,





recommend that promptly we move forward with a major effort
to help these countries defend themselves. I consider the key
here is to get our best MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory
Group) people to control, plan, direct and exact results from our
military aid program. In Vietnam and Thailand, we must move
forward together." 9
The Kennedy Administration heeded Johnson's warning. In De-
cember, 1961, President Diem wrote to President John F. Kennedy
requesting "further assistance" against the "forces of international
Communism now arrayed against us."'30 President Kennedy's reply
expressed the United States' determination to assist the South
Vietnamese regime which confronted a "campaign of force and ter-
ror" which was being "supported and directed from the outside by
the authorities at Hanoi."'' The President noted that this aggres-
sion was violative of the provisions of the Geneva Accords which
were "designed to ensure peace in Vietnam and to which they [the
North Vietnamese] bound themselves in 1954. ' ' 132 Kennedy noted at
the time the Geneva Accords had been signed that the United States
had warned that it would view any renewal of aggression against
South Vietnam with "'grave concern.' "Is The President concluded
that in "accordance with that declaration, and in response to your
request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Vietnam to protect
its people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly in-
crease our assistance to your defense.' "'
4
In addition to military assistance, President Kennedy committed
military advisers, technicians and American-piloted helicopters and
transport and reconnaissance planes and maintenance personnel to
Vietnam. 1 5 By the end of 1961, there were 2,067 American advisers
in South Vietnam; and as of May 1962, thirty-four hundred Ameri-
can personnel were stationed in the country. By the end of 1962, the
United States military presence had reached eleven thousand.1
3 6
Their activities were not limited to military training. American heli-
129. Lyndon Johnson's Report, in AMERICA IN VIETNAM A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
191, 193 (William A. Williams, Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner & Walter LeFeber eds.
1985).
130. Augmented U.S. Support for Ngo Dinh Diem: Correspondence With John F. Ken-
nedy (Dec. 1961), President Diem to President Kennedy, in VIETNAM HISTORY, DOCUMENTS.
AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 206, 208 (1965).
131. President Kennedy to President Diem (Dec. 14, 1961), in VIETNAM HISTORY, DOC-
UMENTS, AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 209 (1965).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. President Kennedy did express reservations about committing American troops
to Vietnam. See President Kennedy's TV Interviews, Sept. 2 and 9, 1963 (Excerpts), in
AMERICA IN VIETNAM A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 198 (William A. Williams, Thomas McCor-
mick, Lloyd Gardner & Walter LeFeber eds. 1985).
135. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 138.
136. Id. at 139.
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copter companies ferried South Vietnam troops throughout the bat-
tle zone.13 United States pilots also began to fly fixed-wing aircraft
in combat against the Viet Cong (NLF guerrillas referred to as VC).
President Kennedy also authorized planes piloted by Vietnamese to
deploy air-delivered napalm (ignited hellied gasoline that burns
deeply into the flesh) and herbicidal defoliants. A major component
of the United States-Saigon strategy was the strategic hamlet pro-
gram. This involved the relocation of peasants into barbed-wire, for-
tified villages. These strategic hamlets were designed to frustrate the
ability of th e Viet Cong to build political support and hide among
rural peasants.
1 38
The distant and corrupt Diem regime, however, was unable to
inspire popular and military support.1 39 Widespread domestic unrest
was ignited when Buddhist monks and students took to the streets to
protest the alleged favored position of Catholics. 40 The Kennedy
Administration decided to encourage and support a coup in South
Vietnam. On November 1, 1963, the military took control of the
government and assassinated both Diem and his chief adviser and
brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.41 Diem was replaced by a military junta
headed by General Duong Van Minh."' This, however, did not
greatly improve the situation in South Vietnam. Viet Cong influence
continued to spread, military morale among the South Vietnamese
troops plummeted and draft evasion increased. 43 General Minh was
succeeded by a dizzying series of United States sponsored military
regimes, none of which was successful in halting the relentless bat-
tlefield success of the Viet Cong. "4  The Pentagon Papers concludes
that President Kennedy left a "Vietnamese legacy of crisis, of politi-
cal instability and of military deterioration at least as alarming to
policy makers as the situation he had inherited from the Eisenhower
Administration. 1' 4 5 The study criticized Kennedy's decision to build
up the combat support and advisory missions "'without extended
study or debate'" or a "precise expectation of what it would
achieve.
'1 46
American involvement was irremediably escalated in August,
137. Id. at 140.
138. Id.
139. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 142-45.
140. Id. at 148-50.
141. Id. at 178-81.
142. Id. at 182-83.
143. Id. at 207-08.
144. Successor regimes included General Nguyen Khanh, KAHIN, supra note 36, at 203
(Jan. 30, 1964); Phan Huy Quat, id. at 303-05 (Mar. 1965); Generals Nguyen Van Thieu,
Nguyen Chanh Thi and Nguyen Cao Ky, id. at 304-05 (June 1965); Generals Nguyen Van
Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky, id. at 417 (Feb. 1966).




1964, when the North Vietnamese torpedo boats allegedly launched
an attack upon the United States destroyer Maddox. On August 4,
the North Vietnamese purportedly initiated a second attack against
the Maddox and the destroyer Turner Joy. 4" Thirteen hours later,
President Johnson informed the American public that United States
bombers were retaliating against North Vietnam." 8 The air war now
had been extended to the North. In February, 1965, a 132 plane raid
was ordered in reprisal for a Viet Cong attack on the United States
helicopter base and advisers' barracks at Pleiku in the Central High-
lands. Eight Americans were killed, 126 wounded, and ten planes
were destroyed during the raid. 4" Less than fourteen hours later,
United States planes launched a retaliatory bombing campaign over
North Vietnam. 50 The same month, a third reprisal attack was or-
dered following a Viet Cong attack against a United States army
barracks in which twenty-three Americans were killed and twenty-
one were wounded.' 5' Finally, in March, 1965, the United States ini-
tiated a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in re-
taliation to what it viewed as the North's continuing infiltration and
aggression in the South. 152 By March, 1966, the United States was
dropping two-and-a-half times the bomb load per month in Vietnam
that it had deployed in Korea. By August, 1966, the bomb tonnage
dropped each week was greater than the tonnage directed against
Germany at the peak of World War II. On July 30, 1966, the
United States started bombing the demilitarized zone between North
and South Vietnam.
53
Meanwhile, United States ground troops, which numbered four-
teen thousand in 1963, reached 267,000 in 1966. The military pres-
ence of United States allies increased from 285 in 1964 to 29,150 in
1966. South Vietnamese regular forces rose from 157,000 in 1961 to
275,000 in 1966; Vietnamese reserve troops increased from fifty
thousand to 339,000 over the same period.15 By the fall of 1967,
there were half a million American soldiers in Vietnam. The com-
bined Allied and South Vietnamese armies totalled 1,300,000
soldiers-one for every fifteen people in South Vietnam.155 The num-
ber of enemy troops in South Vietnam also escalated-expanding
147. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 157.
148. Id. at 158.
149. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 276-77.
150. Id. at 277.
151. Id. at 286.
152. Id. at 305.
153. KAHIN & LEwIs, supra note 3, at 186. Department of State intelligence estimates
indicated that the bombing strengthened rather than diminished the determination and morale
of the North Vietnamese. LARRY BERMAN, PLANNING A TRAGEDY THE AMERICANIZATION OF
WAR IN VIETNAM 51 (1982).
154. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 185 (Table 3).
155. FITZGERALD, supra note 49, at 456.
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from 116,000 in early 1965 to an estimated 282,000 in August,
1966. Roughly one-half of this increase was accounted for by infil-
tration from the North. 156 Casualties mounted on both sides: United
States personnel killed in action increased from zero in 1960 to
3,523 in 1966; Viet Cong killed in action increased from 5,669 in
1960 to 40,149 in 1966.157
American military escalation was based on the concept of
"'strategic persuasion.' "158 The Americans were determined to
make the North Vietnamese pay a heavy price for their aggression.
The United States' goal was to demoralize and to convince the
North that America was willing to deploy whatever level of force
was required to emerge victorious. 59 Perhaps more importantly, Vi-
etnam was perceived as a test of the United States' commitment to
its allies in the developing world and was a demonstration of the
willingness of the "most powerful nation in the world" to commit
resources to defeat Communist wars of national liberation. 6 ' The
Pentagon Papers concludes that the Vietnam War ultimately became
"less important for what it meant to the South Vietnamese people
than for what it meant to the position of the United States in the
world."' 6 '
II. The Legality of United States Involvement in Vietnam
A. The Organized Bar And The War
United States involvement in Vietnam ignited a debate among
lawyers and scholars over the legality of the war. During the height
of the "Cold War" American leaders frequently contrasted their ad-
herence to international law with the Soviet Union's lawless assertion
of raw power. 6 The United States' status as the self-proclaimed
guardian of law and morality left America particularly vulnerable to
criticism that it was violating international law in Vietnam. If
America were subordinating legal principle to power, how did it dif-
fer from the Soviet Union? How could the United States claim legit-
imacy and respect for a policy which violated international law?
Perhaps no American personage during the Vietnam War ri-
valed Arthur J. Goldberg in the belief that international relations
should be guided and restrained by international law. Goldberg re-
signed his position as an Associate Justice of the United States Su-
156. KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 3, at 187.
157. Id. at 188.
158. Id. at 183.
159. Id. at 183-84.
160. Sheehan, supra note 40, at 255.
161. Id.
162. See generally DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990).
[Vol. 11:2
Winter 1993]
preme Court in order to serve as United Nations Ambassador under
Lyndon Johnson. 163 Upon assuming office, Goldberg was asked
which one of his experiences would prove to be the most valuable
preparation for his work at the United Nations. He replied, "I would
hope ... my experience as a Justice of the Supreme Court was
dedicated to the rule of law. That is what we are talking about. The
great adventure of the United Nations is to bring the rule of law to
bear in relation between sovereign states."'" Goldberg's faith in the
rule of law, at times, bordered on the utopian. In a speech at Colum-
bia University in 1966, he observed: "Might does not make right. On
the contrary, law springs from one of the deepest impulses of human
nature. No doubt the contrary impulses to fight and dominate often
prevail, but sooner or later law has its turn.' 16 5 Noting the growing
importance of international influences on national life, Goldberg que-
ried "whether today's law student should not be expected to take at
least one course in international law, just as he takes one course in
torts, contracts, or property."' 66
Goldberg's views were repeated, perhaps with less conviction, by
others. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under Lyndon Johnson, pro-
nounced in 1968:
In international affairs, the steady consolidation of the rule of
law is the alternative to the law of the jungle and is an essential
condition, in this nuclear age, for the survival of man ...
Law forms the basis for collective action by which nations guard
the peace. It knits together countries in an ever-stronger fabric
of agreements about common policies and goals. Finally, it pro-
vides the tools with which mankind can deal with the utterly
new problems we encounter on the earth and in space around
it."1
7
What then of the legality of United States involvement in Viet-
nam? Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia,
writing in the Connecticut Bar Journal, argued that lawyers were
able to make an "important contribution . . . to the dialogue about
163. See Ambassador Goldberg Holds News Conference at New York, DEPT. ST. BULL.,
Aug. 16, 1965, at 272.
164. Id. at 277.
165. Arthur J. Goldberg, The Rule of Law in an Unruly World, DEPT. ST. BULL., June
13, 1966, at 936, 937.
166. Arthur J. Goldberg, International Law in the United Nations, DEPT. ST. BULL.,
Jan. 23, 1967, at 140.
167. Dean Rusk, Consolidating the Rule of Law in International Affairs, DEPT. ST.
BULL., May 27, 1968, at 669. See also William Rogers, The Rule of Law and the Settlement
of International Disputes, DEPT. ST. BULL., May 18, 1970, 623, 627 (Secretary of State under
President Richard M. Nixon). The so-called "realists" viewed it as impractical to believe that
international law could guide and restrain the relations between States. See generally Hans J.
Morgenthau, To Intervene-Or Not To Intervene, 45 FOREIGN AFF. 425 (1967). Cf. John N.
Moore, Law And National Security, 51 FOREIGN AFF. 408 (1973).
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Vietnam both in assessing the claims to legality of the participants
and their advocates and in clarifying community policies about the
regulations of the use of force in international relations."'1 8 He con-
cluded that North Vietnam's deployment of force against the Saigon
regime "is a major violation of the United Nations Charter to which
the United States and its allies may lawfully respond by assisting the
widely recognized government of South Vietnam." 169 Emanuel Mar-
golis noted in response that "it is a tribute to the moral force of
international law that the American involvement in this war [Viet-
nam] has given rise to such strong opposition both at home and
abroad. 170 The fact is, Professor Moore's Herculean efforts to the
contrary, notwithstanding, the legality of our involvement in the
Vietnam war is very questionable." '' Margolis expressed the hope
that, "unlike the case in other wars, truth will not be the first victim
of this one."' 72
Those lawyers and academics who expressed opposition to the
war were criticized by the Johnson Administration. John A. Gro-
nouski, Ambassador to Poland, upbraided a group at the University
of Wisconsin.' 3 He accused the intellectual community of adopting
a critical position towards the war which was "prefabricated, official,
inviolate and all too often followed by rote."' 74
I am suggesting. . . that out of such conformity of thought
have come not reasonable alternatives but valueless slogans.
Is "Stop the Bombing" really a substitute for a reasoned
intellectual position? Or "Negotiate Now" or "Get Out of Viet-
Nam" or "Defy the Draft"?
I submit that America has a right to expect something bet-
ter than vague slogans offering easy solutions to complicated is-
sues from the most trained and disciplined minds it possesses.7 "
The majority of the legal and academic community, however,
viewed the war as legal. In January, 1966, thirty-one teachers of in-
ternational law at leading law schools sent President Lyndon John-
son a statement in support of United States policy in Vietnam which
appeared in the Congressional Record. 6 They concluded that the
168. John N. Moore, The Role Of Law In The Viet Nam Debate, 41 CONN. B.J. 389,
400-01 (1967).
169. Id. at 401.
170. Margolis, Escalating The Viet Nam Debate: A Reply To Professor Moore, 42
CONN. B. 23, 53 (1968).
171. Id. at 54.
172. Id.
173. John A. Gronouski, The Intellectual and American Foreign Policy, DEPT. ST.
BULL., Oct. 2, 1967, at 432.
174. Id. at 432.
175. Id.
176. 112 CONG. REC. A410 (1966).
[Vol. 11:2
Winter 1993]
United States "seeks only to terminate aggression originating in
North Vietnam" and that its involvement in Vietnam is "lawful
under general principles of international law and the United Nations
Charter."' 7 In February, another letter was sent to President John-
son by Professors Richard R. Baxter and Louis B. Sohn of Harvard,
Myres S. McDougal of Yale, Neill H. Alford Jr. of the University of
Virginia and William W. Bishop Jr. of the University of Michi-
gan. 17 8 These five prominent legal academics assured the President
that "the legal position of the United. States in South Vietnam is
clearly defensible. In fact, it would seem to be the legal position
most compatible with protecting the genuine self-determination of
the people of South Vietnam. ' 179 They accused those opposed to the
war of being guilty of "egregious errors" which are "accentuated by
an apparent blindness toward the well-documented direct and indi-
rect aggression by the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam which
the United States seeks to repel." 80
This endorsement of United States policy by leading experts on
international law provided intellectual ammunition for those seeking
the support of the American Bar Association (ABA). On February
21, 1966, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
on the joint recommendation of its Standing Committee on Peace
and Law through United Nations and its Section of International
and Comparative Law, adopted a resolution in support of the Viet-
nam War. 8' The resolution concluded that "the position of the
United States in Vietnam is legal under international law, and is in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the South
East Asia Treaty."'8 2 In May 1966, Eberhard P. Deutsch, Chair of
the American Bar Association Committee on Peace and Law
through United Nations, writing in the American Bar Association
Journal, justified the decision of the House of Delegates and dis-
missed the argument of those opposed to the war as "grounded on an
emotional attitude opposed to United States policy, rather than on
177. Id.
178. 112 CONG. REC. 3843 (1966).
179. Id.
180. Id. This statement was intended to refute analysis of the Lawyers Committee On
American Policy Toward Vietnam. The Lawyers Committee wrote a January 25, 1966 letter
to President Johnson challenging the legality of the war. See 112 CONG. REC. 2666 (1966)
[hereinafter Lawyers Committee 1]. They then issued a response to the Johnson Administra-
tion's defense of the war. See 112 CONG. REC. A5801 (1966) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee
II]. The most comprehensive version of their views is contained in, THE CONSULTATIVE COUN-
CIL OF THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM, VIETNAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, AND
THE PRECEDENT OF VIETNAM FOR SUBSEQUENT INTERVENTIONS (1990) [hereinafter Lawyers
Committee III].
181. Peace and Law Committee, International Law Section, 52 A.B.A. J. 392 (1966).
182. Id. The resolution and brief report of the committees is reprinted in 112 CONG.
REC. 5062 (1966).
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law."' 183 William L. Standard, head of a lawyers group opposed to
the war, responded in the July issue:
This is a solemn hour in history. We have a moral obliga-
tion to history to return to the high purposes and principles of
the United Nations. We may be on the threshold of a further
involvement in Asia. The United Nations Charter forbids our
unilateral intervention in the circumstances which exist in
Vietnam.""
In 1971, the legality of the Vietnam War again was debated at
the ABA's annual meeting. This time, however, opponents brought
the issue to the Assembly rather than to the House of Delegates.'83
A resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of all American
military personnel from Indochina was debated for three hours and
was defeated by a standing vote of 173 to 105.186
Those favoring the resolution argued that the United States
government had a constitutional responsibility to maintain "fidelity"
to law in its foreign relations.187 They insisted that the ABA had a
special responsibility to insist that the government satisfied this con-
stitutional obligation. 188 Most opponents, however, viewed Vietnam
as a political rather than as a legal issue. 89 The Resolutions Com-
mittee issued a report which warned that "[if] the Assembly became
a forum for partisan political debate and action, it would betray its
183. Eberhard P. Deutsch, The Legality of the United States Position in Vietnam, 52
A.B.A. J. 436, 442 (1966).
184. William L. Standard, United States Intervention in Vietnam Is Not Legal, 52
A.B.A. J. 627, 634 (1966).
185. Assembly Defeats End-the-War Resolution; House Meets in New York City, 57
A.B.A. J. 888 (1971) [hereinafter Assembly Defeats]. The House of Delegates is an elected
body which has served as the forum for debate on Bar Association policy since its formation in
1937. The Assembly is composed of all members of the Association who register at the Annual
Meeting. Attendance at Assembly sessions usually has been sparse. The only business trans-
acted by the Assembly is the ratification of amendments to the Constitution and By-Laws, the
election of individuals to fill vacancies in the House of Delegates and the consideration of
resolutions. Any member of the Association may offer a resolution for consideration by the
Assembly. Such resolutions initially are referred to the Committee on Resolutions which con-
ducts a public hearing and then reports back to the Assembly. Those resolutions endorsed by
the Assembly are referred to the House of Delegates which may approve, disapprove or modify
the resolutions. Those disapproved or modified by the House are returned to the Assembly
which may direct a referendum by the entire membership of the Association. Id.
186. Id. The resolution was modified by its sponsors to call for the withdrawal from
Vietnam "as soon a physically and logistically possible without endangering the lives of Ameri-
can troops." Id. at 889. The Young Lawyers Section defeated the resolution to end the war by
a vote of roughly two-to-one. Id. at 891. Three resolutions were debated and voted upon. These
called for: (1) the immediate withdrawal by the United States of all American military per-
sonnel from Indochina; (2) the creation of a special body to study the respective powers of the
President and Congress in entering into and conducting war; and (3) the creation of a special
committee to study whether the United States' conduct of the Vietnam War has been consis-
tent with the principles of land warfare. The first and third were rejected by the Assembly.
The second was adopted with amendment. Id. at 888.
187. Assembly Defeat, supra note 185, at 889 (remarks of Jerome Shestack).
188. Id. at 890 (remarks of David L. Nixon).
189. Id. at 890 (remarks of Raymond Coward).
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responsibility to the profession."19 Others feared that the resolution
"would be used by Hanoi, by the Communists, and by everybody
that is opposed to the United States . . . . [A] stab in the back does
just as much harm if it happens to accidentally come from a friend
with the best intention as if it comes from an enemy ... ."I'l John
C. Satterfield of Mississippi, former President of the American Bar
Association, admonished the Assembly that:
Communism must be fought somewhere, and for some foolish
reason, I prefer it be fought in Vietnam rather than in Yazoo
City, Mississippi, or Boston Massachusetts, . . . we are defend-
ing the free world. Our boys are giving their lives in our defense,
and the defense of our lives, our children, and grandchildren,
and not for some foolish matter.192
The dispute over the legality of the Vietnam War was far from
over. The legal debate would be continued and fought out in legal
memorandums, articles, and ultimately before the federal courts.
B. The Position Of The United States Government
In 1961, the Department of State issued a White Paper on Viet-
nam which portrayed the Saigon regime as under assault by the "au-
thorities in Hanoi and their disciplined followers in the South."1 93
A 1965 White Paper reaffirmed and elaborated upon the threat
posed by the North Vietnamese to the South. 94 The White Paper
argued that South Vietnam is "fighting for its life against a brutal
campaign of terror and armed attack."19 5 According to the report,
this assault is "inspired, directed, supplied and controlled by the
Communist regime in Hanoi."' 96 The Department of State noted
that while this aggression has been going on for years, the pace re-
cently has "quickened and the threat has now become acute."' 97
The White Paper dismissed the notion that South Vietnam was
confronting an internal rebellion. It characterized the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) as the "creature"
of the Hanoi government.'98 According to the Department of State,
190. Id. at 889.
191. Id. at 890-91 (John J. Wicker Jr.).
192. Assembly Defeats, supra note 185, at 890 (remarks of John C. Satterfield).
193. Department of State, A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer
South Viet-Nam, (1961) reprinted in KAHIN & LEwis, supra note 3,. at 470, 472 (Introduc-
tion To The U.S. Department Of State White Paper, 1961).
194. Department of State, Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-
Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam, DEPT. ST. BULL., Mar. 22, 1965, at 404




198. Id. at 422.
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the formation of the Front was "designed to create the illusion that
the Viet Cong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South
Viet-Nam rather than an externally directed Communist plan." 199
The White Paper emphasized that the "hard core of the Communist
forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the North and or-
dered into the South by Hanoi and operated under Hanoi's direc-
tion."2 ' The Department of State rejected the notion that the forces
infiltrated into the South were former southerners who had re-
grouped across the seventeenth parallel in 1954. It noted that the
Viet Cong forces "increasingly" are comprised of "native North
Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet Nam." 0' 1 These forces
are armed, equipped, and supplied by the Hanoi regime and by the
North's Chinese Communist benefactors.20 2
The White Paper estimated that since 1959, the North had dis-
patched nearly 20,000 militia and 17,000 support personnel to the
South. The report cautioned that the somewhat modest number of
infiltrators was misleading. Forces defending against a low-intensity
war require a ten-to-one ratio to defeat the guerrillas. As a result,
the Department of State noted that the infiltration of five thousand
guerilla fighters was the "equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000
regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on
the defenders.
20 3
The Viet Cong were portrayed as relying upon intimidation,
sabotage and terror. Any "official, worker, or establishment that rep-
resents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair
game for the Viet Cong. '204 According to the White Paper, village
officials, agricultural workers, medical personnel and teachers were
targeted for assassination. The Department of State reported that in
1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other officials were
killed by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnapped. More than 1,350
civilians were killed by bombings and by other acts of sabotage and
an estimated 8,400 were kidnapped by the Viet Cong. 2 5
Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new levels of in-
tensity. The elaborate effort by the Communist regime in North
199. Aggression from the North, supra note 194, at 422.
200. Id. at 404.
201. Id. at 406. The Department of State estimates that as many as seventy-five percent
of the more than 4,400 Viet Cong who entered the South in the first eight months of 1964
were natives of North Vietnam. Id. at 414. The report concedes that many of the lower level
elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Vietnam However, "the thousands of
reported cases of VC kidnappings and terrorism make it abundantly clear that threats and
other pressures by the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruitment." Id. at 407.
202. Aggression from the North, supra note 194, at 406.
203. Id. at 407.
204. Id. at 425.
205. Id. at 426.
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Viet-Nam to conquer the South has grown, not diminished. Mil-
itary men, technicians, political organizers, propagandists, and
secret agents have been infiltrating into the Republic of Viet-
Nam from the North in growing numbers. The flow of Commu-
nist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has in-
creased. Communications links with Hanoi are extensive. De-
spite the heavy casualties of 3 years of fighting, the hard-core
VC force is considerably larger now than it was at the end of
196 1.206
The White Paper emphasized that the United States had pledged to
assist South Vietnam in combating this "open aggression. 2 °7 The
Department of State promised that "the United States will continue
necessary measures of defense against the Communist armed aggres-
sion coming from North Viet-Nam. '0°
The United States thus portrayed the South Vietnamese govern-
ment as a brave and beleaguered regime which was under systematic
attack by its Communist neighbor. This, according to the Depart-
ment of State, was part of a long-range plan by the North to take
control of the South. Hanoi initially was described as being confident
that the Saigon regime would degenerate into chaos and disorder
and that the North would be able to peacefully takeover the
South.209 Frustrated by the progress and prosperity achieved by the
South Vietnamese, the Department of State argued that the North
had infiltrated guerilla cadres into the South and instituted an esca-
lating campaign of armed terrorism.21 0 However, "the people'of the
South," according to the White Paper, "have chosen to resist this
threat. '211 "At their request, the United States has taken its place
beside them in their defensive struggle. ' 212 There was little question
based upon this version of the facts that America was acting morally
in assisting the South Vietnamese. The question remained whether
American involvement was legally justifiable under international
law.
In a March 4, 1966 memorandum, Leonard Meeker, Legal Ad-
viser of the Department of State, argued that South Vietnam and
the United States were engaging in collective self-defense against
armed attack from the Communist North.213 According to the mem-
206. Id.
207. Aggression from the North, supra note 194, at 426.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 424.
210. Id. at 425.
211. Id. at 427.
212. Aggression from the North, supra note 194, at 427.
213. Leonard Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of
Viet-Nam, DEPT. ST. BULL., Mar. 28, 1966, at 474 [hereinafter Legality of United States
Participation].
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orandum, the Geneva Accords of 1954 had established a provisional
demarcation line between North and South Vietnam. The Accords
provided for the withdrawal of military forces into their respective
zones.214 The Agreement also prohibited the use of either zone for
the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.215
Yet, as noted in the 1965 White Paper, the North has orchestrated a
covert campaign against the South.2"6 The infiltration of thousands
of armed troops, according to the legal memorandum, clearly consti-
tuted an "armed attack." Of course, such an "armed attack" is not
easily fixed by date and hour as in the case of traditional warfare.
However, there is no doubt that "it had occurred before February
1965.
The United Nations Charter states in Article 2(4) that "[aill
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force."2 Article 51, as noted in the memorandum, is an
exception to the prohibition on the use of armed force. It provides, in
part, that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.
219
Article 51, according to the memorandum, "restates and pre-
serves" the inherent right of self-defense, which is a "long-recog-
214. Id. See Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (July 20, 1954) art.
1, in Cameron, supra note 37, at 288.
215. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 474. See Agreement on
the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (July 20, 1954), art. 19, in Cameron, supra note 37,
at 288.
216. See generally supra notes 193-212. According to the legal memorandum, beginning
in 1964 the Communists had exhausted their cadre of Southerners who had gone North. Since
then, the majority of infiltrators have been native-born North Vietnamese. Today, the legal
memorandum recites that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese are fighting in organ-
ized units in the South. See Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 475. In
June 1954 the United States sent a covert team headed by Colonel Edward G. Lansdale into
North Vietnam to sabotage key facilities and to conduct psychological warfare. See Sheehan,
supra note 40, at 15-18.
217. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 475. President Lyndon
Johnson approved the offensive deployment of ground forces in April and July 1965. Sheehan,
supra note 40, at 382, 402, 416.
218. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 in Legality of United States Participation, supra
note 213, at 475.
219. Id. at art. 51.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Secur-
ity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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nized principle of international law."220 The Charter does not limit
this right to Member States.2 21 In fact, the Charter encourages non-
members, such as South Vietnam, to adhere to the provisions of the
Charter, particularly in regards to the deployment of armed force.
Article 2(6) states that "[t]he Organization shall ensure that states
which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance
with these Principles-so far as may be necessary for the maintenance
of international peace and security. ' 22 2 Depriving nonmembers of
their inherent right of self-defense would not only contravene the
principles of the United Nations, but also would be "prejudicial to
the maintenance of peace. '"223
What of the fact that South Vietnam is not a sovereign State?
May it still assert the right of collective self-defense? According to
the memorandum, there is no question that one zone of a tempora-
rily divided State may not be militarily attacked by the other
zone.224 Such a prohibition, according to the memorandum, would
have a destructive effect on the stability of international engage-
ments such as the Geneva accords of 1954, and on internationally
agreed lines of demarcation. The memorandum concludes that this
only "would create new dangers to international peace and
security.
225
220. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 475.
221. While nonmembers such as South Vietnam have not formally assumed obligations
under the United Nations Charter, the memorandum notes that much of the substantive law
of the Charter has become part of the general law of nations through custom and usage. Id.
This is particularly true of the Charter provisions pertaining to the use of force. Id. South
Vietnam in its application for membership in the United Nations has expressed its willingness
to abide by the Charter. Id. Thus, "it seems entirely appropriate to appraise the actions of
South Viet-Nam in relation to the legal standards set forth in the United Nations Charter."
Id. at 476 n.3.
222. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 6 in Legality of United States Participation, supra
note 213, at 475.
223. Id. at 476.
224. Id. at 477. The memorandum observes that the Republic of Vietnam has been rec-
ognized as a separate international entity by approximately sixty governments. The Depart-
ment of State notes that South Vietnam has been admitted as a member of a number of
specialized United Nations agencies and, in 1957, the General Assembly voted to recommend
South Vietnam for membership. Its admission was frustrated by the veto of the Soviet Union
in the Security Council. Id..
225. Id. at 478. The right of collective self-defense, according to the memorandum, is
not limited to members of regional arrangements. "Article 51 appears in chapter VII of the
Charter entitled 'Actions With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression.'" U.N. CHARTER art. 51, quoted in Legality of United States Participa-
tion, supra note 213, at 475. Chapter VIII is entitled "Regional Arrangements," and concerns
the role of such organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Id.
Chapter VIII begins with Article 52 which provides, in part:
(1) Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional ar-
rangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action,
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
(2) the Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of
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May the United States exercise the right of collective self-de-
fense under Article 51 for an entity which is a nonmember? The
memorandum contended that nothing in the Charter precludes
Member States, such as the United States, from responding to a re-
quest for armed assistance from a nonmember.226 The memorandum
noted that critics will "search in vain for any . . . provision . . . that
would preclude United States participation in the collective defense
of a nonmember. 2 2 7 The fact that Article 51 refers to an "armed
attack" against a "Member of the United Nations," according to the
Department of State, was not intended to preclude members from
participating in the defense of nonmembers. 218 The memorandum
observed that a contrary interpretation "would have serious detri-
mental consequences for international peace and security and would
be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 229
The Department of State also pointed out that States' exercise
of collective self-defense is not precluded by the fact that the United
Nations Security Council is charged with overall responsibility for
insuring the preservation of international peace and security. 230 Arti-
cle 51 permits States to exercise their right of collective self-defense
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. '231 Measures taken by Mem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not ". . . affect the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council . . . to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary . . . to maintain or restore
international peace and security. ' 2 2 It is clear, according to the le-
gal memorandum, that a victim of an armed assault is not required
to passively absorb an attack and wait until the United Nations in-
tervenes to restore the peace. The Charter specifically authorizes
States to assert their right of individual and collective self-defense
until such time as the Security Council acts to restore international
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council.
(3) The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settle-
ment of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the
Security Council.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 52, quoted in Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at
475.
226. Id. at 476.
227. Id. at 477.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, in Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213,
at 479.
231. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, quoted in Legality of United States Participation, supra




peace."3' The memorandum noted that the United States had satis-
fied this notification requirement and has reported to the Security
Council on the measures it has taken to counter Communist aggres-
sion in Vietnam.13" The Council, however, has not taken action to
restore peace and security in southeast Asia. In fact, the memoran-
dum parenthetically observed that "members of the Council have




According to the legal memorandum, this is not an instance of
United States imposing its will on a weak third world country. The
North Vietnamese were contravening the Geneva Accords. The
United States had pledged not to disturb the Geneva Accords and
had declared that it would view any renewal of aggression in viola-
tion of the accords with grave concern.236 United States intervention
in violation of the demilitarization provisions of the agreement
reached at Geneva was justified by the "international law principle
that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles the
other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, correspond-
ing, or related provision until the defaulting party is prepared to
honor its obligations." '
The memorandum also went on to note that the protocol of the
SEATO Treaty extended protection to the South Vietnamese.2 3 Ar-
ticle IV(l) obligated the United States to meet armed aggression in
accordance with its constitutional process. The Treaty does not re-
quire a collective determination that an armed attack has occurred
as a precondition for military actionunder Article IV(1).139 In addi-
tion to these formal legal obligations to assist South Vietnam, the
memorandum stressed that both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
233. Id. at 479, n.8.
234. Id. at 479.
In August 1964 the United States asked the Council to consider the situation
created by North Vietnamese attacks on United States destroyers in the Tonkin
Gulf. The Council thereafter met to debate the question created by North
Vietnamese attacks on United States destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. The Council
thereafter met to debate the question, but adopted no resolutions. Twice in Feb-
ruary 1965 the United States sent additional reports to the Security Council on
the conflict in Viet-Nam and on the additional measures taken by the United
States in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. In January 1966 the United
States formally submitted the Viet-Nam question to the Security Council for its
consideration and introduced a draft resolution calling for discussions looking
towards a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords.
Id.
235. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 479. The memorandum
notes that the United States is not required under international law to formally issue a decla-
ration of war prior to deploying armed force. Id. at 480.
236. Id. at 480.
237. Id. at 489.
238. Id. at 480.
239. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 481; see Dulles, supra
note 89.
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had declared that the United States would provide assistance to
South Vietnam in its struggle against Communist subversion.240
The conditions in North Vietnam, according to the memoran-
dum, also excused the South Vietnamese from entering into consul-
tations concerning the conduct of elections. These elections were to
provide for the free expression of the national will. 241 The Depart-
ment of State parenthetically noted that South Vietnam had ob-
jected to the provisions of the Geneva Accords and the planned elec-
tions. 42 However, even accepting that South Vietnam was bound by
the agreement reached at Geneva, the "conditions in North Vietnam
. . . were such as to make impossible any free and meaningful ex-
pression of popular will."2 ' s The Communists "were running a police
state where executions, terror and torture were commonplace."244
The memorandum concluded that a nationwide election in these cir-
cumstances "would have been a travesty. ' 2 45 No one in the North
would have "dared to vote except as directed. 246 Since a substantial
majority of the populous lived north of the seventeenth parallel, an
election "would have meant turning the country over to the Commu-
nists without regard to the will of the people."247
In conclusion, the legal memorandum briefly addressed the au-
thority of the President to deploy United States troops abroad and to
commit them to military actions. Specifically, may the President de-
ploy American troops abroad absent a declaration of war? As Com-
mander in Chief, according to the Department of State, the Presi-
dent possessed full constitutional authority to carry out military
actions when deemed necessary to maintain the security and defense
of the United States. The SEATO Treaty formally recognized that
an armed attack against any of the Signatories or designated territo-
ries, such as South Vietnam, imperiled the peace and safety of each
of the treaty members s.2 4 A declaration of war, according to the De-
partment of State, has never been the touchstone of constitutionality.
The memorandum recited that since the Constitution was adopted,
there had been at least 125 instances in which the President had
ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions abroad
without obtaining prior congressional authorization.2 9 Thus, it is
clear, according to the memorandum, that the Constitution "leaves
240. Legality of United States Participation. supra note 213, at 482.
241. Id. at 483.
242. Id. at 483.
243. Id. at 483.
244. Id. at 484.
245. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 484.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 484.
249. Id. at 484.
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to the President the judgment to determine whether the circum-
stances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential
consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that
he should act without formally consulting with Congress."2'0 It is
not only the Executive Branch which has recognized that an armed
attack against South Vietnam threatens the security of the United
States. The SEATO Treaty was ratified by the Congress which was
fully cognizant of the President's constitutional authority to commit
troops where required to safeguard the national interest.
2 51
At any rate, according to the Department of State memoran-
dum, Congress unmistakably approved and authorized United States
military activity in Vietnam.2 52 Following the North Vietnamese at-
tacks in the Tonkin Gulf against United States destroyers, both the
Senate and the House adopted a joint resolution approving and sup-
porting "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against
the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. 253
The Department of State contended that section 2 of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution authorized the President, in his discretion, to milita-
rily assist South-Vietnam. The Resolution proclaimed that the
United States regards as "vital to its national interest and to world
peace" the maintenance of international peace and security in
Southeast Asia.254 Section 2 further provided that:
[T]he United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President de-
termines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense
of its freedom. 255
250. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 485.
251. Id. at 485.
252. Id. at 485.
253. Id. at 485 quoting H.J. Res. 1145, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1965) [here-
inafter Tonkin Gulf Resolution]; see supra notes 147-48 and accompanying texts.
254. Legality Of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 486 quoting Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, supra note 253.
255. Tonkin Gulf Resolution, supra note 253, quoted in Legality of United States Par-
ticipation, supra note 213, at 486. The body of the resolution resolved as follows:
That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace and maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of
the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international
conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it
VIETNAM
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According to the Department of State:
Section 2 thus constitutes an authorization to the President,
in his discretion, to act, using armed force, if he determines that
this is required to assist South Vietnam at its request in defense
of its freedom. The identification of South Viet-Nam through
the reference to "protocol state" in this section is unmistakable
and the grant of authority "as the President determines" is
unequivocal. 256
The legal memorandum went on to note that the Senate was aware
that this language authorized the President to act in accordance with
United States obligations under SEATO; and that the Senate recog-
nized that the resolution set the stage for war.
2 57
In sum, the Department of State's legal memorandum argued:
that South Vietnam was being subjected to an armed attack by
Communist North Vietnam; aggression was being carried out
through the infiltration of armed personnel, military equipment, and
regular combat units; South Vietnam and the United States were
exercising their right of individual and collective self-defense against
this armed attack; and the right of self-defense is not qualified by
the fact that South Vietnam is a zone of a temporarily divided State
and is not a member of the United Nations.258
The memorandum also pointed out that the United States was
not only acting at the request of South Vietnam, but had committed
to the collective defense of South Vietnam in the SEATO Treaty.2
59
The memorandum further noted that the United States had inter-
vened to deter additional North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva
accords. These violations, according to the memorandum, justified
the United States suspension of the prohibition against the introduc-
tion of foreign troops into South Vietnam. The argument that North
Vietnam's aggression was justified by South Vietnam's failure to
enter into negotiations concerning the conducting of elections, in the
view of the Department of State, overlooks the fact that repressive
conditions in the North made free and fair elections impossible. 60
The legal memorandum further argued that the President pos-
sessed full constitutional authority to commit United States troops to
the collective defense of South Vietnam. The Department of State
noted that this authority does not rest solely upon the Constitution.
may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, supra note 253 (1964).
256. Legality of United States Participation, supra note 213, at 486.
257. Id. at 487 (citing and quoting 110 CONG. REC. 18409 (1964) (exchange between
Senators John Sherman Cooper and William Fulbright)).
258. Id. at 488.
259. Id. at 488-89.
260. Id. at 489.
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Instead, the SEATO Treaty, which was adopted by the Senate, obli-
gated the United States to defend South Vietnam against armed at-
tack. Congress also explicitly approved the President's deployment of
armed force when it passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The Presi-
dent's inherent constitutional authority as commander in chief, to-
gether with the provisions of the SEATO Treaty and the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, solidified justification for the commitment and use
of United States military forces in South Vietnam. 61
In a speech at the University of Pittsburgh Law School, Legal
Adviser Leonard C. Meeker suggested that the importance of the
conflict in Vietnam transcended the containment of Communism.
According to Meeker, a failure by the United States to defend South
Vietnam would weaken the norms against aggression and "gravely
impair the effectiveness of the international law that we have
today." '262
For one thing, withdrawal and abandonment of South Viet-
Nam would be to sacrifice the Geneva accords and advertise for
all to see that an international agreement can with impunity be
treated by an aggressor as a mere scrap of paper. Moreover,
withdrawal and abandonment of South Viet-Nam would under-
mine the faith of other countries in United States defense treaty
commitments and would encourage would-be aggressors to sup-
pose they could successfully and even freely impose on their
weaker neighbors by force.263
C. The Lawyers' Committee Replies
An ad hoc group which called itself the Lawyers' Committee
On American Policy Toward Vietnam issued two memoranda criti-
cal of the State Department's legal analysis. 6 In a letter dated Jan-
uary 25, 1966, to President Johnson, the co-chairs of the Lawyers
Committee summarized the Committee's argument:
[O]ur committee has reached the regrettable but inescapable
conclusion that the actions of the United States in Vietnam con-
travene the essential provisions of the United Nations Charter,
to which we are bound by treaty; violate the Geneva Accords,
which we pledged to observe; are not sanctioned by the treaty
creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; and violate
our own Constitution and the system of checks and balances
which is the heart of it, by the prosecution of the war in Viet-
261. Id. at 489.
262. Meeker, Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense, DEPT. ST. BULL.,
Jan. 9, 1967, at 54, 62.
263. Id. at 62.
264. See generally Lawyers Committee I-III, supra note 180.
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nam without a congressional declaration of war.
[T]he Geneva accords recognized all of Vietnam as a single
state. The conflict in Vietnam is a civil strife and foreign inter-
vention is forbidden. We do well to recall that President Lincoln,
in the course of our Civil War to preserve the union of the
North and the South, vigorously opposed British and French
threats to intervene in behalf of the independence of the
Confederacy.2 6
The Committee initially noted that the observance of the rule of law
is a basic tenet of American Democracy. As a result, the brief ex-
plained that it is "fitting"' that American lawyers examine the poli-
cies pursued by the United States government to determine whether
its conduct is justified under the "rule of law mandated by the
United Nations Charter, a charter adopted to banish from the earth
the scourge of war."2 6 6
The Committee's foundation brief initially addressed the legal-
ity of United States policy in Vietnam under the United Nations
Charter. The Committee noted that the United Nations Charter re-
quires that Member States refrain from the 'threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.' "267 It is the Security Council which is to determine the " 'ex-
istence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations or shall decide what
measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international
peace and security.' "1268
The Committee noted that Article 51's provision for the use of
armed force in self-defense is the single authorization for States to
unilaterally resort to military force.26 9 The Committee argued that
Article 51 is a narrow exception to the prohibition on unilateral
force27 0 and contended that an act of self-defense only may be un-
dertaken pursuant to Article 51 in response to a particularly grave,
265. 112 CONG. REC. 2665-66 (Letter of January 25, 1966 from Robert W. Kenny &
William L. Standard).
266. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2666.
267. Id. at 26667 quoting U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
268. Id. quoting U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
269. Id. at 26667.
270. Id. at 2667.
In expressly limiting independent military action to instances of armed at-
tack, the founding nations explicitly and implicitly rejected the right to the use
of force based on the familiar claim of "anticipatory self-defense," or "interven-
tion by subversion," or "pre-emptive armed attack to forestall threatened aggres-
sion," and similar rationale. Such concepts were well known to the founding
nations if only because most of the wars of history had been fought under ban-
ners carrying or suggesting these slogans. More importantly for our purposes
here, however, the United States was aware of these precepts before the Senate
ratified the United Nations Charter and consciously acquiesced in their rejection
as a basis for independent armed intervention.
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immediate emergency. Thus, there is no basis for the proposition
that the gradual infiltration of North Vietnamese military and non-
military personnel in support of the Viet Cong insurgency may be
regarded as an "armed attack" under Article 51 .271 The Vietnam
conflict, according to the Lawyers Committee, is governed by Article
33(1) of the United Nations Charter. This provision requires the
parties to a dispute which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security to seek a solution by "negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, re-
sort to regional agencies, or other peaceful means of their own
choice." '
In any event, the Lawyers Committee asserted that an act of
self-defense under Article 51 must be proportionate to the provoca-
tion. Acts such as the bombing of North Vietnam clearly are exces-
sive when compared to the infiltration of troops and support person-
nel.2"' Article 51 addresses the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense of Members of the United Nations. South Vi-
etnam, however, is a temporary zone and does not qualify as a Mem-
ber State within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. This
does not mean that a remedy is unavailable. The Security Council is
the proper forum for the resolution of such a "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 12 74 The Lawyers Commit-
tee argued that the United States cannot justify its intervention into
South Vietnam on the basis of Article 51 for an additional reason.
The Committee contended that Article 51 presupposes that States
invoking their inherent right of collective self-defense are members
of a regional collective defense organization within the purview of
the United Nations Charter. Their memoranda noted that Articles
51 and 53, which address regional systems, are interrelated provi-
sions which were intended to integrate and coordinate the United
Nations peacekeeping apparatus with regional organizations such as.
the Inter-American system.27 According to the Lawyers Committee,
271. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5802. The Committee also parentheti-
cally notes that the infiltration of North Vietnamese was a response to the increasing Ameri-
can military presence in South Vietnam. Id. The Lawyers Committee distinguished between
an armed attack and indirect aggression. Id. at 5801.
272. Id. at 5802 citing U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. The U.N. Charter takes prece-
dence over other international agreements. Article 103 provides that "In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
273. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5802. The Lawyers Committee points
out that neither Germany under Hitler nor Italy under Mussolini claimed that their interven-
tion in the Spanish Civil War on behalf of Franco would have justified the use of military
force against the Soviet Union which intervened on behalf of the Spanish loyalists. Id.
274. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2667 quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
275. Id. at 2668 quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 53. Article 53(1) provides that:
(i) The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional ar-
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the geographically disparate Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
does not qualify as a regional organization within the terms of the
United Nations Charter:
The concept that the United States-a country separated by
oceans and thousands of miles from southeast Asia and bereft of
any historical or ethnic connection with the peoples of southeast
Asia-could validly be considered a member of a regional sys-
tem implanted in southeast Asia is utterly alien to the regional
systems envisaged in the Charter. The "Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty"-connecting the United States with south-
east Asia, architectured by Secretary of State Dulles, is a legal-
istic artificial formulation to circumvent the fundamental
limitations placed by the United Nations Charter on unilateral
actions by individual members . . . . SEATO is a caricature of
the genuine regional systems envisaged by the United Nations
Charter. A buffalo cannot be transformed into a giraffe however
elongated its neck may be stretched. The Dulles approach to col-
lective defense treaties employed legal artifice to circumvent the
exclusive authority vested in the United Nations to deal with
breaches in the peace.
2 7 6
In sum, the Lawyers' Committee concluded that it is "difficult
to escape the conclusion . . . that the action of the United States
Government in Vietnam contravenes essential provisions of the
United Nations Charter . . . . The failure of the United States to
honor its obligations under the United Nations Charter is a regretta-
ble but inescapable conclusion which we, as lawyers, have been com-
pelled to reach.
'2 77
The Lawyers' Committee also argued that the Geneva Accords
did not provide a basis for United States intervention. The division
of Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel, according to the, Lawyers'
Committee, was intended to be a temporary step in preparation for a
general national election to form a unified nation. The division was
part of an armistice agreement and was not intended to be a political
or territorial boundary. The historic reality is that Vietnam is a sin-
gle country. An election was to be held "not to determine whether
North and South Vietnam should be united, but to select a govern-
rangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no en-
forcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . ...
Id.
U.N. CHARTER art 53, para. 1. Article 54 provides that:
the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 54.
276. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2668.
277. Id. at 2669.
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ment of the nation of Vietnam, constituting all of Vietnam--north,
south, east, and west. 27 8
The United States pledged it would refrain from the threat or
use of force to disturb the Geneva Accords.279 The American Gov-
ernment also stated that in the case of "nations now divided against
their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through elec-
tions supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are con-
ducted fairly."2 80 The Lawyers' Committee concluded that the
United States, by endorsing the Accords, had recognized the fact
that Vietnam was a single nation. Nevertheless, "the United States
persists in its denial that it is intervening in a civil war. It seeks to
justify the bombing of North Vietnam by the United States on the
basis that North Vietnam is a foreign aggressor in South
Vietnam. '8 1
The Lawyers' Committee thus concluded that the United States
was in violation of the Geneva Accords. It has contravened the
agreement by sending troops into Vietnam, supporting the South's
refusal to conduct elections and by attempting to transform South
Vietnam into a separate state.28 2 Even if North and South Vietnam
are considered to be separate entities or countries, the United States
may not respond by bombing the North.
2 83
It is sobering to realize that if the United States was lawfully
entitled to bomb North Vietnam in response to North Vietnam's
intervention in the Southern civil war, then North Vietnam or
any of its allies would have been lawfully entitled to bomb the
United States in response to the United States much more mas-
sive intervention in that civil war.
284
The Committee also argued that the United States military
presence in Vietnam could not be justified under the SEATO Treaty.
Article IV(l) permits the use of force by a Signatory State in the
event of "aggression by means of armed attack. ' 285 In cases in which
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2670, quoting United States Declaration, supra note 83.
280. Id., citing United States Declaration, supra note 82.
281. Id. The Lawyers Committee notes that President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, sug-
gests that Ho Chi Minh would have emerged victorious in an electoral contest:
I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo
Chinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held at the time of the
fighting possibly 60 percent of the population would have voted for the Commu-
nist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS, 1953-1956,
372 (1963), quoted in Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2670.
282. Id.
283. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5802.
284. Id.
285. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2670, quoting SEATO TREATY, supra
note 94, art. IV, para. 1.
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the integrity or inviolability of any territory covered by the Treaty is
threatened by "other than armed attack," or by any situation which
might "endanger the peace of the area," Article IV(2) requires that
Signatories "consult immediately in order to agree on the measures
to be taken. 128  The Lawyers' Committee argued that the civil war
in Vietnam clearly fell within paragraph 2. However, SEATO had
not endorsed the United States military action in Vietnam. Even if
SEATO had agreed on a course of joint action, the Lawyers' Com-
mittee noted that regional organizations would have been required to
obtain United Nations approval prior to engaging in any "enforce-
ment action.
218 7
The Lawyers' Committee concluded by contending that Ameri-
can intervention in Vietnam also is-violative of the United States
Constitution. They pointed out that the power to make and conduct
foreign policy is not vested exclusively in the President. Such author-
ity is divided between the President and Congress, with "each en-
dowed with complementary, but separate powers and responsibili-
ties."288 In those instances in which diplomacy fails and there is a
need to resort to armed force, the President is constricted by the fact
that the power to declare war is vested in Congress. "Under Article
I, Section 8, Clause II, that power is confided exclusively to the Con-
gress . . . . Under the Constitution, Congress alone must make this
decision. The Clause does not read 'on recommendation of the Presi-
dent,' nor that the 'President with advice and consent of Congress
may declare war.' " 8 According to the Lawyers Committee, the re-
pelling of a "sudden attack" is the only instance in which the Presi-
dent may unilaterally deploy armed force without a declaration of
war.290 The limitations on the President's powers to conduct foreign
policy and to declare war, in the view of the Committee, reflects a
"profound distrust of executive authority and a corresponding reli-
ance upon the legislature as the instrument for the decisionmaking in
this vital area. 291
The Lawyers' Committee conceded that there are many in-
stances in which the President had sent American armed forces
abroad without a declaration of war. However, the Committee
pointed out, that for the most part, these were minor skirmishes or
police actions. 92
None of the incidents, except possibly the Korean conflict, in-
286. Id., quoting SEATO TREATY, supra note 94, art. IV, para. 2.
287. Id., quoting U.N. CHARTER, supra note 218, art. 53(1). See supra note 275.
288. Id. at 2671.
289. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2671.
290. Id.




volves United States war actions comparable in magnitude to
those in Vietnam. None involved the dispatch of military force
for combat to a territory form which, by solemn international
compact, foreign military personnel, foreign equipment and for-
eign bases were to be excluded. Moreover, most of these in-
stances were the product of "gunboat diplomacy" undertaken
before the United Nations Charter limited the permissible use of
force under international law to self-defense against armed
attack.293
According to the Lawyers' Committee, the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion did not constitute a congressional declaration of war. At most, it
approved and supported the determination of the President, as Com-
mander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel an armed
attack against the United States. The Lawyers' Committee conceded
that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution recognized that the maintenance of
international peace and security in Southeast Asia was vital to the
national interest of the United States and declared that the United
States was ready to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed forces, to assist any member or protocol SEATO State to de-
fend their freedom. The Committee, however, stressed that the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution stipulated that all such steps should be conso-
nant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of
the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.29 The Committee also
observed that Congress' appropriation of funds for operations in Vi-
etnam also did not serve as a substitute for a declaration of war.295
The pledges offered by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to
assist South Vietnam also afforded no justification for United States
intervention in Vietnam. These pledges were not ratified by Congress
and did not possess the status of treaties. These pledges also were
ambiguous and did not clearly commit the United States to milita-
rily intervene to defend South Vietnam against internal or external
aggression. 2 " The Lawyers' Committee noted that it was "strange
legal logic retrospectively to construe these carefully guarded offers
of limited assistance as commitments for military intervention." '97
The Committee also observed that South Vietnam is financially and
militarily dependent on the United States. It queried, "[i]n what
sense, then, is such a regime sufficiently constituted as a government
to authorize military intervention of the United States on its
293. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5803.
294. Lawyers Committee I, supra note 180, at 2672.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2669.
297. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5803.
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behalf?"298
The Committee pointed out that the contention that the Presi-
dent may commit United States forces abroad absent a declaration
of war is a dangerous abrogation of executive power which is viola-
tive of the separation of powers. It noted that "[i]f the Constitution
has such elastic, evanescent character . . . presidentially determined
expediency would become . . . the standard of constitutional con-
struction."2 99 At any rate, the Lawyers' Committee observed that
even a congressional declaration of war cannot override the require-
ments of international law and treaties. 300
Since United States actions in South Vietnam violate trea-
ties to which the United States has become a party by ratifica-
tion pursuant to the Constitution, they violate the Supreme Law
of the Land. No branch of the Government, alone or together,
may under the Constitution, authorize actions in violation of
treaties or delegate power to do so. There is no constitutional
authority to violate the Charter of the United Nations, a treaty
of which the United States was a principal architect, which em-
bodies the conscience of mankind, and which is legally binding
on all its members." 1
In conclusion, the Lawyers' Committee called for the uncondi-
tional termination of the bombing of North Vietnam and for the ces-
sation of military operations in South Vietnam. The Committee ad-
vocated the unconditional recognition of the National Liberation
Front and the initiation of negotiations based on the principles em-
bodied in the Geneva Accords of 1954.02
D. Summary
The memoranda drafted by the Department of State and the
Lawyers' Committee were adversarial documents. The legal argu-
ments reflect differing perceptions of the wisdom of United States
involvement in Vietnam and are based upon divergent views concern-
ing the nature of United States foreign policy.303
The Department of State legal memorandum is based on the
premise that Hanoi fomented and organized the revolt in South Viet-
nam and has supplied and augmented the NLF.30 4 It is doubtful
whether this scenario of "aggression from the North," adequately
298. Id. at 5802.
299. Lawyers Committee 11, supra note 180, at 2672.
300. Id. at 2673.
301. Lawyers Committee II, supra note 180, at A5803.
302. Id. at A5804.
303. See generally Richard A. Falk, International Law And The United States Role In
The Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1133-34 (1966).
304. See supra notes 193-212 and accompanying texts.
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captured the complex reality of the Vietnam problem.1 30 5 This in-
terventionist model possessed the virtue of greatly simplifying the
task of legally justifying United States policy. United States inter-
vention could rather easily be portrayed as an exercise of collective
self-defense under the United Nations Charters 6 and as an expres-
sion of the United States obligation to defend a country or territory
which is accorded protection under the SEATO Treaty.3"'
Hanoi, of course, claimed that its infiltration of troops was justi-
fied by the failure of Saigon to enter into consultations concerning
the conduct of national elections. The Department of State, however,
pointed out that Saigon's resistance to elections was based on repres-
sive conditions in the North which made it impossible to guarantee
that an election would permit the expression of popular senti-
ments.30 8 North Vietnam's contravention of the Geneva Accords'
prohibition on the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities
or the furtherance of an aggressive policy was characterized by the
Department of State as a material breach of the Geneva Agreement
which justified the United States' suspension of the demilitarization
provisions of the agreement reached at Geneva. 309
Professor John Norton Moore elaborated on the contention that
Saigon's failure to enter into negotiations concerning the conduct of
elections did not constitute a material breach which justified Hanoi's
invasion of South Vietnam. 10 According to Professor Moore, the
partition of Vietnam was the core provision of the Geneva settlement
which affirmed the separate de facto status of the two territories. 31
He pointed out that the Geneva settlement was largely devoted to
the provisions for a cease-fire and to the transfer of populations be-
tween zones and to the maintenance of troop limitations. 312 Moore
argued that the Western Powers did not expect Vietnam to be united
and, as a result, little attention was devoted to the conduction and
organization of elections. 31 3 The purpose of the partition, in Profes-
sor Moore's view, was to provide a democratic alternative for those
Vietnamese who wished to live under a Communist regime.3""
The Department of State's legal memorandum concluded by
finding constitutional support for the President's authority to commit
305. John N. Moore, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam: A
Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051, 1053 (1967).
306. See supra notes 213-37 and accompanying text.
307. Supra note 238-40 and accompanying text.
308. Supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
310. Moore, supra note 305, at 1055-66.
311. Id. at 1065.
312. Id. at 1062.
313. Id. at 1061-62.
314. Id. at 1062.
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troops abroad in the President's inherent authority as commander in
chief,315 and in the language of the SEATO Treaty 16 and the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution.
31 7
The United States position is clear and uncomplicated. It rests
on the factual assertion that Hanoi organized, launched and contin-
ued to orchestrate an unjustified offensive against South Vietnam.
North Vietnam's armed attack across an internationally recognized
cease-fire line was a violation of the territorial integrity of South Vi-
etnam and was in defiance of the international norm against the uni-
lateral exercise of armed force. The United States military interven-
tion thus was a justifiable act of collective self-defense designed to
halt Hanoi's aggression.
A significant problem with this intervention model is that it as-
sumed that the unrest in the South was completely orchestrated and
organized by North Vietnam. 3 8 John Norton Moore refined the
State Department's position and argued that Hanoi initially assisted
and gradually gained control over the NLF and indigenous rebellion
in the South.3 19 Professor Moore argued that the North Vietnamese
gradually took organizational control of the rebellion in the South.
By 1965, North Vietnamese troops had assumed responsibility for
most of the fighting in South Vietnam.3"' Moore concluded that
North Vietnam "is not simply assisting in a struggle for 'internal
control' of the South, but is substantially tied up with the military
and political leadership of the insurgency in the South and has as a
major, although possibly long term objective; unification with the
South."321
The Lawyers' Committee, in contrast to the Department of
State, viewed Vietnam as an internal, civil war for control of the
southern zone. According to the Lawyers' Committee, the NLF ini-
tially launched an internal rebellion, and Hanoi gradually extended
increasing assistance to the NLF to counter the United States' ex-
panding military intervention.322 Quincy Wright, a leading figure in
the Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, ar-
gued that the United States' portrayal of Vietnam as a war of ag-
gression overlooked that the'conflict in Vietnam was an extension of
the historic struggle to unify Vietnam and compared Ho Chi Minh
to Abraham Lincoln: 3
2 3
315. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 241, 251, and 257 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 193-203 and 209-10 and accompanying text.
319. Moore, supra note 305, at 1070-73.
320. Id. at 1073.
321. Id. at 1075.
322. See generally supra notes 271, 273 and 281 and accompanying text.
323. Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects Of The Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 750,
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The issue of civil strife in America in 1861 and in Viet-Nam in
1965 was whether the Declaration of Independence of the
United States of July 4, 1776, and the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam of September 2,
1945, closely resembling it, contemplated in each case a unified
state as held by Lincoln and Ho Ch Minh, or permitted seces-
sion as held by Jefferson Davis and Diem . . . . [T]he position
of Ho in regard to the legal unity of Viet-Nam is similar to that
of Lincoln in regard to the United States and the position of the
United States in Viet-Nam is similar to that which Great Brit-
ain would have had if it had intervened in behalf of the Confed-
eracy as it threatened to do in 1861, giving rise to diplomatic
notes by Secretary of State Seward and a resolution by Congress
indicating that such a move would be an unfriendly act.324
Hanoi's gradual infiltration of arms, supplies, technical person-
nel and of troops largely comprised of former southerners, in the
view of the Lawyers' Committee,3 25 did not constitute an "armed
attack" under the United Nations Charter
2 6 or SEATO Treaty.327
The United States, thus, may not legally claim that it was engaged
in an act of collective self-defense. 328 Such a claim would be para-
doxical in light of the fact that it was the flaunting of the Geneva
Accords by South Vietnam and the United States which provoked
the NLF and later motivated Hanoi to engage in an armed rebel-
lion. 29 Quincy Wright observed that South Vietnam's refusal to
enter into consultations concerning the conduct of elections was par-
ticularly provocative:
33°
There can be little doubt but that Ho Chi Minh regarded
the Geneva resolutions as part of the settlement to which he
agreed. Military unification of Viet-Nam was within his grasp
after the defeat of France at Dien Bien Phu if external aggres-
sion, especially by the United States, could be avoided. It is in-
credible that he would have agreed to the cease-fire, even though
he desired it, in the hope that it would prevent such intervention,
unless he was convinced that unification would shortly be ef-
fected by the peaceful method of elections. A study of the diplo-
macy at Geneva suggests that the principal Powers except the
United States were more interested in peace than in ideologies,
767 (1966).
324. Id. at 763-64.
325. Supra note 276 and accompanying text.
326. Supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
327. Supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
329. See generally supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
330. Wright, supra note 323, at 759-61. Wright argues that the North Vietnamese mili-
tia did not cross the cease-fire line until after United States bombing attacks were initiated in
February 1965. Wright, supra note 327, at 766.
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and recognized that the political provisions of the settlement,
which would probably result in a national Communist Viet-
Nam, were the price of peace, and were therefore no less impor-
tant than the military provisions.3
Wright went on to argue that South Vietnam's failure to enter into
consultations concerning the conduct of elections to unify Vietnam
suspended Ho Chi Minh's obligation to respect the cease-fire and
authorized Ho to continue his "long effort" to unify Viet-Nam by
force. 2
Critics of the war either viewed Vietnam as a civil war between
competing southern factions, both of whom enlisted outside sup-
port,33 3 or as a resumption of the historic conflict between factions
based in Hanoi and in Saigon.3 34 Scholars also differed as to the
right of outside powers, such as the United States, to intervene in
such a civil war.335 The Lawyers' Committee adopted the position
that the United States unilateral intervention in a civil war between
southern factions "contravenes not only the Geneva Accords but also
the general undertaking, fundamental in international law, that one
state has no right to intervene in the internal affairs of another. 3 3 6
The Lawyers' Committee noted that if that the United States was
entitled under international law to intervene in civil war, then
"North Vietnam's much smaller amount of aid to the southern in-
surgents would then be equally justified, and could not constitute in-
direct aggression, much less 'armed attack.' The entire justification
for United States intervention would collapse. ' '3  The United States'
intervention into Vietnam, in the view of the Lawyers' Committee,
created a dangerous precedent which could lead to counter-interven-
tion by other major powers and the expansion of domestic conflicts
into major international confrontations. The State Department's ar-
gument that North Vietnam's involvement in the South constituted
an "armed attack" would "permit any country in the future to bomb
and defoliate any other country intervening in a civil war by charac-
terizing the latter's intervention as 'armed attack.' . . . [T]he State
Department Memorandum conjures up arguments capable of leading
to unpredictably ominous developments destructive of the world legal
331. Id. at 760.
332. Wright, supra note 323, at 760.
333. See Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in Viet Nam:
A Response to Professor Moore, 76 YALE L.J. 1095, 1109-58 (1967).
334. See Wright, supra note 323, at 763-64.
335. See generally Thomas Farer, Intervention IN Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1967). See also Richard A. Falk, The International Regulation Of
Internal Violence In The Developing Countries,-60 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 58 (1966).
336. Lawyers Committee III, supra note 180, at 73.
337. Id. at 72.
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order.""'8
The United States, in the view of many critics of American pol-
icy in Vietnam, had blurred the distinction between international
and civil wars. Opponents of the war argued that America had por-
trayed an internal subversion as an "armed attack" to justify inter-
vention under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.33 9 The
United States' reliance on Article IV(2) of the SEATO Treaty was
an egregious example of unilateral military intervention being por-
trayed as collective regional action.3 40 Professor Wolfgang Fried-
mann of Columbia concluded that the United States had endeavored
to "disguise . . . legal anarchy by the invocation of formulae that
merely cloak the nakedness of the political and ideological
struggle.
'3 41
Professor John Norton Moore dismissed the attacks on the le-
gality of United States policy in Vietnam as "pseudo-scholarship"
which rigidly interpreted international law "as if it were a municipal
traffic ordinance. 34 2 Technical arguments concerning the constitu-
ent elements of an "armed attack" should not divert attention from
the fundamental reality. The United States, in Professor Moore's
view, was intervening in Vietnam to uphold the United Nations
Charter which prohibits reliance upon armed force as a mechanism
for change in international affairs. Moore emphasized that
"[p]olitical disputes, black, white, or grey, provide no justification
for major resort to force. There is a South Viet-Nam and its neigh-
bors must learn to live in peace with it."'3 43 The American judiciary
soon found itself confronted with the challenge of evaluating the
merits of these various arguments and determining the legality of
United States intervention into Vietnam.
E. United States Intervention Into Vietnam And the American
Judiciary
The United States judiciary circumvented their responsibility to
338. Id. at 73. Some argue that States are permitted to intervene in a civil war and are
required to limit their military activity to the site of the territorial conflict. See Richard A.
Falk, International Law And the United States Role In The Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J.
1122, 1123 (1966).
339. See generally Wolfgang Friedmann, Law And Politics In The Vietnamese War: A
Comment, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 776, 782-83 (1967) [hereinafter Friedman]. This, of course, was
premised on the view that so-called wars of national liberation are a product of an interna-
tional Communist movement that is intent on undermining Western democracies. Id. at 782.
340. Id. at 784.
341. Id. at 785. On the lack of effectiveness of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, see
generally Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing The Use
Of Force By States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
342. John N. Moore, Law And Politics In The Vietnamese War: A Response To Profes-
sor.Friedmann, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1039, 1053 (1967).
343. Id. at 1053.
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determine the international legality of the Vietnam War, claiming
that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the war and that the legal justification of the conflict constituted a
political question. As a result, there was no definitive determination
as to the constitutional status of the War and the legality of the
struggle remained a subject of continuing debate.344
The judiciary proclaimed that it was moving prudently into the
area of foreign affairs and cautioned that "principled forbearance" is
the "touchstone of a wise judicial policy."345 Courts.observed that
such restraint was consistent with democratic principles. It was
noted.that judges "serve democracy best by leaving the principal is-
sues confronting the citizenry for decision to the political branches of
government. The law was not intended nor is it suited to be a mere
substitute for politics."3 "
[T]o fight out questions concerning the wise use of executive au-
thority in the forum of public opinion rather than to transform
such a contest to the judicial arena would more appropriately
serve to vindicate the confidence and conviction of a democratic
society without, at the same time, placing in jeopardy the bal-
ance envisioned by the separation of powers concept and
adopted by our federal system.
The great power wielded by federal courts brings them
close to the most sensitive areas of public affairs. As appeals
from executive decisions or legislative actions become more fre-
quent, judicial self-restraint looms ever more important. Other-
wise, we shall begin to enter political domains far outside our
competence and legitimate concern.""
In a series of cases, courts rejected the standing of individuals to
challenge the legality of the Vietnam War. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the government from sending an
enlisted army private to Fort Dix, New Jersey-a final posting for
soldiers who were to be sent to Vietnam. The plaintiff contended that
the United States Government was ,exceeding its powers in ordering
him to fight in an undeclared and illegal war. 48 The Court explained
that only individuals actually ordered to report to Vietnam possessed
standing to contest the legality of the war. 3 9 The Ninth Circuit
based their rejection of the standing of members of the United
344. See Robert P. Sugarman, Judicial Decisions Concerning The Constitutionality Of
United States Military Activity in Indo-China: A Bibliography Of Court Decisions, 13
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 470 (1974).
345. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd without opinion sub
nom., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
346. Id. at 707-08.
347. Id. at 708.
348. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1970).
349. Id. at 306.
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States Air Force and Army Reserves based upon a similar ration-
ale.35 The Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs had not yet re-
ceived orders to report for duty in Indochina and that, as a result,
"neither actual nor threatened injury is alleged." 351 As a result, the
plaintiffs had failed to allege a personal stake and interest sufficient
to avoid the prohibition against employing the federal courts as a
forum to air generalized grievances. 352 District Court Judge William
T. Sweigert criticized the judiciary's denial of standing to those in
the military and in the reserves:
To say that these . . . plaintiffs must wait until they are called
up, perhaps suddenly, and ordered to the Vietnam area, perhaps
quickly, and then file a court suit for a declaration of their legal
rights, perhaps with too little time to properly do so, borders, we
think, on the absurd.353
Those refusing induction into the military also were unsuccess-
ful in challenging the war. The Sixth Circuit denied standing to a
defendant who refused induction into the armed forces based upon
their belief that they were being conscripted to fight in an illegal
war.354 The Court explained that the defendant's challenge was
''premature" and that he thus lacked standing to raise the illegality
of the war as a defense to a violation of the Selective Service Act.3 55
Judge Harry Phillips explained that if the defendant "had obeyed
the order to be inducted, he might never have been assigned to Viet-
nam and might never have been exposed to the situations of which
he complains." 35 United States v. Sisson3 57 was one of the few cases
which recognized the standing of an individual who refused conscrip-
tion to challenge the legality of the Vietnam War. District Court
Judge Charles Wzanski argued that the judiciary's refusal to grant
standing to those already in the military had insulated the govern-
350. Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F.2d 178, 179,
181-83 (9th Cir. 1972).
351. Id. at 181.
352. Id.
353. 318 F. Supp. at 547 n.12.
354. United States v. Owens, 415 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997
(1970).
355. Id. at 1313..
356. Id. See also United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 984 (D.P.R. 1968).
Taxpayers also lack standing to challenge the legality of the Indo-Chinese War. See Velvel v.
Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970). Finally, the Second
Circuit rejected the standing of Congresswomen Elizabeth Holtzman to challenge the Ameri-
can military incursion into Cambodia. Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd sub nom., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). The Court noted that Congresswomen Holtzman "has not been
denied, any right to vote on Cambodia by any action of the defendants. She has fully partici-
pated in the congressional debates .... [T]he fact that her vote was ineffective was due to
the contrary votes of her colleagues and not the defendants herein." Id.
357. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968), appeal on other
grounds dismissed, 396 U.S. 1035 (1970).
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ment's prosecution of the war from legal accountability.358 Judge
Wzanski went on to argue that "if there is to be a presently effective
judicial review it must come at the point of induction and not
later."359
Courts also refused to rule on the legality of the Vietnam War
on the grounds that this constituted a political question.3 "' In Luftig
v. McNamara,361 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in a per curiam decision refused to rule on the justifia-
bility of the Vietnam War. The Court explained that the deployment
of armed force outside the borders of the United States was the ex-
clusive constitutional preserve of the Presidency and Congress.3 62
It is difficult to think of an area less suited for judicial ac-
tion than that into which Appellant would have us intrude. The
fundamental division of authority and power established by the
Constitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of
foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these
matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the
Executive.363
358. Id. at 512-13.
359. Id. at 513. See also Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(recognizes standing of taxpayers to challenge the legality of the war).
There are few citizens who could be so callous as to be unmoved by the almost
daily reports in the media of the death and destruction being caused by this war
.... The blood of these men provides a sufficient "conversational" interest on
the part of every citizen in saving the human resources of this nation.
The fact that our nation is at war also necessarily causes some threat to the
personal safety and security of all the citizens, given the complexity of interna-
tional relations and the advanced means of war that have been developed
through technology. Finally, plaintiffs have alleged that the expenditure of bil-
lions of dollars on the war has resulted in there being less funds available to be
expended on urgent domestic needs . . . . [C]onsidering the huge expenditures
on the war this cannot be dismissed as idle speculation.
Id.
360. See Sugarman, supra note 344, at 472.
These courts set forth four reasons to justify their conclusion: First, the courts do
not have the necessary expertise to make competent judgments about the con-
duct of foreign affairs. Second, questions concerning the conduct of foreign af-
fairs and the use of military power are within the exclusive province of coordi-
nate branches of government. Third, the courts are reluctant to render a decision
that could have unpredictable international consequences. Fourth, the courts felt
that they lacked appropriate standards to reach a decision.
Id. But see Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971) (holding that the constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the Con-
gress contains a discoverable and manageable standard imposing on the Congress a duty of
mutual participation in the prosecution of war. The propriety of the means by which Congress
has chosen to ratify and approve the protracted military operations in Southeast Asia, how-
ever, is a political question). See also Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1971);
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2nd Cir. 1970). The principles governing the determination
of a political questions are set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
361. Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
934 (1954).
362. Id. at 665-66.
363. Id.
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Courts also rested their invocation of the political question doctrine
on the grounds of public policy. In Sisson, Judge Wyzanski ex-
plained that the federal courts were ill-equipped to analyze the di-
vergent factual contentions of those who challenged or supported the
legality of the war:
It is not an act of abdication when a court says that political
questions of this sort are not within its jurisdiction. It is a recog-
nition that the tools with which a court can work, the data
which it can fairly appraise, the conclusions which it can reach
as a basis for entering judgments, have limits.3 64
In addition, judges pointed out that a decision which questioned the
legality of the Vietnam War might impede the conduct of foreign
policy. Judicial interference with the prosecution of the war could
lower morale and cripple the American war effort, strain relations
with Asian allies, and encourage Communist subversion throughout
the third world. It was noted that these are the type of "implications
for which the political branches must, under our system of govern-
ment, stand responsible at the polls."6 5
The United States Supreme Court avoided the Vietnam issue by
denying certiorari36 or affirming lower court decisions without issu-
ing an opinion.36 7 The Court clearly was reluctant to interfere with
the war effort. In Gillette v. United States,368 the Court majority
interpreted the Selective Service Act so as to preclude so-called "se-
lective conscientious objection"-the recognition of conscientious ob-
jector status for those opposed to the Vietnam War rather than 'to
"war in any form."369 Justice Marshall emphasized that the "exemp-
tion of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of
those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite
personal cost, uneasiness at the prospect of violence, or even serious
moral reservations or policy objections concerning the particular con-
flict."137 0 Justice Marshall stressed that this "mood of bitterness and
cynicism ' 371 would interfere with the Government's "interest in pro-
curing the manpower necessary for military purposes.
'
"372
Justices Stewart and Douglas chastised their brethren for refus-
364. 294 F. Supp. at 515.
365. 347 F. Supp. at 707.
366. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 934
(1967), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 1025 (1967).
367. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affid without opinion sub nom.
Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
368. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
369. Id. at 443.
370. Id. at 459-60.
371. Id. at 460.
372. Id. at 462. But see United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970) (recognizing selective conscientious objection).
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ing to rule on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. 73 Dissent-
ing from the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in Mora v.
McNamara,"4 Justice Stewart admonished the Court:
These are large and deeply troubling questions . . . . We cannot
make these problems go away simply by refusing to hear the
case of three obscure Army privates . . . I think the Court
should squarely face them by granting certiorari and setting this
case for oral argument. 75
In Mitchell v. United States,37 Justice Douglas enumerated the le-
gal questions surrounding the Vietnam War and conceded that
"[t]hese are extremely sensitive and delicate questions. But they
should, I think, be answered . . . . I think the petition for certiorari
should be granted.
3 77
The Supreme Court's decisions to deny certiorari, to dismiss
suits without a reasoned opinion, and to avoid discussing the legality
of the Vietnam War, along with the decisions of other courts, helped
to create a "limbo of legality" surrounding the war.3 8 The impact of
the Court's decisions was to further fuel the legal debate over the
war.379 Professor Louis Loeb, writing in 1969, conceded that there
were valid political reasons for the Court's reluctance to become em-
broiled in the Vietnam debate.3 80 However, he argued that this judi-
cial abstention must be "rejected morally. Individual life, liberty and
belief were and are at stake." 381
This judicial abdication meant that the Executive and the mili-
tary were free to prosecute the war without having to concern them-
selves with legal oversight or restraint. As a result, those who
designed American military strategies and tactics paid little atten-
tion to the requirements of the international humanitarian law of
war.382 There was no detailed public debate concerning the legality
of American military strategies and tactics in Vietnam. As Professor
Wolfgang Friedmann noted in 1967, the Vietnam Conflict was being
373. See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. at 934.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 935 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
376. United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972
(1967).
377. Id. at 973-74 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
378. Graham Hughes, Civil Disobedience And The Political Question Doctrine, 43
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1968).
379. Id. at 18-9. Judicial reluctance to review the war is discussed in Falk, The Nurem-
berg Defense in the Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 8, 211-14 (1974).
380. Louis Loeb, The Courts And Vietnam, 18 AM. U. L. REV. 376, 395 (1969).
381. Id.
382. See generally CRIMES OF WAR A LEGAL POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIM-
INAL ACTS IN WAR (Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko & Robert J. Lifton eds., 1971) [hereinaf-
ter Falk, Kolko & Liftonl.
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pursued in a "legal vacuum."383
II. American War Crimes in Vietnam
A. American Strategy, Tactics And The Humanitarian Law Of
War
The United States confronted a guerilla war in Vietnam. The
NLF and North Vietnamese launched a war of attrition designed to
frustrate and exhaust the morale of the American forces. The
Vietnamese avoided large-scale confrontations. Instead, they relied
on "hit and run" tactics-quickly striking and then disappearing into
the jungles. The Americans were frustrated over their inability to
locate and to engage the Vietnamese. They adopted a military strat-
egy designed to deny the guerrillas the safety of their jungle sanctu-
ary. This involved the destruction of vegetation and food crops, the
forced removal of villagers from the war zone so as to prevent them
from assisting the enemy, and the systematic deployment of heavy
ordinance against suspected guerilla headquarters. 8' This policy of
"[t]error bombing and the indiscriminate killing" was based on
"four key factors:1
385
(a) American wealth and technological capability which permit
the use of virtually unlimited supplies of ordinance and modern
weapons, and which constitutes the U.S. military advantage; (b)
the absence of any threat of enemy retaliation by terror attacks
on the United States; (c) the desire, and political need, to reduce
American casualties, which in the short run is helped by the lav-
ish use of firepower; (d) the fact that the bulk of the rural popu-
lation of South Vietnam supports or tolerates the NLF and
DRV and is thus treated as enemy.3 86
The prominent French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that
America was not concerned only with defeating the Vietnamese.
They were sending a stern message to the Third World--that the
price of revolt would be genocide. 8 7 Sartre wrote that this "genoci-
dal example is addressed to the whole of humanity. By means of this
warning, six percent of mankind hopes to succeed in controlling the
other ninety-four percent at a reasonably low cost in money and
effort."3 8
There is no question that United States policy in Vietnam was
383. Friedmann, supra note 339, at 785.
384. See generally Gabriel Kolko, War Crimes And The Nature Of The Vietnam War
in Falk, Kolko & Lifton, supra note 382, at 403.
385. EDWARD S. HERMAN, ATROCITIES IN VIETNAM MYTHS AND REALITIES 58 (1970).
386. Id. at 58-59.
387. Jean-Paul Sartre, On Genocide, in Falk, Kolko & Lifton, supra note 382, at 534-
388. Id. at 540.
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subject to the requirements of the humanitarian law of war.3 89 The
Geneva Conventions of 1949390 had been ratified by the United
States391 as well as by North3 92 and South Vietnam.393 The United
States3 9' and South Vietnam3 95 acknowledged that the Conventions
were applicable to the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese and the
NLF, however, proclaimed that they were not bound by the Geneva
Conventions. 39' Nevertheless, the laws of war apply to "all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict . . . even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of [the Parties]."39 7 The Conventions
also shall apply "[a]lthough one of the Powers in conflict may not be
a party to the present Convention." '98 Nor is a declaration of war
required. The United States Army Field Manual proclaims that "a
declaration of war is not an essential condition of the application of
[customary humanitarian] law. Similarly, treaties relating to
'war' may become operative notwithstanding the absence of a formal
declaration of war. 399
389. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Supreme Court recognized that "[fOrom
the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as
including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status,
rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals." Id. at 27-28. The law of
warfare is part of customary and positive international law which is binding upon the United
States. See generally Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
390. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949 (1955) 3 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949 (1955) 3
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955) 3 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [here-
inafter Geneva I1]; Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In
Time Of War, Aug. 12, 1949, (1955) 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
IV].
391. See 213 U.N.T.S. 378-84 (1955) cited in Comment, Punishment for War Crimes:
Duty-or Discretion, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 1312, 1315 n.21 (1971).
392. See 275 U.N.T.S. 335-42 (1957) cited in Punishment for War Crimes: Duty or
Discretion, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1312, 1316 n.32.
393. 181 U.N.T.S. 349-52 (1953) cited in Punishment for War Crimes: Duty or Discre-
tion, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1312, 1316 n.32.
394. Letter from Dean Rusk, Sec. of State, to the International Committee of the Red
Cross, Aug. 10, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 1173 (1965).
395. Letter from Tran-Van-Do, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, Aug. 10, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 1174 (1965).
396. Letter from Bui Tan Linh, Acting Head of the Cabinet, to the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, Aug. 31, 1965, 5 I.L.M. 124 (1966). The North Vietnamese an-
nounced that they would treat American pilots as war criminals. Id. The North Vietnamese
lodged a significant reservation to Article 85 of the Prisoners of War Convention (Geneva III).
See Comment, The Geneva Convention And The Treatment Of Prisoners Of War In Vietnam,
80 HARV. L. REV. 851, 862 (1967). It would be "most difficult for the United States to argue
that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not apply vis-a-vis the National Liberation Front
which is not a party, inasmuch as the United States has consistently characterized the NLF as
a political arm of Hanoi in the South." Anthony A. D'Amato, Harvey L. Gould & Larry D.
Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service Re-
sister, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1969) [hereinafter D'Amato, Gould & Woods].
397. This is stated in Article 2, common to all four conventions, supra note 390.
398. Id.
399. Department of the Army Field Manual, No. 27-19, para. 9 (1956) reprinted in
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In any event, "the United States [had] never denied nor con-
tested the applicability of the international law of warfare to the
American military engagements in Vietnam."' 00 It explicitly had
recognized that the conflict in Vietnam was an "international con-
flict to which both customary and written or conventional law of war
apply, and the United States [had] declared its intent to observe this
law."' 0 1 As a result, there is no question that both the Geneva Con-
ventions and other international treaties were fully applicable to
American troops in Vietnam.' 2 United States military activities also
were to be guided by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff'03 and by field manuals issued by the various
military branches.' 04 Despite this purported adherence to interna-
tional treaties, United States' military practices and procedures were
in gross and persistent disregard of the humanitarian law of war.
American rural strategy was based on what, in the language of
the bureaucracy, was termed "forced-draft urbanization and mod-
Excerpts From The U.S. Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, in WAR CRIMES
AND THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE 184, 188 (Erwin Knoll & Judith Nies McFadden eds. 1970)
[hereinafter Army Field Manual].
400. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1059.
401. United States Army, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT: VOLUME I THE REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATION 9-2 (1970) [hereinafter PEERS REPORT]. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are
applicable to conflicts of "an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties. In other instances, the Parties shall be bound by provisions of com-
mon Article three which sets forth certain minimum standards of conduct. Each convention
contains a common Article 3, supra note 390. Article Three, in part, provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including mem-
bers of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-men-
tioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Supra note 390, at art. 3.
402. See generally Convention (No. IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War
On Land, With Annex Of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans
631 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
403. PEERS REPORT, supra note 401, at 9-5-6.
404. See supra note 399.
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ernization. ' 0 5 This was a euphemism for expelling the Vietnamese
from their villages in order to deny the guerrillas a base of support.
Central to this strategy was the strategic hamlet program which in-
volved the evacuation of peasants to government-controlled enclosed
villages. The peasants' livestock, possessions, and crops were de-
stroyed to prevent them from being used to sustain enemy forces.
Those peasants who were forced from their ancestral lands and de-
ported into-these new hamlets experienced alienation, anomie, and
developed resentment towards the South Vietnamese government.
0 6
Living conditions in the hamlets were appalling 0 7 and those inside
invariably shifted their loyalties to the NLF.0 8 Article 49 of the Ge-
neva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In
Time Of War prohibits "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as
well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. 410
Evacuation is only permitted in order to provide for the "security" of
the population or if "imperative military reasons so demand.1
410
Also, those transferred are to be provided proper hygiene, health,
safety and nutrition and are to be transported back to their homes as
soon as hostilities in the area have ceased."1"
The massive relocation program clearly would have been per-
missible to protect the rural population.' 2 However, the true purpose
405. Noam Chomsky, The Rule of Force in International Affairs, 80 YALE L.J. 1456,
1470 (1971).
406. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 165-67.
407. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 147
(1971).
408. KARNOW, supra note 44, at 273-74.
409. Geneva IV, supra note 390, at art. 49.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Waldemar A. SoIlf, A Response To Telford Taylor's Nuremberg And Vietnam: An
American Tragedy, 5 AKRON L. REV. 43, 52-53 (1972). The Geneva Civilian's Convention
distinguishes between the law applicable in occupied territory on the one hand, and the mini-
mum protection to the population generally (including the battle area) on the other." Id. at 50.
A major debate concerned whether various rural areas where to be considered occupied or
contested territory. Id. I am assuming that Vietnamese in rural areas were protected by Ge-
neva IV, supra note 390. The Civilian Persons Convention applies to "all cases of partial or
total occupation of a territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance." Geneva IV, supra note 390, at art. 2. Article 4 goes on to state that
persons protected by the Convention "are those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." Geneva IV, supra note 390, at
art. 4. These provisions certainly encompassed Vietnamese being detained by American troops.
However, Article 4 goes on to exclude those who are nationals of a State which "has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are." Geneva IV, supra note 390,
at art. 4. In the latter instance, it is thought that individuals being detained can rely on normal
diplomatic processes for protection against abuse. It seems clear, however, that diplomatic
channels were not sufficient to provide protection to Vietnamese civilians who were being con-
fronted or detained by American troops. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 133. The best approach
to analyzing article 4 is to distinguish between "friendly" and "enemy" territory. Most con-
tested rural areas of South Vietnam were under NLF control and fell within the latter cate-
gory. The South Vietnamese regime viewed the population as hostile and had little interest in
extending protection to the inhabitants. TAYLOR, supra note 411, at 134.
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was to insulate the peasantry from the influence of the Viet Cong
and to create a base of support for the South Vietnamese regime. 13
More importantly, the strategic hamlet program was a central com-
ponent in an illegal military rural strategy. The areas vacated by the
peasantry were declared "free fire zones" in which by official decla-
ration, "there are no friendly forces or populace and in which targets
may be attacked on the initiative of US/FW (Free World) com-
manders."' 14 Pursuant to this policy, United States' forces breached
the law of war by making no effort to distinguish between civilians
and combatants. 15 This was the so-called "mere gook rule," accord-
ing to which "anything that moves and has a yellow skin is an en-
emy, unless there is incontrovertible evidence to the contrary."' 16
The United States also engaged in a scorched earth policy. Va-
cated villages were burned to the ground. At times, inhabited vil-
lages were surrounded and attacked without warning in the course of
"search and destroy" missions.4 As many as four million refugees
may have been created by this scorched earth policy. 18 This destruc-
tion and immolation of civilian foodstuffs and property was in fla-
grant disregard of law of war.' 9
"Free fire" zones were carpeted with anti-personnel weapons
such as cluster bombs units (CBU's)--canisters which burst in the
air, each scattering three hundred baseball-sized explosives which
detonated on impact. Each unit, in turn, scattered hundreds of pea-
sized, napalm coated pellets at a high velocity over a wide area.
CBU's were inherently incapable of discriminating between civilians
and combatants. Once penetrating the human body, these pellets
were both difficult to detect and to remove.' 20 The Hague Conven-
tion introduces an overtly moral dimension into the humanitarian
law of war and admonishes that the "right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.' 4 1 The use of CBU's
also would appear to fall within the proscription against killing or
wounding "treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
413. KARNOW, supra note 44, at 272-73. By September 1962 it is estimated that almost
one-third of the population of South Vietnam was living in the hamlets. This figure is exagger-
ated, but it provides some sense of the extensive nature of the program. Id. at 273.
414. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 61 quoting Civilian Casualty, Social Welfare and Ref-
ugee problems in South Vietnam, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Refugees, Senate
Judiciary Committee, 91st Congress, First Session, part 1, 1969, 27.
415. Geneva IV, supra note 394, at art. 27.
416.! Chomsky, supra note 405, at 1470.
417. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 62, 83-87.
418. Id. at 86.
419. See Geneva IV, supra note 390, at arts. 53 (prohibits destruction by the Occupying
Power of a private person's real or personal property) 55 (Occupying Power has the duty of
ensuring that the population is provided the necessary food and medical supplies).
420. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 72-74.
421. Hague Convention, suprd note 402, art. 22.
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or army;" '422 as well as within the prohibition against the employ-
ment of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to "cause unneces-
sary suffering.
423
The CBU was one of an array of legally questionable weapons
deployed by American forces. Large quantities of the powerful tear-
gas CS was heavily used in South Vietnam. The use of CS rose from
93,000 pounds in 1965, to 869,000 pounds in 1968 to 2,334,000
pounds in 1969. Tear gas mainly was deployed to force NLF soldiers
out of their tunnels. The gas induced vomiting and in many cases
infected the lungs and caused pulmonary edema. 424
Fifty thousand tons of napalm were dropped on enemy forces
and on villages suspected of being friendly to the NLF by the end of
1966.42 5 Napalm is a jellied gasoline combined with phosphorus and
other chemicals, which depending on the mixture, burns at between
eight hundred and three thousand degree centigrade. Those suffering
phosphorous burns die a particularly painful death--the phosphorus
fragments continue to burn inside the body for eight to ten days. 421
The United States also deployed a range of chemical herbicides
designed to destroy crops, vegetation, and foliage. 427 A 1967 Japa-
nese study claimed that United States' herbicides had contaminated
almost 3.8 million acres of arable land in South Vietnam and killed
roughly one thousand peasants and over one thousand head of live-
stock. Many of these herbicides entered the food chain and caused
fetal death and birth defects. 2 Noam Chomsky, in 1971, described
the effects of the defoliant program.
Some six and one-half million acres have been defoliated with
chemical poisons, often applied at tremendous concentrations.
Included are perhaps one-half million acres of crop-growing
land. South Vietnam, once a major rice-exporter, is now import-
ing enormous quantities of food . . .[a]bout one acre in six has
been sprayed by defoliants. In many areas, there are no signs of
recovery. Crop destruction is done largely with an arsenical
compound which may remain in the soil for years and is not
cleared for use on crops in the United States. A contaminant in
422. Id. at art. 23(b).
423. Id. at 23(e). This Article reflects several principles. Maiming and killing should be
efficient-a weapon should not cause superfluous suffering to the victim. The damage resulting
from the deployment of a weapon also should be proportionate to the objective to be attained.
A weapon, such as the CBU, which causes severe individual suffering to combatants and
which, while targeting combatants, inflicts needless injury on civilians violates this provision.
424. HERMAN, supra note 389, at 81.
425. Id. at 71.
426. Id. at 71-72.
427. Id. at 75.
428. Seymour Hersh, Chemical Warfare In Vietnam, in Falk, Kolko & Lifton, supra
note 382, at 285, 286-87. As much as one-half of the arable land in Vietnam may have been
sprayed. Id. at 288.
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the herbicides, dioxin, is known to be a highly potent agent caus-
ing birth defects in mammals.429
The Geneva Protocol of 1925430 prohibits the "use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids,
materials, or devices." '431 At the time of the Vietnam War, the
United States was not a signatory to the Protocol. However, the
agreement was viewed as part of customary international law and
was considered binding upon all countries, including the United
States. 32 The Protocol also clearly encompasses and prohibits the
use of tear gas"" as well as chemical defoliants and herbicides. 3"
Such sprays also appear to contravene the Hague Convention's pro-
hibition on "poison or poisoned weapons."' 36 Napalm arguably falls
within the prohibition on "analogous liquids, materials or de-
vices."'4 36 A different approach might be to recognize that napalm
emits large quantities of carbon monoxide. This deadly asphyxiating
gas is at least "equally effective, in terms of the number of victims
killed or injured as the direct burning by napalm itself . . . . Thus,
as a lethal-gas-producing 'device' . . . napalm may come within the
prohibition of the laws of war even though its most obvious and dra-
matic effect is combustion."""
In truth, all of South Vietnam and a significant portion of
North Vietnam were transformed into a "free fire zone." The United
States unleashed an unrelenting air war. By the end of 1969, it had
dropped seventy tons of bombs for every square mile of North and
South Vietnam; and five hundred pounds of bombs had been dropped
for every resident of Vietnam. 38 The tonnage of bombs dropped in
all of Vietnam, an agricultural country slightly larger in size than
429. Chomsky, supra note 405, at 1473.
430. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous Or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65.
431. Id.
432. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1091. See also William V. O'Brien,
Selective Conscientious Objection And International Law, 56 GEo. L.J. 1080, 1117-8 (1968).
433. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 82-83.
434. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1095. The authors argue that
"[a]lthough not technically 'gases,' these spray chemicals ejected in mist or cloud-like form are
covered by the language of the Geneva Protocol which applies to 'gases, and . all analogous
liquids, materials or devices.' " Id.
435. Hague Convention, supra note 402, at art. 23(a).
436. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1096.
437. Id. at 1097. The debate over the use of tear gas, herbicides and tear gas need not
focus on the nuances of legal language. The so-called Martens Clause of the Hague Conven-
tion states that the humanitarian law of war should be broadly interpreted in light of "the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience. Hague Convention, supra note 402.
438. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 55. An average of 1,600 B-52 sorties per month were
flown during 1970. Id. at 56. During the period 1967-9, total United States ordinance expendi-
tures out-numbered those by the NLF-DRV by a ratio of 450-to-1. Id. at 55.
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New York State, exceeded the total tonnage of bombs expended by
the Allies in the European and Asian theaters during World War
II.'1 9 In order to dislodge the enemy, U.S. forces often deployed
bombs in an indiscriminate fashion against villages thought to har-
bor the Viet Cong. "4 0 Such attacks also were designed to terrorize
the peasantry in order to intimidate and deter them from assisting
the guerrillas. 4 As one general noted "[y]ou've got to dry up the
sea the guerilla swim in--that's the peasants--and the best way to do
that is blast the hell out of their villages so they'll come into our
refugee camps. No villages, no guerrillas: simple."" 2 In the North, a
number of studies determined that hospitals, schools, and churches
were intentionally destroyed." 3 In addition, the United. States
targeted dikes and damns, in an attempt to flood cities and destroy
the water supply. 4' As the war droned on, northern fishing villages
and rice paddies were targeted."
45
The conventional view is that there are no firm rules limiting
aerial bombardment.4 6 However, bombing certainly may not be in-
tentionally directed against non-military targets."4 The Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick prohibits attacks on hospitals and mobile medical units.
48
The Hague Convention is even more expansive and extends protec-
tion to buildings dedicated to medical, humanitarian, religious, scien-
tific purposes as well as to historic monuments. 4  The Hague Con-
vention also states that the attack or bombardment of "towns,
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohib-
ited.' 450 The 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare were never rati-.,
fled and are not legally binding. 51 Nevertheless, they have some per-
suasive authority in adjudging the legality of aerial bombardment
439. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1084.
440. Erich Norden, American Atrocities In Vietnam, in Falk, Kolko & Lifton, supra
note 382, at 265, 278-80.
441. Id. at 282. See also Richard Gott, Precision Bombing Not Very Precise, in Falk,
Koko & Lifton, supra note 382, at 397.
442. Chomsky, supra note 405, at 1470.
443. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1085-86.
444. Id. at 1087.
445. Id. at 1087-88.
446. See Hamilton Desaussure, The Laws of Air Warfare: Are There Any?, 5 INT'L
LAW. 527 (1971).
447. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1081-2. Non-military targets are
expansively defined to encompass roads, bridges, railroads tunnels and transportation facilities.
Id. at 1081.
448. Geneva I, supra note 390, at art. 19.
449. Hague Convention, supra note 402, at art. 27.
450. Id. at art. 25. The officer in command of an attacking force must before commenc-
ing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, "do all in his power to warn the authorities."
Id. at art. 26.




against civilian targets."52 Article 24 states that aerial bombardment
is legitimate only when directed against a military object.45s The
bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not in
the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is pro-
hibited.' 54 Article 22 prohibits aerial bombardment for the purpose
of terrorizing the civilian population or damaging private property
which is not of a military character or injuring non-combatants. 5
. Leaflets distributed by American troops did warn villagers that
their hamlets would be destroyed if they cooperated with or har-
bored the Viet Cong.' 5 a Such notice, however, has no legal signifi-
cance. These air strikes clearly were violative of the proscription
against attacking civilian targets.'57 In addition, they constituted il-
legal reprisals and an illicit collective penalty, intimidation and ter-
ror tactic.' 58
The United States Rules of Engagement (ROE) affirm that ae-
rial attacks against civilians and civilian targets are prohibited.
Airpower was to be employed with the objective of eliminating "inci-
dents involving friendly forces, noncombatants and damage to civil-
ian property.' 4 9 American forces were admonished that whether an
individual, at any given time, lived in a Viet Cong or South
Vietnamese hamlet depends to a large extent upon factors beyond
their control. As a result, commanders were directed to avoid the
deployment of "unnecessary force leading to noncombatant battle
casualties in area temporarily controlled by the VC."' 60
Civilians suspected of being part of the Viet Cong infrastructure
were targeted for assassination or arrest under the Operation Phoe-
nix Program. 6 ' The Saigon government claimed that under the
Phoenix program, 40,994 suspected civilians who were working on
452. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1083.
453. Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, supra note 451 at art. 24(l). A military objective
is an object of vhich "the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage
to the belligerent.
454. Id. at art. 24(3). Such buildings may be bombarded where there "exists a reasona-
ble presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bom-
bardment, having regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian population." Id. at art.
24(4).
455. Id. at art. 22.
456. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 144.
457. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
458. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 145. Geneva IV, supra note 390, at art. 33 (prohibit-
ing collective penalties and measures of intimidation and terrorism as well as reprisals).
459. PEERS REPORT, supra note 401, at 9-6.
460. Id. at 9-8. The ROE did permit the bombing or shelling without warning if Ameri-
can troops received fire from the village. The villagers were presumed able to prevent the use
of their village as a fire base. Any village known to be hostile could be bombed or shelled if its
inhabitants were warned in advance, either by the dropping of leaflets or by helicopter loud-
speaker. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH His-
TORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 189 (1977).
461. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 47.
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behalf of the enemy were killed between August 1968 and the mid-
dle of 1971.62 In 1971, William Colby, Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA), estimated that Operation Phoenix had de-
tected and interned twenty-eight thousand civilian members of the
Viet Cong cadre in South Vietnam. According to Colby, twenty
thousand had been killed and another seventeen thousand had de-
fected.4 63 These covert operations usually were carried out by former
criminals or communists recruited and paid by the CIA.464 In their
eagerness to meet their quota, these CIA operatives often inadver-
tently targeted "innocent" individuals. 46  Francis FitzGerald writes
that the terror of the Phoenix program was reminiscent of that prac-
ticed under Diem. The program enabled the United States to ignore
the limitations of the humanitarian law of war and to arrest, torture
or kill "anyone in the country, whether or not the person was carry-
ing a gun."' 6  This covert program, of course, was a flagrant viola-
tion of international humanitarian law of war. It is prohibited to en-
gage in violent attacks on civilians.6 7 The arbitrary internment or
execution of civilians also was in disregard of the due process protec-
tions to be accorded to those suspected of criminal offenses.468
The same type of arbitrary treatment was meted out to prison-
ers of war. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that American
troops tortured, decapitated, shot and pushed prisoners out of heli-
copters.46 9 Most of those turned over to the South Vietnamese re-
portedly were subjected to abuse and torture.
Methods of torture include mutilation, disembowelment, near-
drowning, bamboo slivers under fingernails, smothering with wet
towels, dragging the prisoner behind a moving vehicle, pouring
water with hot pepper into the nose, wire-cage confinement, and
rice-paddy strangulation. After torture, the captors usually exe-
cute the prisoner. Peter Hamill, correspondent for the New
York Post, wrote in 1966 that there are no huge prisoner-of-war
camps springing up in South Vietnam as there were during the
second World War; prisoners are "usually executed. 47
0
462. NOAM CHOMSY & EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS-VOLUME I: THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM 324
(1979).
463. NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIET-
NAM 733 (1988).
464. CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note 462, at 325. They were paid eleven thousand
dollars for a living Viet Cong operative and five thousand five hundred dollars for a dead Viet
Cong. Id.
465. Id. at 326-27.
466. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 550.
467. See Geneva IV, supra note 390, at arts. 27-33.
468. Id. at arts. 66-75.
469. D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1077-79.
470. Id. at 1079.
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The Americans, of course, schooled the South Vietnamese in these
techniques and tolerated, if not encouraged, the abuse of POW's.
47 1
Such abuse, torture, and murder of prisoners was a flagrant vio-
lation of international humanitarian law. 472 Article 13 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War provides
that prisoners must be "humanely treated. '473 Acts causing death or
which seriously endanger the health of a prisoner of war are prohib-
ited and constitute a "serious breach" of the Convention.4 74 The
transfer of prisoners to the South Vietnamese did not absolve the
United States of responsibility. Before turning such prisoners over to
the South, the United States was obligated'to satisfy itself of the
"willingness and ability of the South Vietnamese to adhere to the
Geneva Convention. 475 Once having received notice that the South
Vietnamese were not carrying out the requirements of the Conven-
tion, the United States was required to "take effective measures to
correct the situation or . . . [to] request the return of the prisoners
of war. '476 Telford Taylor, Chief Counsel for the United States at
Nuremberg, concluded that, in view of the South Vietnamese record
of prisoner mistreatment "it might well be doubted whether the cir-
cumstances of transfer of our prisoners to their hands was in compli-
ance with these requirements.
477
Vietnam, in the words of Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Her-
man, was a "deliberately imposed bloodbath. '47 8 American decision-
makers were determined to destroy the Viet Cong and their base of
support.4 79 Success was measured in terms of body counts - the
number of Vietnamese bodies left on the battlefield.480 General Wil-
liam DePuy, who was instrumental in designing the war of attrition
against the Vietnamese, proclaimed that "[t]he solution in Vietnam
is more bombs, more shells, more napalm . . . till the other side
cracks and gives up."481 The key, according to General William
Westmoreland the Commander of United States forces in Vietnam,
was to "'stomp' the enemy to death. 41 82 When questioned about the
large number of civilian casualties from air strikes and shelling,
Westmoreland noted that "Yes, . . it is a problem . . . but it does
471. Id. at 1080-81.
472. Hague Convention, supra note 402, at arts. 4, 7.
473. Geneva III, supra note 390, at art. 13.
474. Id.
475. Id. at art. 12.
476. Id.
477. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 149-50. See generally HERMAN, supra note 385, at 68-
70.
478. CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note 462, at 304.
479. Id. at 308.
480. Id. at 310.
481. Quoted in Sheehan, supra note 463, at 619.
482. Quoted in id. at 620.
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deprive the enemy of the population, doesn't it?"'48 In the end, be-
tween a fifth and a quarter of the civilian population was wounded or
killed by military operations in Vietnam. 84 This translated into
roughly twenty-five thousand civilian dead per year, an *average of
sixty-eight men, women and children every day.'8 5 The most lasting
memory of this onslaught was the My Lai massacre in which as
many as four hundred helpless civilians were intentionally shot at
close range by American troops.486 One officer observed that "My
Lai represented to the average professional soldier nothing more
than being caught in a cover-up of something which he knew had
been going on for a long time on a smaller scale." 8  Any estimate of
war-related fatalities, of course, cannot accurately account for those
who later died from war-related maladies and toxic poisoning. For
instance, the use of the defoliant Agent Orange left the South
Vietnamese with a level of dioxin poison in their bodies which was
three times higher than the inhabitants of the United States.4
8 8
The Vietnam massacre generally is attributed to misguided poli-
cies rather than to deliberate cruelty. In his classic defense of Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson, Townsend Hoopes wrote:
Lyndon Johnson, though disturbingly volatile, was not in
his worst moments an evil man in the Hitlerian sense. And his
principle advisers were, almost uniformly, those considered when
they took office to be among the ablest, the best, the most hu-
mane and liberal men that could be found for public trust. No
one doubted their honest, high-minded pursuit of the best inter-
ests of their country, and indeed of the whole non-communist
world, as they perceived those interests. 89
Chomsky and Herman argue that any notion that the Vietnam
bloodbath was the inadvertent result of misguided policies is belied
by the "mile after mile of lunar craters, razed villages, and the
graves of hundreds of thousands of permanently pacified peas-
ants. 490 Was all this an accident? Did it escape notice? They con-
483. Quoted in id. at 621. Westmoreland compared United States policy to a "meat-
grinder" which would mechanically exterminate the enemy. CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note
462, at 308.
484. HERMAN, supra note 385, at 44. The standard figures for civilian casualties are
400,000 dead, 900,000 wounded and 6.4 million refugees. CHOMSKY & HERMAN, supra note
462, at 312.
485. SHEEHAN, supra note 463, at 617.
486. See PEERS REPORT, supra note 401, at 2-3.
487. EDWARD L. KING, THE DEATH OF THE ARMY 122 (1972) quoted in DOUGLAS KIN-
NARD. THE WAR MANAGERS AMERICAN GENERALS REFLECT ON VIETNAM 52 (1977).
488. SHEEHAN, supra note 463, at 619.
489. Townsend Hoopes, The Nuremberg Suggestion, in Falk, Koko & Lifton, supra
note 382, at 233, 236.
490. NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS-VOLUME I: AFTER THE CATACLYSM: POSTWAR INDOCHINA AND THE RECONSTRUC-
TION OF IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY 15 (1979).
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clude that patriotism blinded Americans to the fact that their leader-
ship deliberately committed massive atrocities in Vietnam.
The beauty of nationalism is that whatever the means your state
employs, since the leadership always proclaims noble objectives,
and a nationalist can swallow these, wickedness is ruled out and
stupidity explains all despicable behavior. It is only for assorted
enemies that we look closely at real objectives and apply the
more serious observation that means are both important in
themselves as measures of evil and are inseparably related to
(and interactive with) ends.""
American conduct in Vietnam, of course, not only was morally ques-
tionable, but flagrantly trampled upon international law.
4 92
B. Those At The Bottom: The Failure To Prosecute American
Combatants In Vietnam
The Geneva Conventions enumerate certain "grave breaches" of
the humanitarian law of war which encompass those acts committed
by the United States in Vietnam:
Grave breaches . . . shall be . . . wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment . . . wilfully causing great suffering or seri-
ous injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or
unlawful confinement of a protected person . . . wilfully depriv-
ing a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial pre-
scribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. 9
High contracting parties are required to enact any legislation neces-
sary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons "committing or
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches" of the Conven-
tion.494 A Signatory State also is obligated to search for persons al-
leged to have committed such grave breaches and to bring such per-
sons to trial. 95 No High Contracting Party "shall be allowed to
absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability
incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party" in respect
to grave breaches of the Convention.' 96
The United States did not fulfill its obligation to bring those
491. Id. at 15-16.
492. See generally AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL IN-
TERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL (John Duffett ed. 1968). See generally supra notes
412-87 and accompanying text.
493. See Geneva IV, supra note 390, at art. 147.
494. Id. at art. 146.
495. Id. A High Contracting Party may also, if it prefers, hand such persons over to
another High Contracting Party for trial. Id.
496. Id. at art. 148.
VIETNAM
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
who committed grave breaches of the law of war to trial.497 One
difficulty was that the military possessed no jurisdiction over dis-
charged service personnel.4 98 However, there certainly also was a dis-
tinct lack of concern with the humanitarian law of war. A 1969
study found that roughly fifty percent of all army personnel in Viet-
nam had not received their required annual training in the Geneva
and Hague Conventions. Guenter Lewy observed that the "pressure
for body count and the free use of heavy weapons in populated areas
probably made this kind of instruction seem rather academic and
irrelevant. ' 499 The whole regime of military training discounted the
importance of the law of war. Robert Lifton recounts witnessing a
lecture given to a group of Marines about to depart for Vietnam.
The lecturer held up a rabbit, cracked it in the neck, skinned it,
disemboweled it and threw the rabbit's guts out into the audience.
According to Lifton, the message of the "rabbit lesson" was
clear-kill or be killed.5"'
Officers, in order to protect their men and conceal their own
lack of control, invariably failed to report, covered-up or justified the
killing of civilians.51 The filing of such charges by officers was dis-
couraged by the fact that they did not want their reputation sullied,
career advancement jeopardized, or loyalty to their fellow officers
questioned.502 There also was an unwritten code that officers, partic-
ularly those who attended West Point, were expected to protect one
another.5 a0 In some instances, investigative files of alleged war
crimes disappeared within the bowels of the bureaucracy. 54 In June,
1971, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Hebert, a highly-decorated Vi-
etnam Veteran, took the unprecedented step of lodging war crimes
charges against his superior officers. Herbert was aware of the risks
involved: It is like ". . . one of the gunmen calling up the head of
the Mafia and saying, 'Hey, tomorrow let's all go the police,' or, 'I'd
497. See Punishment for War Crimes: Duty-or Discretion? supra note 391. The most
accessible and detailed discussion of the military justice system is General William Westmore-
land & Major General George S. Prugh, Judges In Command: The Judicialized Uniform
Code Of Military Justice In Combat, 3 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1980). See also Edward
F. Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398 (1973).
498. See United States ex. rel. Toth V. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1950). See generally
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (court-martial jurisdiction is limited to service-
connected crimes). On the question of military jurisdiction see Jordan J. Paust, After My Lai:
The Case For War Crime Jurisdiction Over Civilians In Federal District Courts 50 TEX. L.
REV. 6 (1971).
499. GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 366 (1978).
500. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, HOME FROM THE WAR VIETNAM VETERANS: NEITHER VIC-
TIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS 43 (1973).
501. LEWY, supra note 399, at 345-47.
502. SEYMOUR M. HERSH, COVER-UP 37 (1972).
503. Id. at 230. Hersh notes the existence of the so-called West Point Protective Associ-
ation (WPPA) in Vietnam. Id.
504. Id. at 218-21.
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like to go to the police and talk.' How long do you think that fellow's
going to last . . . I mean, really.
50 5
The Peers Report on the My Lai massacre discovered that "at
every command level from company to division, actions were taken
or omitted which together effectively concealed from higher head-
quarters the events which transpired in T.F. Barker's operation of
March 16-19, 1968."508 Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh
quoted an Episcopalian chaplain assigned to Vietnam who observed
that "as far as the United States Army was concerned, there was no
such thing as a murder of a Vietnamese civilian." 507 Hersh found
that in those rare cases in which murder, rape, and arson were re-
ported that they were treated as administrative rather than as crimi-
nal violations. 5 8 Civil affairs officers often were sent to rebuild
burned hamlets5 9 or to compensate the victims' families. 510 Despite
the requirements of the ROE, Hersh reported that in Calley's Bri-
gade that "murder, rape, and arson were common . . . [m]ost of 'the
infantry companies had gone so far as'to informally set up 'zippo'
squads, groups of men whose sole mission was to follow the combat
troops through hamlets and set them on fire."511 A 1974 survey of
generals who served in Vietnam revealed that the ROE were not
"very well understood, nor were they carefully adhered to."'512
Large scale atrocities merely were symptomatic of a general dis-
regard of the humanitarian law of war. The onslaught of armament
directed against civilians served to heighten the perception that
Vietnamese lives were not deserving of respect.51a In 1970, Army
Captain Leonard Goldman was convicted of failing to report the
death of a female detainee as well as failing to enforce adequate
safeguards to protect the detainee. 514 In June 1968, Goldman's com-
pany took several prisoners, including two female nurses.51 5 The
women subsequently were subjected to multiple rapes, sodomy and
other mistreatment at the hands of various members of Goldman's
company. In the morning, a Lieutenant under Goldman's command
handed one of the Viet Cong detainees a rifle and ordered him to
505. Id. at 37.
506. PEERS REPORT, supra note 401, at 11-1. Despite the ineffectiveness of the system of
investigation, the Army refused to permit investigators to monitor the military's compliance
with the law of war. LEWY, supra note 498, at 349.
507. HERSH, supra note 502, at 37 quoting Father Carl E. Creswell.
508. Id. at 35.
509. Id. at 36.
510. Id. at 49. Compensation was roughly thirty-three dollars for each adult and half
that total for a child under fifteen. Id.
511. HERSH, supra note 502, at 34.
512. KINNARD, supra note 487, at 54.
513. HERSH, supra note 502, at 38.
514. United States v. Goldman, 43 C.M.R. 711, 719 (1970).
515. Id. at 713.
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shoot one of the nurses. The detainee shot the nurse in the neck and
the lieutenant then fired two additional shots into the nurse's
head.5 16 Goldman was not present, but heard three shots.517 He was
informed following the shooting that "some gink grabbed a rifle and
shot one of the nurses. '51 8 Goldman's only response was to warn his
men that if the other female was taken back to headquarters and
"tells what happened in the field, we'll all swing for it."'519 It was
only after Goldman was confronted two days later by his battalion
commander that he admitted that he had failed to report the inci-
dent.520 Goldman claimed that the matter was not the type of serious
incident which he was required to report to his superiors.
5 1
1
Goldman, who was on his second tour in Vietnam, had received nu-
merous combat awards. He was sentenced to a reprimand and forfei-
ture of one hundred dollars pay per month for twelve months.522
Goldman was not an aberration. Army First Lieutenant James
B. Duffy ordered several of his platoon to kill a Vietnamese prisoner
suspected of being absent without leave from a Viet Cong unit.523
They shot the prisoner with an M-16 rifle and reported to Duffy that
the prisoner had been shot while trying to escape. Duffy relayed this
to his company commander. At trial, Duffy explained that the bat-
talion policy stressed the desirability of high body counts and that
"shot while trying to escape" was the customary euphemism which
was used to indicate that a prisoner had been summarily executed.52'
The Court rejected the contention that Duffy could have reasonably
believed that battalion policy required the execution of prisoners.
525
Duffy also argued that he was forced to kill prisoners or suffer poor
efficiency reports for not producing body counts. The Court of Mili-
tary Review, however, declined to "equate the importance of one
man's life with another man's efficiency rating. '526 Nevertheless,
Duffy only was sentenced to six months confinement and forfeiture
of two hundred-and fifty dollars for six months.
52 7
In United States v. Potter,528 Marine Private First Class John
D. Potter was convicted of rape and murder.5 29 Potter and others
516. Id. at 714.,
517. Id. at 715.
518. Id. at 714.
519. United States v. Goldman, 43 C.M.R. 711, 719 (1970).
520. Id.
521. Id. at 714-15.
522. Id. at 719.
523. United States v. Duffy, 47 C.M.R. 658, 660 (1973).
524. Id. at 661.
525. Id. at 663.
526. Id. at 664.
527. Id. at 660.
528. United States v. Potter, 39 C.M.R. 791 (1968).
529. Id. at 792.
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were ordered to establish an ambush at a hamlet. As they arrived at
the hamlet, Potter told the men that they were on their own: "We
are to beat up the people, tear up the hooches, rape and kill if neces-
sary. ' 530 The squad inspected a number of houses and then stopped
at a house with a bunker. They apprehended two children as well as
a younger and older woman. 31 On the right side of the house four of
the soldiers discovered and gang raped another young woman. The
four captive Vietnamese then were killed with a burst of fire from a
semi-automatic rifle, A grenade was detonated at the site of the kill-
ing in order to destroy evidence of the killings. The GI's subse-
quently shot the rape victim, who miraculously lived to testify
against the soldiers.532 The shootings were reported to a lieutenant
who ordered the men to return to the hamlet and to rearrange the
bodies so as to make it appear that the civilians had been inadver-
tently killed during a fire fight at the ambush site. 533 Upon returning
to the hamlet, the GI's discovered that one of the babies was still
alive. Potter pounded and killed the baby with the butt of his rifle. 34
In Crider,535 Marine Lance Corporal Stephen D. Crider and
eight other marines apprehended a young eleven year-old male as
well as three young women ranging in age from roughly thirteen to
nineteen. The four were tied, gagged and left at an ambush site on
the trail. Crider and another soldier took the four to a clearing
where they were stabbed and bludgeoned to death.536 Crider later
complained that "[t]he gooks are hard to kill with the neck strangle-
hold. ' 537 He warned the other members of the patrol not to "tell
anybody, because if you do we'll all burn." 58 Crider's sentence for
four counts of premeditated murder ultimately was reduced to con-
finement for three years at hard labor.
53 9
Those in the military justice system appeared to possess greater
understanding and concern for the plight of American GI's than for
their Vietnamese victims. In Potter, the Court of Military Review
emphasized that Vietnam "was a setting where the native civilian
friend by day, became by night, a treacherous betrayer, who leads
the enemy into the heart of the villages, sometimes concealing him,
and sometimes aiding him to sew booby traps and to lay the
530. Id. at 793.
531. Id. at 793-94.
532. Id. at 796-97.
533. United States v. Potter, 39 C.M.R. 791 (1968).
534. Id. at 801.
535. United States v. Crider, 45 C.M.R. 815 (1972).
536. Id. at 820.
537. Id. at 821.
538. Id. at 820.
539. Id. at 828.
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mine. "540 The Court expressed "great sympathy" for marines such
as Crider who "lost a 'buddy' by reason of such treachery. ' 54 1 The
judges also empathized with the dilemma confronting American
soldiers. They could repose full trust and faith in a civilian and risk
suffering "death as a consequence of perfidy. ' 5 2 Alternatively, they
could treat a civilian as a "foe presumptive" and "deal with them
according to the law of self defense." 4" The Court observed that
soldiers did not have time to reflect on the proper course: "Action is
required. The battlefield is not a debating ground. It is singularly a
place for action. 5,4 In Crider, despite the uncontroverted evidence
that the defendant brutally murdered four Vietnamese juveniles, the
eight members of the court martial panel signed a petition urging
clemency. Seven of the eight also petitioned that Lance Corporal
Crider be retained in the Marine Corps.5 45 The Court of Military
Review agreed: "We reach this decision after carefully considering
appellant's exemplary . . . record . . . and . . . the almost unbear-
able prolonged combat conditions to which he had been exposed and
which served to trigger these events.
'546
Between 1965 and 1975, excluding the My Lai case, only 241
allegations of war crimes were lodged against United States Army
personnel. Only fifty of these cases arose prior to the publicity sur-
rounding the My Lai massacre. There was determined to be proba-
ble cause to prosecute in only seventy-eight cases and only thirty-six
of these were referred to a court-martial. 5 7 These thirty-six inci-
dents involved sixty-one men, of whom thirty-one were convicted.
54 8
Officers serving on court-martial juries sympathized with the difficul-
ties and frustrations confronting those on trial and were reluctant to
convict defendants of the offense with which they were charged.5 '
The instructions of military judges at times also appeared to en-
courage acquittals. 55 0 A total of thirty-two army personnel were con-
victed of war crimes in Vietnam. 1
It is hardly likely that only thirty-two members of the United





545. 45 C.M.R. at 828.
546. Id. at 828-29.
547. LEWY. supra note 499, at 348 (Table 10-1). Each case refers to an incident, which
may involve more than one person. Id.
548. Id. at 350. Figures refer to cases (incidents) which may involve more than one
-individual. The thirty-six cases leading to court-martial involved sixty-one men, of whom
thirty-one were convicted. Id.
549. Id. at 372.
550. See generally Roger S. Clark, Medina: An Essay On The Principles Of Criminal
Liability For Homicide, 5 RUT-CAM. L.J. 59 (1973).
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States Army in Vietnam were guilty of committing war crimes. The
Air Force reported only seven court-martial convictions for war
crimes against Vietnamese; the Navy recorded only nine convictions
for such offenses." Ninety marines were convicted and forty-six
were acquitted for crimes against Vietnamese. 553 Only two marine
officers were charged and convicted for filing false reports to cover
up murders or failing to report murders.
554
Army officers convicted of war crimes generally received more
lenient treatment than did enlisted men. Fifty-two percent of enlisted
men charged with allegations of war crimes were tried by court-mar-
tial. Fifty-one percent were convicted. Only thirty percent of officers
accused of war crimes were tried by court-martial. Thirty-six per-
cent of these individuals were convicted. Sixty-one percent of the of-
ficers were either acquitted, had their charges dismissed before trial,
or were only subjected to administrative action. Only thirty-four per-
cent of enlisted men received such treatment. 555
Those convicted generally received lenient sentences. Between
1967 and 1969, the average sentence for army personnel in Europe
and the United States convicted for premeditated murder was
twenty-nine years; the average sentence for unpremeditated murder
was 12.8 years. Between 1965 and 1970, the average sentence for
the premeditated murder of a Vietnamese was sixteen years, while
the average sentence for unpremeditated murder was 9.7 years.
Gunter Lewy observed that this "meant that the killing of a
Vietnamese civilian . . . was seen as a somewhat less grave offense
than the unprovoked killing of a German, Frenchman or fellow
American in a situation where servicemen did not labor under the
severe tension produced by a counterinsurgency war. 556
Lewy concluded that the sentences "adjudged by courts-martial
in Vietnam at times were so light as to eliminate any deterrent ef-
fect, and the review process . . . often further undercut this impor-
tant purpose of punishment.115 7 Prisoners were often released on pa-
role after serving only a small portion of their sentences. The
command structures of the military services also used their discre-
tion to grant clemency. Twenty-seven marines were convicted of
murdering Vietnamese. The average sentence served by the twelve
552. Id. at 350.
553. Id. at 456 (Table 10-2). The Marines Corps statistics for homicide combined war
crimes with ordinary offenses such as off-duty assaults and vehicular homicide. As a result,
their data is a bit misleading. Id. at 351.
554. Id. at 456 (Table 10-2).
555. LEWY, supra note 499, at 352. Officers are tried by courts composed of officers
while enlisted men generally are not tried before a jury of their peers (they may request that
one-third of their jury is composed of enlisted men). Id.
556. Id. at 352-53.
557. Id. at 370.
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marines sentenced to confinement at hard labor for life was 62
years. In only four of the twenty-seven cases, all involving sentences
of five years or less, did the defendants serve their full sentence.
As of May 21, 1971, twenty-nine army personnel had been convicted
of war crimes in Vietnam, fifteen of whom were sentenced to con-
finement. Data available for thirteen of these men indicate that, on
average, they served 51.5 percent of each sentence before being re-
leased as a result of parole or clemency action.
5 59
The prosecutions growing out of the My Lai massacre illustrate
that even the most well-publicized and documented war crime did
not result in the application of severe criminal punishments. In
March 1971, First Lieutenant William Calley was found guilty of
three counts of the premeditated murder of not less than twenty-two
unarmed Vietnamese civilians and of assault with intent to commit
the murder of a young Vietnamese child. Two days later he was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment at hard labor. The evidence established
that Calley had directed and killed a number of unarmed and help-
less men, women and children.56 The Secretary of the Army re-
duced the sentence to ten years and Calley ultimately was paroled
effective November 1974.51
The Pentagon inquiry had listed thirty individuals as implicated
in criminal offenses related to the My Lai operation. Charges were
brought against sixteen of these individuals and five were court-mar-
tialed. Only Calley was convicted. All other charges were dismissed.
General William R. Peers who conducted the military inquiry into
My Lai remarked that the My Lai massacre was "a horrible thing,
and we find we have only one man finally convicted and he's set free
after doing a relatively small part of his sentence." 562 Calley is not
an isolated example.
Before Lt. Calley was convicted, 24 other Americans had been
convicted for premeditated murder. In every previous case, the
sentences were reduced drastically on appeal. The longest was
set at 35 years; almost all the others were set at 5 to 10 years
... .Staff Sergeant Walter Griffen who was charged with pre-
meditated murder of a suspected Viet Cong prisoner in 1967.
Griffen admitted shooting the prisoner but argued that he had
done so under orders. He was convicted only of unpremeditated
murder, sentenced to 10 years in prison, which was reduced to 7
years by the commanding general, then knocked down to two
years by the board of review, and he was returned to duty in
558. Id.
559. LEWY, supra note 499, at 371.
560. Id. at 356.
561. Id. at 358.
562. Id. quoting General William R. Peers.
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December of 1968, after having been imprisoned for only 17
months.
563
The military portrayed those war crimes which came to public
attention as an exception-the product of stress and psychological
dislocation. The United States military leadership confidently as-
serted that American troops scrupulously adhered to the law of
war.5"' General William C. Westmoreland, commander of United
States forces in Vietnam, pointed out that although his troops were
"armed and operating in a hostile environment," that the "remarka-
ble fact may well be not that crimes occurred but that they were as
few as they were."5 5 He proudly observed that "[d]uring my tenure
in Vietnam, thirty-one men were tried for murder of civilians, seven-
teen for rape, and eleven for manslaughter. Of the total of fifty-nine,
thirty-six were convicted, a conviction rate, above the average for
American civilian juries." '566 Westmoreland conceded that over the
years, a number of other "battlefield irregularities" had been re-
ported or alleged.567 However, he asserted that most, particularly
those leveled by individuals testifying under the aegis of groups criti-
cal of the war, were "backed by no responsible evidence. "568 West-
moreland specifically addressed the contention that high body
counts, combined with the low number of weapons collected, should
have alerted the American command to a pattern of war crimes. He
countered that the "guerrillas were adept at disposing of weapons in
paddies or canals and many guerrillas often were armed only with
grenades and explosives.569 To the extent that various excesses oc-
curred, Westmoreland attributed them to the Congressional policy of
granting deferments to college students which forced the army to
reduce its standards for officers.5 70
C. Those At The Top: The Failure To Prosecute Political Leaders
Contrary to Westmoreland's contentions, the United States ci-
vilian and military leadership were well aware that American mili-
tary tactics were responsible for a massive number of civilian casual-
563. Procedures for Protection of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Armed Conflicts:
Southeast Asian Examples, 65 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 209, 222-23 (1971) (Comments of
Jon M. Van Dyke).
564. See GLORIA EMERSON. WINNERS AND LOSERS BATTLES. RETREATS, GAINS, LOSSES
AND RUINS FROM THE VIETNAM WAR 213-16 (1972) (detailing the lack of interest in an alle-
gation of war crimes made by a former American soldier who served in Vietnam).
565. GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND. A SOLDIER REPORTS 378 (1976).
566. Id.
567. Id. at 501.
568. Id.
569. id. at 500.
570. GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 498-99 (1976).
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ties.57 1 They mechanically totalled "kill-ratios" and calculated the
number of American and Vietnamese lives which would have to be
expended to win the war.
572
President Johnson and his advisers were closely involved in de-
signing strategies and tactics and met on a weekly basis to select
targets., 73 They strained to formulate legal justifications for their ag-
gressive bombing policy. Daily and weekly summaries of Viet Cong
assassinations and kidnappings were compiled to portray American
bombing as a " 'policy of sustained reprisal against North Viet-
nam.' "74 Their military strategy was based on a "hopelessly over-
simplified derivative of. . . rat psychology . . . [i]f you want to mo-
tivate a rat, give him a pellet or shock him with a bolt of
electricity." 57 5 They believed that once the "screw" was "twisted,"
the North Vietnamese would feel "pain" and abandon the strug-
gle .5 7 Daniel Ellsberg, who before turning against the war, was a
high-level presidential adviser, reported that the "situation that I en-
tered in mid-1964--as it looks to me now--amounted to a conspiracy:
The officials who became my colleagues were concerting, in secrecy,
to plan and, ultimately, to wage aggressive war against North Viet-
nam." 77 American decision-ma,-ers were well-aware that the de-
ployment of sophisticated technology against an indigenous popular
revolt in a third world country would inevitably result in civilian
deaths. The best that can be said is that they chose to remain igno-
rant concerning the extent of civilian casualties.5 7 8 Telford Taylor
argued that it is improbable that the American leadership was
"blind to the probable consequences to civilians of a massive employ-
ment of American troops in Vietnam to engage in counterinsurgency
operations. ' 79 Francis FitzGerald observed: "charges of war crimes
against the American civilian and military authorities who directed
the war have a certain validity . . . . [T]he U.S. command's deci-
sion to use certain weapons and certain strategies insured that the
number of civilian deaths would be sizable. 58 Vietnam, in the words
571. SHEEHAN, supra note 463, at 620-21.
572. Id. at 569, 630. The war was based on a "kill-ratio" of one American or Saigon
soldier for every 2.6 Viet Cong or North Vietnamese killed. Id. at 630.
573. DANIEL ELLSBERG, The Responsibility Of Officials In A Criminal War, in PAPERS
ON THE WAR 289, 312-13 (1972).
574. Id. at 312 n.20.
575. RICHARD J. BARNET, ROOTS OF WAR 99 (1971) (Barnet was a former member of
the Department of State and a Defense Department consultant).
576. Id. at 105.
577. ELLSBERG, supra note 573, at 311.
578. Id. at 316-20.
579. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 172. Taylor notes that communications and mobility in
Vietnam generally were "rapid and efficient" and that the military leadership was able to keep
abreast of battlefield developments. Id. at 181.
580. FITZGERALD, supra note 48, at 500.
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of Robert Lifton, was an "atrocity-producing situation."5 81 Lifton
characterized American military strategy as "inevitably
genocidal:"582
[A] counterinsurgency war undertaken by an advanced indus-
trial society against a revolutionary movement of an underdevel-
oped country, in which the revolutionary guerrillas are insepara-
ble from the rest of the population. Those elements in turn
contribute greatly to the draconian American military policies in
Vietnam: the "free-fire zone" (where every civilian is a target),
and the "search-and-destroy mission" (on which everyone and
everything can be killed, or as the expression has it, "wasted");
the extensive use of plant defoliants that not only destroy the
overall ecology . . . but, if encountered in sufficient concentra-
tion by pregnant women, human embryos as well; and the al-
most random saturation of a small country with an unprece-
dented level of technological destruction and firepower both
from the air and on the ground. These external historical factors
and military policies lead, in turn, to a compelling internal se-
quence that constitutes the psychological or experiential dimen-
sion of the atrocity-producing situation. 583
A series of American civilian and military leaders either or-
dered or knew of war crimes and stood mute. As early as 1966, Rep-
resentative Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin, a leading supporter of
the war, reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that an
average of two civilians had been killed for every Viet Cong and,
more recently, that the ratio had been six civilians for every enemy
soldier slain.584 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, in a commentary
on Zablocki's report approved by General William Westmoreland,
explained that the United States' reliance on high technology weap-
ons made civilian casualties inevitable. Lodge argued that too re-
strictive a policy on the use of such weapons might compromise the
United States' military superiority. He advocated a public relations
effort to impress on the public and Congress that the inordinate
number of civilian casualties resulted from the Viet Cong's use of
civilians to carry out military attacks. Lodge urged officials to stress
that the Viet Cong's deliberate attacks on civilians were much more
cruel and morally reprehensible than those inadvertently caused by
the Allied forces. 585
The discussion in the White House often was frighteningly can-
did and callous. A memo from John T. McNaughton in 1966, ar-
581. LIFTON, supra note 500, at 41.
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 403.
585. KAHIN, supra note 36, at 403-04.
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gued against bombing "population targets. '581 McNaughton con-
tended that this would be "counterproductive," embolden the North
Vietnamese and risk drawing China and the Soviet Union into the
war. 587 On the other hand, McNaughton contended that the destruc-
tion of locks and dams should be considered: "Such destruction does
not kill or drown people. By shallow-flooding the rice, it leads after
time to widespread starvation (more than a million?) unless food is
provided--which we could offer to do 'at the conference table.' "1588
Richard Barnet noted that any White House adviser who would have
objected to the killing of Vietnamese would have been dismissed as a
flaccid idealist. As a result, those opposed to the escalation "never
raised the issue that 'taking out' great areas of Vietnam, a euphe-
mism for killing large numbers of Vietnamese, was wrong. Their ar-
guments were invariably pragmatic--bombing doesn't work, don't get
bogged down in a land war in Asia or . ..keep the victim alive
for later.
s589
Ellsberg reluctantly reached the conclusion that our "humane"
and "liberal" leaders were waging a war involving the deliberate
"burning of villages; herbicides; defoliation; torture: the creation of
millions of refugees; air and ground invasions; and the dropping of
over six million tons . . . of explosives from the air, and another six
million tons of artillery shells, on the people of Indochina. ' 590 The
White House memos on the American bombing program advocated
ominous sounding strategies such as the " 'water-drip technique'...
'hot-cold' treatment . ..painful surgical strikes . . . 'salami-slice'
bombing . . . [and] one more turn of the screw." 591 Richard Barnet
observed that this "verbal camouflage" 592 permitted decision-makers
to avoid confronting the fact that what they were advocating inevita-
bly would lead to "flaming children, torn limbs, or shattered bodies
pinned under rubble . . [that] mutilated, weeping, and dazed
human beings . . . will be the actual target of the bombs. ' 593 Daniel
Ellsberg reported that only later did he come to appreciate that these
586. ELLSBERG, supra note 573, at 309.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. BARNET, supra note 575, at I11.
590. ELLSBERG, supra note 573, at 293.
591. Id. at 319.
592. BARNET, supra note 575, at 129.
593. Id. at 129-30.
Pacification trips off the tongue far more easily in a Pentagon briefing and looks
better on the page of a neat memorandum than phrases that would actually
describe the death and suffering to which the antiseptic term refers. Emotional
distance from the homicidal consequences of his planning is essential to the





seemingly innocent phrases were the "the language of torturers.'594
When confronted with the consequences of United States ac-
tions, White House decision-makers strained to deny the impact of
their policies. They responded to the fact that churches and pagodas
were being systematically bombed by explaining that the structures
were being used by the enemy to store trucks.595 It was noted that
herbicides could not possibly be harming civilians since the only indi-
viduals in the jungles were Viet Cong.596 In the end, between 1965
and 1975, it is estimated that the war resulted in roughly 1,800,000
civilian casualties in the South; over ten million refugees; 83,000 am-
putees; 8,000 paraplegics; 30,000 blind; 10,000 deaf; and 50,000 dis-
abled individuals. 597 The South was overwhelmed by malaria,
bubonic plague, leprosy, tuberculosis, and venereal disease. Inestima-
ble damage also was created by the dropping of half a million tons of
toxic chemicals, 7,000 tons of toxic gas, and 7,600,000 tons of
bombs. 598 Yet, no high-level American civilian or military official
was prosecuted for war crimes in Vietnam. Were these individuals
immune from international legal liability? Were only those in the
field who actually pulled the trigger or pushed the button legally
responsible?
It is well established that civilian and military leaders are crimi-
nally responsible for violations of the law of war under international
law. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg convicted
sixteen of the eighteen Nazi leaders indicted for war crimes and for
crimes against humanity. Twelve were sentenced to death, two re-
ceived life imprisonment, and four were sentenced to between ten
and twenty years in prison.599 The Tribunal ruled that individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations
demanded by the individual state. The international panel pro-
nounced that those who fail to heed these responsibilities and violate
the dictates of international law will be held internationally liable for
transgressions, regardless of their rank or status. The Tribunal ex-
plained that crimes against international law are "committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be en-
forced." 00 The Nuremberg panel also ruled that the fact that an
594. ELLSBERG, supra note 573, at 320.
595. BARNET, supra note 574, at 128.
596. Id. at 127.
597. EMERSON, supra note 564, at 357.
598. Id. at 358.
599. See D'Amato, Gould & Woods, supra note 396, at 1062 (The verdicts are conve-
niently arrayed in a table). Four defendants were only indicted for Crimes Against Peace. Id.
For a discussion of crimes against peace and Vietnam, see Benjamin B. Ferencz, War Crimes
Law And The Vietnam War, 17 AM. U. L. REV. 403 (1968).
600. XXII TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILl-
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individual who violated the law of war acted pursuant to superior
orders does not provide a defense. The existence of such orders may
be considered in mitigation of punishment in circumstances in which
no "moral choice was in fact possible." '
The Third Reich, of course, compiled a record of unequaled
horrors. Nevertheless, the Tribunal's general discussion of the Nazis'
crimes anticipated the type of horrors perpetrated by the Americans
in Vietnam."0 2 The Nuremberg panel sketched the impact of the
"Nazi conception of 'total war.' "603
Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not
only in defiance of the well-established rules of international
law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of hu-
manity. Civilian populations in occupied territories suffered the
same fate. Whole populations were deported . ..Cities and
towns and villages were wantonly destroyed without military jus-
tification or necessity.60 4
German civilian and military leaders were held criminally liable for
planning or ordering the commission of war crimes or for implement-
ing such orders.60 5 As British prosecutor Sir Hartley Shawcross ob-
served, "[t]hese were the men in the inner councils, the men who
planned as well as carried out; of all people the ones who might have
advised, restrained, halted Hitler instead of encouraging him in his
TARY TRIBUNAL 466 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
601. Id.
602. The Nuremberg Charter defined war crimes:
(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment, or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Agreement for the prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258
(Supp. 1943) art. 6(a) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter] cited in Matthew Lippman, Reflec-
tions On Non-Violent Resistance And The Necessity Defense, II Hous. J. INT'L L. 277, 284
n.60.
The Tribunal did not distinguish between war crimes and crimes against humanity. See
Trial Of The Major War Criminals, supra note 545, at 498. The Nuremberg Charter defined
crimes against humanity:
(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 602, at 6(c).
603. Trial Of The Major War Criminals, supra note 600, at 469.
604. Id. at 470.
605. See id. at 524, 526-7 (liability of Goring for war crimes and crimes against human-
ity); 530, 532-3 (liability of Von Ribbentrop for war crimes and crimes against humanity);
533, 534-6 (liability of Keitel for war crimes and crimes against humanity).
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satanic courses."" 6 Sir Hartley concluded,
there comes a time when a man must choose between his con-
science and his leader. No one who chooses, as these men did, to
abdicate their consciences in favor of this monster of their own
creation can complain now if they are held responsible for com-
plicity in what their monster did.
607
The Nuremberg precedent was not intended to be limited to the
German leaders. Robert H. Jackson, United States prosecutor at
Nuremberg, in his opening statement proclaimed:
[W]hile this law is first applied against German aggressors, the
law . . . if it is to serve a useful purpose . . . must condemn
aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here
now in judgment. We are able to do away with domestic tyranny
and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights
of their own people only when we make all men answerable to
the law. Application of this standard would have resulted in the
criminal punishment of those involved in designing and imple-
menting of policies such as free fire zones. 60 8
In United States v. List,609 various members of the German military
were convicted of war crimes.6 10 The Court stressed the importance
of punishing those responsible for such offenses:
Unless civilization is to give way to barbarism in the conduct of
war, crime must be punished . . . . If all war criminals are not
brought to the bar of justice under present procedures, such pro-
cedures should be made more inclusive and more effective. If the
laws of war are to have any beneficent effect, they must be
enforced.6 "
The scope of command responsibility was further refined and
broadened by the United States Supreme Court in In Re
Yamashita."2 Yamashita was military governor of the Philippines as
well as commander of the Japanese forces.6 " As American troops
invaded the Philippines, the retreating Japanese troops allegedly dev-
astated and destroyed property and brutally mistreated and killed
more than twenty-five thousand civilians.6" An American military
606. XIX TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 545, at 466.
607. Id. at 515.
608. II TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 545, at 154.
609. United States v. List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 1230 (American Mil. Trib.
Nuremberg, Germany 1948) [hereinafter Hostage Case].
610. Id. at 1318-19.
611. Id. at 1254.
612. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
613. Id. at 16.
614. Id. at 14.
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commission convicted Yamashita of unlawfully disregarding and
failing to discharge his duty as commander of Japanese forces to
"control the operations of the members of his command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes."1'
The Supreme Court, in affirming Yamashita's conviction, ex-
plained that a military commander is obligated to insure that his or
her troops abide by the law of war. A commander who fails to prop-
erly supervise the actions of his troops is vicariously responsible for
their transgressions. Thus, an officer is legally required to take "such
appropriate measures as are within his power to control the troops
under his command. ' 16 The Court thus concluded that Yamashita
was properly convicted of a "breach of his duty to control the opera-
tions of the members of his command, by permitting them to commit
the specified atrocities."6 7
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial ruled in 1948, that civilian offi-
cials, like their military counterparts, possessed an affirmative duty
to take reasonable steps to prevent the commission of those war
crimes of which they were or reasonably should have been aware. On
December 13, 1937, Japanese troops pushed back the Chinese forces
and entered Nanking. The invading troops roamed the city--murder-
ing, raping, looting and burning.618 Over 200,000 civilians and pris-
oners of war were murdered in the city and outskirts of Nanking
during the first six weeks of Japanese occupation6 19 and there were
20,000 cases of rape during the first month.62 Koki Hirota served as
Japanese Foreign Minister during the so-called "rape of Nanking"
and later was elevated to Prime Minister.6"' The Tokyo Tribunal de-
termined that Hirota had received reports of atrocities immediately
after the entry of the Japanese forces into Nanking. The War Minis-
try assured Hirota that such atrocities would be halted. However,
the Tribunal found that Hirota continued to receive reports of atroc-
ities and chose to remain silent. The Tribunal concluded that Hirota
had been guilty of criminal negligence in failing to intervene to halt
the atrocities in Nanking:122
Hirota was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabi-
net that immediate action be taken to put an end to the atroci-
ties, failing any other action open to him to bring about the
615. Id.
616. Id. at 15.
617. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 17.
618. International Military Tribunal For The Far East, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial
(November 1948) in VOLUME II: THE LAW OF WAR A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1039, 1061
(Leon Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter International Military Tribunal].
619. Id. at 1062.
620. Id. at 1061.
621. Id. at 1132.
622. Id. at 1134.
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same result. He was content to rely on assurances which he
knew were not being implemented while hundreds of murders,
violations of women, and other atrocities were committed daily.
His inaction amounted to criminal negligence.
623
The Tokyo Tribunal broadly interpreted the scope of the responsibil-
ity of civilian officials. It ruled that any member of the Cabinet who
has knowledge of war crimes and who elects to continue as a mem-
ber of the government may be charged with personal liability. This is
the case even if the Minister does not have administrative responsi-
bilities relating to the conduct of the war. Such an individual, in the
words of the Tribunal, "willingly assumes responsibility for any ill-
treatment in the future.
'6 24
A high-echelon official cannot escape criminal liability by re-
maining in the government in order to exert some moderating influ-
ence on governmental policy. Between April 1938 and the spring of
1943, Ernst von Weizaecker was State Secretary of the German For-
eign Ministry. Only von Ribbentrop (who was convicted and sen-
tenced to death at Nuremberg) outranked von Weizaecker in terms
of responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs.625 von Weiz-
saecker was aware of Hitler's plans for repression against the civilian
populations of occupied countries. He claimed to have possessed
"mental reservations and objections" concerning many of the direc-
tives ordering the deportation of Jews which passed over his desk.
However, he generally did not articulate his protests.626 von Weiz-
saecker explained that he desired to remain in office in order to pro-
vide information to the underground opposition to Hitler and to be in
a position to initiate or aid in attempts to negotiate peace. He also
hoped to moderate the Nazi's excesses. Nevertheless, the Court
623. International Military Tribunal, supra note 618, at 1134.
624. Id. at 1039. The Tribunal broadly interpreted the knowledge requirement:
(1) They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and hav-
ing such knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power to
prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or
(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge. If, such a
person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowl-
edge he is not excused for inaction if his Office required or permitted him to take
any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not enough for the
exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he accepted
assurances from others more directly associated with the control of the prisoners
if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of reports of
such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should have been put upon further
enquiry as to whether those assurances were true or untrue. That crimes are
notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters to be con-
sidered in imputing knowledge.
Id. at 1039.
625. THE MINISTRIES CASE, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 314, 340 (1949) [hereinafter
The Ministries Case].
626. Id. at 497.
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noted that while von Weizsaecker's private opposition might be con-
sidered a mitigating factor, it cannot constitute a defense to charges
of war crimes or crimes against humanity.621 7 The Court proclaimed
that "[o]ne cannot give consent to or implement the commission of
murder because by so doing, he hopes eventually to be able to rid
society of the chief murderer. The first is a crime of imminent actu-
ality; the second is but a future hope." '628
The principles governing individual liability are of more than
academic importance. The Army Field Manual, which provides "au-
thoritative guidance" to military personnel,629 incorporates the Nu-
remberg Principles. 630 Paragraph 498 punishes members of the
armed forces and civilians who commit the Nuremberg offenses of
Crimes against humanity and war crimes. 3 1 Paragraph 500 punishes
conspiracy, direct incitement, and attempts to commit as well as
complicity in the -commission of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.632 Paragraph 509 establishes the fact that an individual ac-
ted pursuant to superior orders does not constitute a defense to the
commission of a war crime. 38 Paragraph 501 directly incorporates
the Yamashita standard.
In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for
war crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces, or other persons subject to their control. Thus, for in-
stance, when troops commit massacres and atrocities against the
civilian population of occupied territory or against prisoners of
war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual perpe-
trators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility
arises directly when the acts in question have been committed in
pursuance of an order of the commander concerned. The com-
mander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should
have knowledge, through reports received by him or through
other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control
are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails
to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance
with the law of war or to punish violation thereof.634
Paragraph 510 emphasizes that the standards set forth in the Field
627. Id.
628. Id. at 497-98. The Tribunal queried "[how a decent man could continue to hold
officer under a regime which carried out planned and wholesale barbarities of this kind is
difficult to understand." Id. at 472.
629. Army Field Manual, supra note 399, at 184, para. 1.
630. Id. at 189, para. 498.
631. Id. Crimes against peace also are punishable. Id. Paragraph 499 defines a war
crime as a "violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian. Every
violation of the law of war is a war crime. Id. at para. 499, 189.
632. Id. at 189, at para. 500.
633. Army Field Manual, supra note 399, at 190, para. 509.
634. Id. at 190, para. 501.
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Manual are applicable to both high-level and lower echelon officials.
It states that the fact that a "person who committed an act which
constitutes a war crime acted as the head of a state or as a responsi-
ble government official does not relieve him from responsibility for
his act."'63 Commanding officers of United States troops are re-
quired to "insure that war crimes committed by members of their
forces against enemy personnel are promptly and adequately pun-
ished." 636 The punishment imposed for a violation of the law of war
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offense. Such penalties
should be sufficiently severe to deter future violations and the death
penalty may be imposed for grave breaches of the law.
637
Thus, those high-echelon civilian and military leaders involved
in the planning and prosecution of the Vietnam War who were
aware of (or should have been aware of) war crimes were subject to
punishment. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Yamashita, prophetically
noted that "the fate of some future President of the United States
and his chiefs of staff and military advisers may well have been
sealed by this decision." 38 It must be remembered that the Germans
convicted of war crimes by post World War II trials, like the Ameri-
can leadership during the Vietnam War, were people of culture and
education who were held in high esteem. A post World War II
American military tribunal noted in United States v. Ohlendorf,3 9
that the defendants were not "untutored aborigines incapable of ap-
preciation of the finer values of life and living. Each man at the bar
has had the benefit of considerable schooling . . . . It was indeed
one of the many remarkable aspects of this trial that the discussions
of enormous atrocities was constantly interspersed with the academic
titles of the persons mentioned as their perpetrators. '640
Of course, the military strategies adopted by the American
leadership were considered to be necessary to combat a guerilla in-
surgency. However, as observed in Ohlendorf, this type of conception
of military necessity would permit "any belligerent who is hard
pressed .. .unilaterally to abrogate the laws and customs of war
... . [W]ith such facile disregarding of restrictions, the rules of
war would quickly disappear . . . .Every belligerent could find a
reason to assume that it had higher interests to protect."6 4' The
United States Army Field Manual clearly states that military neces-
635. Id. at 192, para. 510.
636. Id. at 191-2, para. 507.
637. Id. at 192, at para. 508.
638. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28.
639. United States v. Ohlendorf, IV TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 411 (1948) (Einsatz-
gruppen case).
640. Id. at 500.
641. Id. at 463.
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sity does not permit the direct violation of the humanitarian law of
war. Such rules have been developed and framed with consideration
for the concept of military necessity.642
Military necessity only permits the incidental damaging of civil-
ian structures and injury to civilians during the course of an other-
wise lawful military operation. As observed in United States v. Wil-
helm List,643 this destruction must be "imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war."644 Destruction "as an end in itself is a viola-
tion of international law. There must be some reasonable connection
between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the en-
emy forces . . . .It does not admit the wanton devastation of a dis-
trict or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the
sake of suffering alone."6 46 As observed in United States v. von
Leeb,646 an expansive interpretation of necessity "would eliminate all
humanity and decency and all law from the conduct of war and it is
a contention which this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the ac-
cepted usages of civilized nations. ' 47 Clearly, the considered and de-
liberate deployment of high technology weapons and the indiscrimi-
nate targeting of civilian hamlets cannot be justified under military
necessity. Much of the destruction in Vietnam was an end itself
rather than incidental to some larger objective. This needless injury
and killing of civilians also certainly was disproportionate to any pos-
sible military advantage or objective which the American leadership
was attempting to attain. 8 "
American military tactics also cannot be justified as reprisals.
Reprisals are illegal actions undertaken in response to a belligerent's
transgressions which are intended to deter the enemy's continuing
violations of the law of war. 49 In List, the American military tribu-
nal observed that it is a "fundamental rule that a reprisal may not
exceed the degree of the criminal act it is designed to correct. Where
an excess is knowingly indulged, it in turn is criminal and may be
punished." 650 Telford Taylor noted that the United States engaged
in "[rieprisal bombing attacks on villages" which "have driven
642. Army Field Manual, supra note 399, at 185, para. 3(a).
643. United States v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE Nu-
REMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL No. 10 1230 (1950) (The Hos-
tage Case).
644. Id. at 1253.
645. Id. at 1253-54.
646. United States v. von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 462 (1949) (hereinafter
The High Command Case).
647. Id. at 541.
648. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 143 (necessity embodies the principle of
proportionality).
649. Id. at 53-54.
650. United States v. Wilhelm List, supra note 643 at 1248-49.
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thousands of inhabitants to refugee camps, and subjected those who
stay to a fear-ridden existence." '51 In List, the Tribunal admonished
that "members of the population of one community cannot properly
be shot in reprisal for an act against the occupation forces commit-
ted at some other place." '652 It also is a "fundamental rule of justice
that the lives of persons may not be arbitrarily taken."65 Such kill-
ings only may be undertaken pursuant to a judicial determination
that such persons were responsible for the violation of the laws of
war. The only exception is where an immediate reprisal is required
to deter the enemy from violating the law of war.65" Excessive "re-
prisals are in themselves criminal and guilt attaches to the persons
responsible for their commission. 651 5 The targeting of entire hamlets,
even in cases in which the villagers were suspected of harboring or
assisting the Viet Cong or having fired on American troops, consti-
tuted an unduly severe and collective penalty in violation of the laws
of war. 56
In summary, American high-echelon civilian and military lead-
ers were subject to prosecution for their role in planning and imple-
menting war crimes in Vietnam. Many of their military tactics were
reminiscent of those carried out by Nazi leaders during World War
II. However, high-echelon American officials, like most of those in
the field, were not held legally accountable for their actions. After
all, men of such achievement could not possibly be compared to the
monsters who had been convicted at Nuremberg. As Townsend
Hoopes warned, such "shockingly glib"6 57 war crimes allegations
only will lead to a "new McCarthyism and to anarchy."6 58 He cau-
tioned that Americans should avoid the "destructive and childish
pleasure of branding as deliberate criminals duly elected and ap-
pointed leaders who . . are struggling in good conscience to uphold
the Constitution and to serve to broad national interest according to
their lights. 65 9 The vast majority of Americans, of course, agreed
with Hoopes and did not believe that United States troops or leaders
should be prosecuted for even the most flagrant violations of the law
of war. 6 0 At the same time, there was little tolerance for those who
651. TAYLOR, supra note 407, at 195.
652. United States v. Wilhelm List, supra note 643, at 1252.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 1253.
655. Id.
656. See Geneva IV, supra note 390, at art. 33.
657. Hoopes, supra note 489, at 236.
658. Id. at 235.
659. Id. at 237.
660. See generally Herbert C. Kelman & Lee H. Lawrence, Assignment of Responsibil-
ity in the Case of Lt. Calley: Preliminary Report on a National Survey, 28 J. Soc. ISSUES 177
(1972).
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protested or refused to serve in the war. 661 Vice-President Spiro Ag-
new seemed to capture the public mood when he observed in 1970,
that "as for these deserters, malcontents, radicals, incendiaries, the
civil and the uncivil disobedients among our youth . . . . I would
swap the whole damn zoo for a single platoon of the kind of young
Americans I saw in Vietnam." '662
D. Dissenters: The Prosecution Of Protesters Against War Crimes
Opposition against the war was intense. In 1965, a number of
pacifist organizations issued a Declaration Of Conscience Against
The War In Vietnam663 in which they declared their conscientious
refusal to cooperate with the United States government in the prose-
cution of the Vietnam War.664 Thousands signed A Call To Resist
Illegitimate Authority6 5 which was issued in 1967 and pledged to
"exert every effort to end the war, to avoid collusion with it, and to
encourage others to do the same." '666 It is ironic that while few pros-
ecutions were brought against those who committed war crimes in
Vietnam, over ten thousand were brought to trial for draft-related
charges. Over eight thousand were convicted, and four thousand
were sentenced to prison.667 The average prison sentence handed out
to draft offenders in 1968-69 was three years-a harsher sentence
than was meted out to draft evaders during World War II or Ko-
rea. 6 8 Forty-six of the fifty-four draft offenders convicted in Mil-
waukee in 1970 were sentenced to prison terms.66 9
A number of those in the military who resisted service in Viet-
nam argued their refusal was a justifiable effort to avoid liability
under the Nuremberg Principles. Captain Doctor Howard Levy was
convicted of willfully disobeying a lawful command of his superior
officer, uttering public statements designed to promote disloyalty and
disaffection, and making disrespectful and disloyal statements to en-
listed personnel.67  Levy refused to train Special Forces aidmen in
dermatology. He asserted that Special Forces personnel, including
aidmen, were involved in war crimes in Vietnam and that the act of
training these men would constitute complicity in such crimes. Levy
661. See generally United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
662. Quoted in Lifton, supra note 500, at 370.
663. Declaration Of Conscience Against The War In Vietnam, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
THEORY AND PRACTICE 160 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed. 1969).
664. Id.
665. A Call To Resist Illegitimate Authority in id. at 162.
666. Id. at 163.
667. LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE THE
DRAFT, THE WAR AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 69 (1979) (Figure 4).
668. Id. at 79.
669. Id. at 80. As protest mounted, it was customary to drop draft-related charges. Id.
at 80-1.
670. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 776, 778 (1st Cit. 1973), rev'd 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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also alleged that providing medical training to these personnel would
violate his Hippocratic Oath.671 In 1973, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that there was no evidence that the Special Forces
had systematically engaged in war crimes and rejected Levy's
contention:
At best, appellant could establish that individual American
personnel may have violated the law of war in Vietnam. How-
ever, there never was any showing that the medical training ap-
pellant was ordered to give had any connection whatsoever with
the perpetration of any war crime. Thus, appellant failed to
demonstrate how the existence of war crimes committed by indi-
viduals other than those he was ordered to train was relevant to
his failure to obey the order. Particularly relevant in this is that
he failed to show that Special Forces aidmen as a group, engaged
systematically in the commission of war crimes by prostituting
their medical training.
72
In Switkes v. Laird,6 3 Switkes, a psychiatrist, sought immedi-
ate discharge from the armed forces or, in the alternative a judicial
order enjoining him from being compelled to report to Vietnam. 74
Switkes contended that the Indochinese War was being prosecuted
in violation of international law. He specifically cited the indiscrimi-
nate killing of noncombatants, the use of chemical warfare, the vio-
lations of the rights of prisoners of war, pillage, denial of medical
care for enemy wounded, saturation bombing of populated areas,
and destruction of agricultural land. Switkes argued that if he was
transported to Vietnam that he "[would] be required to engage in,
and become an accomplice to, war crimes. 6 75 Switkes alleged that
there would be no practical and effective way to raise the law crimes
issue once he was transported to Vietnam.
67 6
The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to address Switkes'
contentions.
[E]ven if they were decided in favor of Switkes, he would not be
entitled to a preliminary injunction since there is no showing of
any damage to him. The damage claimed is that he will become
671. Id. at 797. The law officer heard evidence outside the presence of the members of
the court-martial on the question of war crimes in Vietnam. He ruled:
[A]lthough there perhaps occurred instances of needless brutality in the Viet-
nam War, nevertheless, there was "no evidence that would render this order to
train aidmen illegal on the grounds that eventually these men would become
engaged in war crimes or in some other way prostitute their medical training by
employing it in crimes against humanity.
Id. Levy's anti-war statements and views are recorded in id. at 778-79 n.1.
672. Id. at 797.
673. Switkes v: Laird, 316 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
674. Id. at 360.
675. Id. at 365.
676. Id.
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a war criminal. This is so unlikely as to require rejection of his
claim. If he were a combat soldier or combat officer, the matter
would stand differently. Switkes, however, is a medical officer
specializing in psychiatry.
If war crimes are being committed in Indochina, not every
member of the armed forces there is an accomplice to those
crimes.
677
Thus, the federal courts of appeals ruled that neither Levy nor
Switkes was able to demonstrate that he would be implicated in war
crimes. Neither training military personnel nor mere service in Viet-
nam was considered sufficient to constitute criminal liability. Some
argued that the courts had adopted an overly narrow interpretation
of the evolving requirements of the Nuremberg judgment. It was
pointed out that "in a higher sense, the Nuremberg law implicitly
approves and demands efforts not to participate in objectively illegal
acts, even by individuals who would not be personally punishable be-
cause they would commit them under pressures. 6 78 Under such a
broad interpretation, the involvement of both Levy and Switkes in
supporting the military effort in Vietnam might be viewed as consti-
tuting "complicity" in the commission of war crimes.6 79
A number of individuals outside the military were morally com-
pelled to protest war crimes and engaged in acts of civil disobedi-
ence. Courts uniformly rejected claims that these actions were le-
gally justified. 8 In United States v. O'Brien,6 81 O'Brien and three
companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates to
vividly proclaim their opposition to the war and to influence others to
reevaluate their positions.6 82 The Court rejected O'Brien's claim that
his action was protected symbolic speech.6 83 According to the Court,
a law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates "no
more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law
prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibit-
ing the destruction of books and records." '84 Justice Warren con-
cluded that the "many functions performed by Selective Service cer-
tificates establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and
substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained de-
677. Id.
678. 'The Nuremberg Trials and Objection to Military Service in Viet-Nam, 66 PROC.
AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 140, 172 (1969) (comments of Professor John E. Fried).
679. Army Field Manual, supra note 399, at 189, para. 500 (punishing conspiracy, di-
rect incitement, attempts to commit as well as complicity in the commission of war crimes,
crimes against humanity and crimes against the peace).
680. See generally MICHAEL FERBER & STAUGHTON LYND, THE RESISTANCE (1971).
681. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
682. Id. at 369-70.
683. Id. at 376-80.
684. Id. at 375.
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struction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing peo-
ple who knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them." '685
The Court's dismissal of O'Brien's first amendment claim was
not thoroughly convincing. 686 In 1965, at the time Congress voted to
punish the burning of certificates, such conduct already was punisha-
ble under the "nonpossession" provision of the Selective Service
Act.687 Congress' stated purpose in adopting the 1965 amendment
was to deter the public destruction of draft cards and registration
certificates which it believed encouraged individuals to defy the
draft. 88 It certainly could not be contended that the destruction of a
certificate which merely recited basic demographic information mer-
ited the specified punishment of a ten thousand dollar fine or impris-
onment of five years, or both.689 The judiciary clearly feared that the
extension of first amendment protection to the burning of registra-
tion certificates would encourage even more extreme acts of anti-war
protest. What would be next, queried the Second Court of Appeals,
"turning on water faucets, dumping of garbage in front of City Hall,
stalling cars at an event attracting heavy traffic, burning an Ameri-
can flag on a street corner, or tearing up on television a court order
or a document required to be kept under internal revenue regula-
tions."6 90 Their first amendment claim having been rejected, dis-
obedients invoked other promising criminal defenses.
In State v. Marley,69' Marley, an absent without leave
(AWOL) sailor, and seven other defendants entered and occupied
the offices of the Honeywell Corporation to protest Honeywell's man-
ufacture of anti-personnel weapons being used in Vietnam. The de-
fendants were arrested and convicted of trespass.69 ' The Supreme
Court of Hawaii rejected the defendants' claim of necessity.6 93 The
Court ruled that the harm sought to be prevented by the defendants
could not be considered imminent since it was occurring several
thousand miles away. In addition, it was not reasonable for the de-
fendants to believe that their actions would halt Honeywell's produc-
tion of war material. Finally, the Supreme Court of Hawaii deter-
685. Id. at 380.
686. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 380.
687. Id. at 371.
688. Id. at 387-88.
689. Id. at 387.
690. United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911
(1966), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 917 (1967).
691. State v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095 (Hawaii, 1973).
692. Id. at 1099.
693. Id. at 1109.
In essence, the "necessity" defense exonerates persons who commit a crime
under the "pressure of circumstances," if the harm that would have resulted
from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actu-
ally resulting from the defendants' breach of the law.
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mined that there was no necessity to violate the law since
noncriminal avenues of protest were available to the defendants to
enable them to dramatize and terminate the conduct which they rea-
sonably believed to be harmful. 94 Thus, "[e]ven assuming that Hon-
eywell is a war criminal, the applicable law does not give these de-
fendants either a right or a duty to be present without invitation on
the Honeywell premises." '695
The Marley Court also rejected the so-called Nuremberg de-
fense--the defendants' contention that they were obligated to act to
prevent the commission of Nuremberg crimes. The Supreme Court
of Hawaii ruled that they were prevented by the political question
doctrine from inquiring into whether the United States government
was violating its "own treaty obligations. '696 In addition, the Court
ruled that ordinary citizens and soldiers were not liable under Nu-
remberg and consequently did not possess a duty to act to prevent
the commission of war crimes. As a result, the defendants were
deemed to lack standing to raise the Nuremberg defense.697
In United States v. Berrigan,698 the defendants were charged
with the destruction of draft records. They contended that their ac-
tions were justified by their good motive-the halting of an "im-
moral and illegal" conflict in which the United States was "violating
certain precepts of international law, constitutional law, and judg-
ments which were handed down at Nuremberg."6 99 The District
Court ruled that "once the commission of a crime is estab-
lished-the doing of a prohibited act with the necessary intent-proof
of a good motive will not save the accused from conviction."700 The
Court explained that:
No civilized nation can endure where a citizen can select what
law he would obey because of his moral or religious belief. It
matters not how worthy his motives may be. It is axiomatic that
chaos would exist if an individual were permitted to impose his
beliefs upon others and invoke justification in a court to excuse
his transgression of a duly-enacted law.710
In rejecting the good motive defense, the Court noted that the rea-
sonableness of the defendants' belief that the government was acting
694. Id. at 1109. The defendants also sought to rely on the justification defense-the pre-
vention or termination of a crime by another. The Court, however, ruled that the crime must
take place in the defendants' presence. State v. Marley, 509 P.2d at 1108.
695. Id. at 1110.
696. Id. at 1110.
697. Id. at 1110-11.
698. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968), affd sub nom., United
States v. Ebherhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
699. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. at 338.
700. Id.
701. Id. at 339.
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illegally in Vietnam is irrelevant. "[F]or even if it were demonstrable
that the United States is committing violations of international law,
this violation by itself would afford the defendants no justifiable ba-
sis for their acts. ' '70 1 The defendants' belief concerning the legality
of United States conduct in Vietnam does not "go to the question
whether they sincerely and honestly believed that their acts were
lawful and thus negate the specific intent necessary for conviction,
namely willfulness. ' 703 In the related case of United States v. Moy-
lan'7 0 1 the Court noted that while a morally motivated act contrary
to the law may be ethically justified, the defendant must accept that
his act is neither legally justified nor immune from punishment.
70 5
Rulings in cases such as Marley and Berrigan were used as
precedents by other courts to prevent defendants from invoking de-
fenses which relied upon the United States' commission of war
crimes in Vietnam as a justification for their putatively criminal
acts.70 1 In United States v. Dougherty707 members of the so-called
"D.C. Nine" entered and vandalized the offices of Dow Chemical
Company to protest and halt Dow's manufacture of napalm which
was used to commit alleged war crimes in Vietnam. 708 The defend-
ants appealed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury of their
right to disregard the law and to acquit the defendants. 70 9 The de-
fendants argued that recognition of the jury's inherent and demo-
cratic right to acquit the defendants based upon considerations of
equity, morality, and the community's sense of justice was an indis-
pensable check against prosecutorial and judicial abuse. 10
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized the his-
702. Id.
703. Id. at 340 [italics omitted]. The Berrigan court also rejected the Nuremberg de-
fense. It held that the defendants lacked standing to raise the defense. United States v. Berri-
gan, 283 F. Supp. at 341. The Court also held that the legality of United States conduct under
international law was a political question. Id. at 342.
Whether the actions by the executive and the legislative branches in utilizing our
armed forces are in accord with international law is a question which necessarily
must be left to the elected representatives of the people and not to the judiciary.
This is so even if the government's actions are contrary to valid treaties to which
the government is a signatory.
Id. at 342.
704. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
910 (1970) (several of the defendants in Berrigan participated in another action involving the
destruction of draft records).
705. Id. at 1008. Religious motive also was rejected as a defense. See United States v.
Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1971).
706. See United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972) (defendants not legally
justified in attempting to seize and destroy selective service records as a protest against the
Vietnam War).
707. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C.C. 1972).
708. Id. at 1116-17.
709. Id. at 1117, 1130.
710. Id. at 1,130-32.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
torical prerogative of jury nullification."' The Court, however, ar-
gued that the jury is well-aware of its right to depart from the re-
quirements of the law. The issuance of a nullification instruction
only would encourage the frequent and casual invocation of this priv-
ilege and lead to the denigration of the law.7 2 According to the
Court, jurors already experience extreme difficulty in reaching an
agreement on verdicts without imposing the additional burden of
evaluating the merits of various legal rules. Thus "[w]hat makes for
health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily
diet."
713
Judge David Bazelon, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
argued that jury nullification permits the jury to introduce a sense of
"fairness and particularized justice . . . .The very essence of the
jury's function is its role as spokesman for the community conscience
in determining whether or not blame can be imposed. ' 714 He admon-
ished his brethren:
If revulsion against the war in Southeast Asia has reached a
point where a jury would be unwilling to convict a defendant for
commission of the acts alleged here, we would be far better ad-
vised to ponder the implications of that result than to spend our
time devising stratagems which let us pretend that the power of




Judges thus effectively closed the courtroom to evidence con-
cerning war crimes in Vietnam. They refused to permit defendants
to transform the judicial forum into a platform for the articulation
of what they viewed as political grievances. 71 Some defendants lost
faith in the ability of the judicial system to fairly adjudicate the
claims of war resisters. They began to directly challenge judges and
disrupt the courtroom. 71 7 Some suggested that those judges who re-
fused to permit war resisters to present a defense, like their German
counterparts, were in complicity with war crimes.718 One law profes-
sor proclaimed that such "moral indignation" was a "reaction to real
inequities and iniquities. The halls of justice must themselves, be
711. Id. at 1132.
712. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135.
713. Id. at 1136.
714. Id. at 1142 (Bazelon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
715. Id. at 1144.
716. See id. at 1144-46 (Adams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
717. In Re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d
345 (7th Cir. 1972).
718. The Justice Trial, 6 LAW REiP. OF TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 49 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n American Mil. Trib. Nuremberg, Germany 1947). "The very essence of the
prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitler decrees and the draconic, corrupt, and perverted
Nazi judicial system themselves constituted the substance of war crimes and crimes against
humanity and that participation in the enactment and enforcement of them amounts to com-
plicity in crime." Id.
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cleansed before those who are dragged inside them may be expected
to show any respect." '719 The Supreme Court responded to this chal-
lenge in Illinois v. Allen.720 The Court proclaimed that the "citadels
of justice" cannot and must not be "infected with the. . . scurrilous,
abusive language and conduct. '721 The Court authorized judges to
cite disruptive defendants for contempt and, if necessary, to bind and
gag or to remove them from the courtroom.
7 22
Others pointed to the unfairness of prosecuting civil dis-
obedients for protesting a war whose legality remained uncertain and
open to debate.723 Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin called for a
tolerant attitude towards resisters, arguing it offended due process to
prosecute and convict offenders at the same time that courts were
invoking the political question doctrine to avoid adjudicating the le-
gality of the war.724 Dworkin argued that it simply was "unfair to
punish men for disobeying a doubtful law. ' 725 Others forthrightly
called for courts to recognize individuals' Nuremberg Privilege to
halt the Vietnam War and contended that acts of civil disobedience
against the war were legally justifiable expressions of their preroga-
tive to protest and to halt war crimes. 726 Richard Falk argued that
Nuremberg was both a sword to prosecute war criminals and a
shield which protected those who acted to uphold the rule of interna-
tional law. 727 He argued that
there are grounds to maintain that anyone who believes or has
reason to believe that a war is being waged in violation of mini-
mal cannons of law and morality has an obligation of conscience
to resist participation in and support of that war effort by every
means at his disposal. In that respect, the Nuremberg Principles
provide guidelines for citizens' conscience and a shield that can
be used in the domestic legal system to interpose obligations
under international law between the government and members
of the society.
72
The judiciary, however, refused to modify its formalistic ap-
proach to the adjudication of protest cases. Judges felt compelled to
719. Graham Hughes, In Defense of Disruption, 30 THE ANTIOCH REV. 171, 176
(1970).
720. 397 U.S. 337 (1969).
721. Id. at 347.
722. Id. at 344.
723. See generally Hughes, supra note 378.
724. Ronald Dworkin, Civil Disobedience, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206 (1977).
725. Id. at 221.
726. Richard A. Falk, THE CIRCLE OF RESPONSIBILITY, in Falk, Kolko & Lifton, supra
note 382, at 222, 229-30.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 230. See also Richard A. Falk, The Nuremberg Defense in the Pentagon
Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 208 (1974). But see Charles E. Patterson, The
Principles Of Nuremberg As A Defense To Civil Disobedience, 37 Mo. L. REV. 33 (1972).
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support the war effort and tended to view dissenters as unpatriotic. 29
In his opinion in United States v. Sisson,730 Judge Charles E.
Wyzanski recognized the bias inherent in domestic courts and con-
ceded that:
It is inherent in a tribunal composed partly of judges drawn
from the alleged offending nation that a wholly disinterested
judgment is most unlikely to be achieved . . [A] domestic
tribunal is entirely unfit to adjudicate the question whether there
has been a violation of international law during a war by the
very nation which created, manned, and compensated the tribu-
nal seized of the case.
73
1
Courts expressed the fear that judicial tolerance of civil disobedience
would lead to anarchy.73 2 Yet, protesters merely were insisting that
the rule of law should be respected at home as well as abroad.7 3
Was it protesters or the United States disregard for the law in Viet-
nam which was eroding respect for the legal system? The Govern-
ment clearly was willing to apply all its legal resources and to com-
promise fundamental legal protections in order to dampen domestic
protest against the war. The aphorism used in Vietnam, "that we
had to destroy the country in order to save it," at times seemed to
capture the government's approach to the American constitutional
system. In New York Times v. United States,73' Justice Black noted
the dangerous implications of President Nixon's attempt to impose a
prior restraint upon the Washington Post and New York Times'
publication of the Pentagon Papers.7"5
To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the pub-
lication of news by resort to .the courts would wipe out the First
Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of
the very people the Government hopes to make "secure." No
one can read the history of the adoption of the First Amendment
without being convinced beyond any doubt that it was injunc-
tions like those sought here that Madison and his collaborators
intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.
The word "security" is a broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law
embodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military
and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative
729. See generally MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
TIMES OF WAR 113-56 (1990).
730. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968).
731. Id. at 517.
732. See JOHN F. BANNAN & ROSEMARY S. BANNAN. LAW, MORALITY AND VIETNAM
THE PEACE MILITANTS AND THE COURTS 186-87 (1974).
733. Id. at 15.
734. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
735. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
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government provides no real security for our Republic'i'
In sum, during the Vietnam War Lady Justice had a schizo-
phrenic personality. The law of war was applied on rare and infre-
quent occasions against those who committed war crimes in Viet-
nam73 7 while high-echelon civilian and military leadership largely
were immune from legal accountability.7 3 8 In contrast, those who vi-
olated the law in an effort to protest or to halt war crimes were sub-
jected to prosecution. Courts, in rejecting dissidents' legal defenses,
explained that civil disobedients threatened to erode the rule of
law. 73 9 Robert Lifton observed that the effort to silence dissent was
an expression of America's psychological need to avoid confronting
the consequences of the Vietnam War--an effort to muffle the mes-
sage by massacring the messenger.
7 40
III. Conclusion: Vietnam and War Crimes
The history of Vietnam is characterized by a continual effort to
assert self-determination against a succession of foreign powers
which attempted to dominate the country. America found itself
bogged down in a guerilla war and responded by relentlessly escalat-
ing the conflict.
The domestic debate over the war within the legal profession
centered on the legality of the America effort in Vietnam. The or-
ganized Bar and the Government viewed the American effort as a
justified exercise of collective self-determination. Opponents of the
war, in contrast, argued that the United States was illegally inter-
vening in a civil war. These differing conceptions of the war provided
the foundation upon which technical legal arguments were con-
structed. The American judiciary refused to enter into the political
thicket and to definitively determine the legality of the war. This
perpetuated the uncertainty concerning the justification for the war
and sent a strong signal to civilian and military officials that they
were free to prosecute the war free of legal constraint. As a result,
little effort was made to justify the legality of military strategies and
tactics.
The United States proceeded to launch a virtually unparalleled
war of annihilation against a third world rural society. Atrocities
such as My Lai were portrayed as the exception. However, such
massacres arguably were the norm. The occasional prosecution of
American GI's diverted attention from the fact that there was a
736. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
737. See generally supra notes 497-570 and accompanying text.
738. See generally supra notes 571-656 and accompanying text.
739. See generally supra notes 670-715 and accompanying text.
740. LiFroN, supra note 500, at 360-61.
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yawning gap between the.United States formal adherence to the hu-
manitarian law of armed conflict and the reality of the Vietnam
War. The law of war largely was ignored and violated with
impunity.
The Nuremberg Tribunal generally limited liability to high-ech-
elon officials.74 In his opening argument, Robert Jackson empha-
sized that these were the people with "brains. ' 742 The men of a "sta-
tion and rank which does not soil its own hands with blood ...
[who] knew how to use lesser folk as tools .. . [these were] the
planners and designers, the inciters and leaders. '743 In contrast, the
few American war crimes trials which occurred during Vietnam fo-
cused on the crimes committed by ordinary combatants and low-level
officers. Those who planned and directed the strategies and tactics
which -led to these crimes were not held accountable. At Nuremberg,
Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom em-
phasized that the moral "guilt of Germany will not be erased for the
people of Germany share it in large measure. "'74 Many Americans
refused to silently witness the crimes of their country in Vietnam.
Yet, it was precisely those who protested and refused to participate
in the war who were singled out for criminal prosecution and
punishment.
It is ironic that we continue to concern ourselves with bringing
Nazi war criminals to justice while we overlook that those responsi-
ble for crimes in Indochina continue to occupy positions of respect
and responsibility in the United States. 74 5 Can we expect other na-
tions to abide by international humanitarian law when we persist in
refusing to apply it to ourselves? It is striking that during the Viet-
nam War the war crimes issue largely was ignored by the American
legal profession and by international legal scholars. 46 Intellectuals
generally focused on the more cerebrally challenging, but less vital
question of the legality of United States intervention in Vietnam.747
The political history of the war currently is being written by the
741. Trial Of The Major War Criminals, supra note 600, at 467-68. the Tribunal lim-
ited liability to high echelon officials who were present at planning sessions for wars of aggres-
sion. Id.
742. II THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 600 at 104.
743. Id. at 105.
744. XIX TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 600, at 434.
745. See generally James W. Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War
Criminals: International Law, Immigration Law, and the Need for International Cooperation,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 793 (1985).
746. But see Vietnam And The Nuremberg Principles: A Colloquy On War Crimes, 5
RUT-CAM. L.J. 1 (1973). See also LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE THE VIETNAM EX-
PERIENCE (Peter D. Trooboff & Arthur J. Goldberg eds. 1975). A compilation of accounts of
war crimes as reported by Vietnam veterans is contained in Vietnam Veterans Against the
War, THE WiNTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES
(1972).
747. See generally supra notes 264-302 and accompanying text.
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Americans and little attention is being paid to the price paid by the
Vietnamese. 48 There are no major memorials to the mass of inno-
cent Asian victims. Americans seems to be searching for vindication
rather than confronting their culpability for war crimes. The reality
is that most Americans during the Vietnam War, like the "masses of
the home-loving German people," were "more content to have a lit-
tle garden in which to grow a plant or two" than to face the reality
of their country's military policies.749 Yet, as observed by an Ameri-
can war crimes tribunal following World War II, "[n]o one can
shrug off so appalling a moral responsibility with the statement that
there was no point in trying. "750
748. It is striking how little attention is paid to American war crimes in the contempo-
rary political histories of the war. See generally KARNOW, supra note 44.
749. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 639, at 485.
750. Id. at 482.
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